El Secretario de\u00a0Defensa\u00a0de la US Air Force ha hecho de la\u00a0detecci\u00f3n y seguimiento de misiles, una prioridad de su gesti\u00f3n. Adem\u00e1s,\u00a0las diferentes agencias del Pent\u00e1gono est\u00e1n trabajando en una serie de esfuerzos y programas para que esa capacidad pueda ser ejecutada con sistemas satelitales desde el espacio.\u00a0La recientemente creada SPACE FORCE ha presentado un\u00a0importante trabajo\u00a0sobre el tema\u00a0de \u201cAFA Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies\u201d, en el que se realizan propuestas para integrar en un solo Sistema Multi-Orbital, los diferentes desarrollos que cada una de las Fuerzas y agencias llevan adelante y que genera innecesaria dispersi\u00f3n de recursos y capacidades.<\/p>\n
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has made\u00a0missile warning and tracking a priority<\/a>\u00a0of his tenure, and agencies across the Pentagon are working on a number of efforts to handle that mission from space.<\/p>\n But instead of relying on a less coordinated approach, one that forces programs to compete for funds, the Defense Department\u2014and particularly the Space Force\u2014would be better served by integrating their efforts into one multi-orbit system,\u00a0a new study from AFA\u2019s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies<\/a>\u00a0recommends.<\/p>\n The issue is especially urgent because of the continued proliferation of new kinds of missiles, said the study\u2019s author, Christopher Stone, during a virtual event June 7. Technologies such as hypersonic weapons and\u00a0fractional orbital bombardment systems<\/a>\u00a0exploit gaps in the U.S.\u2019s current missile tracking infrastructure so that the weapons can\u2019t be tracked completely by radars on the ground.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the\u00a0Space Based Infrared System<\/a>, flying in highly elliptical and geosynchronous Earth orbits, provides good missile warning, Stone said, but lacks the fidelity for persistent tracking.<\/p>\n Persistently tracking missiles from the moment of their launch to their landing is crucial, said Col. Miguel A. Cruz, commander of the Space Force\u2019s missile warning delta, Space Delta 4, during the virtual event.<\/p>\n \u201cMissile warning is about bells ringing, missiles are coming, duck and cover, right?\u201d Cruz said. \u201cMissile tracking is about custody of a target. It\u2019s about being able to look at that target and pass that information to a shooter that will engage it. And so there\u2019s a nuance there. I think in our culture, as we\u2019re moving forward [we\u2019re having] the realization that we\u2019re not just bell-ringers, that we\u2019re actually contributing to a much broader engagement.\u201d<\/p>\n When it comes to missile tracking, \u201cthe good news is that we have three different entities in government looking at this problem,\u201d Stone told reporters in a June 6 briefing. \u201cThey\u2019re looking at it, though, from a competitive vantage point, not an integrated development [vantage point].\u201d<\/p>\n The Space Development Agency, scheduled to transfer to the Space Force later this year, has already spent years working on the National Defense Space Architecture, a massive constellation of hundreds of satellites in low Earth orbit for missile warning, communications, data coverage and sharing, and other uses.<\/p>\n The launch timeline for the Tracking Layer of the NDSA, which will handle missile warning and tracking, places it in\u00a0orbit by 2025 or 2026<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Space Force, meanwhile, is working on the Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared System, the eventual\u00a0replacement<\/a>\u00a0to SBIRS that will also fly in highly elliptical and geosynchronous Earth orbits. The service is also working on a network of satellites to go in medium Earth orbit.<\/p>\n Finally, the Missile Defense Agency is working on its own missile tracking system, the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor. Like the NDSA, the HBTSS would consist of satellites in low Earth orbit. The first two satellite prototypes are scheduled to launch in March 2023.<\/p>\n And while MDA director Vice Adm. Jon A. Hill has told lawmakers he wants\u00a0HBTSS to integrate<\/a>\u00a0into the SDA\u2019s Tracking Layer, Stone noted that \u201cthey initially were not designed that way\u201d and remain as separate line items in the budget.<\/p>\n Rather than let those programs continue to develop separately, competing for funding, Stone\u2019s study recommends combining elements from each to form an architecture with satellites in every orbit.<\/p>\n \u201cEach of those organizations view their project as the answer, and that it\u2019s resilient and cost-effective and everything and that everybody else\u2019s is not, and that\u2019s just part of the industry competition, no problem,\u201d Stone said. \u201cBut I think it would be best if we took \u2026 a little bit of all these things, and we would have the capability, I believe, to achieve all those required attributes that\u2019s lacking in today\u2019s system.\u201d<\/p>\n The advantages of such an approach are clear, said Davin Swanson, chief engineer in space and C2 systems for Raytheon Intelligence & Space.<\/p>\n \u201cThere\u2019s the resiliency aspect, mainly through orbital diversity of the multi-layered approach,\u201d Swanson said. \u201cHaving a multi-layered approach allows you to tune the sensor designs of each layer according to the optimal portion of that missile warning, missile tracking requirement set, depending on the orbit that that sensor is in. And it requires and it allows a shift away from the current paradigm of a small number of exquisite high-value assets to a more proliferated architecture where you\u2019ve got more vehicles, different orbits.\u201d<\/p>\n With the wider coverage of higher orbits and the higher fidelity of lower ones, such a system would ensure persistent missile warning and tracking, Stone and Swanson said. And it would also address the need for resiliency,\u00a0an attribute emphasized by Space Force leaders<\/a>, especially as countries such as China and Russia have demonstrated kinetic and\u00a0non-kinetic threats<\/a>.<\/p>\n \u201cJust having hundreds of targets at LEO is not sufficient with an adversary who\u2019s building a deep magazine of kinetic weapons and a multi-layered attack architecture across the spectrum,\u201d Stone said. \u201cWe need to be able to plan for a survivable construct that can live through that sort of thing. And so instead of just having everything in one orbit, with everybody\u2019s targets there to be hit, it\u2019s best to have multiple layers and have a defense in depth approach.\u201d<\/p>\n Stone also argued that if satellites in different orbits are integrated and work together, it will reduce the number of satellites needed overall\u2014the Tracking Layer is currently slated to\u00a0start with 28<\/a>\u00a0and expand, and the planned MEO constellation could have 36 or more.<\/p>\n \u201cIf you want to do it the way that I recommended, you \u2026 don\u2019t have to have the hundreds of satellites at LEO, the 36-plus at MEO, and five at GEO. You\u2019ll need the five at GEO to have the global coverage, but as you go lower, as you integrate them all into one system, just three different orbits, you\u2019ll need less satellites,\u201d Stone said.<\/p>\n However, Stone also pushed for those satellites to be equipped with more advanced technology to increase their survivability against anti-satellite weapons. Such technology could include new propulsion methods and systems, or perhaps decoy satellites, he said.<\/p>\n Such additions, though, would drive up cost\u2014an issue that retired Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, Explorer Chair of the Mitchell Institute, predicted would be the biggest hurdle to implementing Stone\u2019s recommendations.<\/p>\n \u201cI don\u2019t think technology will be the pacing factor. I think the technology is there, and I think we will continue to improve it, and with this architecture, we\u2019ll be able to update it more easily with reduced launch costs,\u201d Chilton said. \u201cFunding is always going to be cussed and discussed at [top levels of government]. \u2026 It\u2019s a risk trade-off about how much you\u2019re going to put up and how you\u2019re going to do it. And so I think that\u2019s where the big debates will be. But at the end of the day, there won\u2019t be a debate on the need for these capabilities, in my view.\u201d<\/p>\n