Las fuerzas rusas han interferido regularmente las se\u00f1ales del Sistema de Posicionamiento Global de EE. UU. como parte de sus operaciones contra Ucrania. Estas se\u00f1ales son la base de muchos aspectos de la guerra moderna, desde la navegaci\u00f3n de drones de vigilancia y la orientaci\u00f3n de misiles hasta la habilitaci\u00f3n de radios m\u00f3viles. Despu\u00e9s de que Rusia demostr\u00f3 que pod\u00eda destruir un sat\u00e9lite en el espacio, se dijo que la naci\u00f3n podr\u00eda \u201ccegar a la OTAN\u201d derribando todos los sat\u00e9lites GPS. Sin embargo, la interferencia rusa del GPS en Ucrania no ha sido tan agresiva como esperaban muchos observadores militares.<\/p>\n
Russian forces have been regularly jamming signals from the U.S. Global Positioning System as part of its war on Ukraine. These signals underlie many aspects of modern warfare, from navigating surveillance drones and targeting missiles to enabling mobile radios.<\/p>\n
The importance of GPS as a military tool was underscored by Kremlin media in November as troops were massing along the Ukraine border. After Russia demonstrated it could destroy a satellite in space, a television commentator known to be an unofficial mouthpiece of President Vladimir Putin said the nation could \u201cblind NATO\u201d by shooting down all GPS satellites.<\/p>\n
Despite this, Russian interference with GPS in Ukraine has not been nearly as aggressive as many observers had expected.<\/p>\n
Experts within the GPS\/positioning, navigation, and timing communities have proposed a number of possible reasons for this. Here are the most prevalent, all of which are based entirely on publicly available information:<\/p>\n
Russia\u2019s electronic warfare capability isn\u2019t as good as it was thought to be.<\/b>\u00a0Russian forces have a fearsome reputation when it comes to electronic warfare. And they go out of their way to reinforce this. At one point, the state-owned news agency\u00a0Sputnik proclaimed Russian EW capabilities \u201crender aircraft carriers useless.\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n The popular wisdom is that they have developed and maintained this capability as a response to superior technology used by Western forces. Electronic warfare can be an inexpensive way to level the playing field.<\/p>\n Since Russian forces have been surprisingly less capable than expected in other aspects of the Ukraine conflict, some think this may be true with their ability to interfere with GPS.<\/p>\n Most observers discount this suggestion, though.<\/p>\n They point out that Russian forces regularly jam GPS signals in northern Norway from locations far across the border. And that in some cases this jamming has been so precise, signals in a nearby frequency band from Russia\u2019s GLONASS satellite navigation system have been unaffected.<\/p>\n Russia has clearly demonstrated impressive abilities to spoof GPS over wide areas. Users in downtown Moscow often find their equipment falsely reporting they are at an airport. The same is true in many coastal areas, the Black Sea and other locations where senior government officials are to be found.<\/p>\n A 2016 Moscow Times headline read \u201cThe Kremlin eats GPS for Breakfast<\/a>.\u201d The general consensus in the community is that there has been a lot of evidence to support that claim.<\/p>\n The question is then, why is the Kremlin only nibbling at GPS in Ukraine?<\/p>\n Russian forces use and need GPS.\u00a0<\/b>Proponents of this idea point to downed\u00a0Russian fighter jets found to have GPS receivers<\/a>\u00a0taped to their dashboards.<\/p>\n Signals from Russia\u2019s GLONASS system and terrestrial Chayka electronic navigation system are both available for use in Ukraine. Yet it seems likely there not enough compatible receivers for these systems to equip all Russian forces. As the world\u2019s first global navigation satellite system, GPS receivers have become both plentiful and inexpensive. Cheap GPS receivers and some duct tape seems like an interim solution for some poorly equipped Russians.<\/p>\n Also, GPS signals support a wide variety of infrastructure. Telecommunications, the internet, electrical grids and machine-control systems all rely on GPS for timing. Russian forces may wish to protect Ukraine\u2019s infrastructure for their own benefit and use. Prolonged and widespread attacks on GPS signals could cause serious infrastructure problems with long-term strategic downsides greater than any temporary tactical gains.<\/p>\n High-power, persistent GPS jammers are easily targeted.<\/b>\u00a0Any strong and consistent radio frequency transmission can be easily located and attacked. Many militaries have missiles specially designed to home in on and destroy jamming transmitters. Even without such weapons, direction-finding technology can pinpoint a transmitter enabling an artillery attack or an air or ground assault. Russian commanders may be limiting transmission power and time on air to avoid attracting hostile fire.<\/p>\n Ukraine is less impacted.\u00a0<\/b>While Ukraine is increasingly receiving and using more Western weapons, many of which use GPS, it also has\u00a0huge stockpiles of Soviet-era weapons<\/a>. These don\u2019t rely on GPS and are likely unaffected by most, if not all, forms of electronic warfare. Also, Ukrainian regular and irregular forces are likely less reliant upon sophisticated command, control and communications systems used by larger militaries. Thus, GPS jamming that could hamper normal operations for the U.S. and NATO may have less impact in Ukraine.<\/p>\n Saving the best to use against the U.S. and NATO.\u00a0<\/b>Despite the location of the conflict, Ukraine is not the enemy Vladimir Putin is really worried about. His concerns focus on the U.S. and NATO. Deploying Russia\u2019s most sophisticated and powerful electronic weapons in Ukraine would enable adversaries to study technologies and tactics. This would lead to the development of countermeasures and make the weapons less effective in future conflicts.<\/p>\n Better for Russia to keep its best tools and tricks for interfering with GPS in reserve, for use later against larger forces and more important targets.<\/p>\n Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation and serves on the U.S. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.<\/i><\/p>\n