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China in recent years has made rapid advances in missile technology, part of a broader national drive to build\u00a0<\/b>a \u201cworld-class military\u201d on par with leading defense powers like the United States by 2049, the centenary of the People\u2019s Republic of China.<\/p>\n\n
Though CAAA is not on\u00a0<\/b>the Entity List, the \u201cmissile catchall\u201d provision should bar American software from being sent to it if the exporter or one of its resellers had knowledge that the software was going to be used for missile development, experts said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
\u201cU.S. export controls require a license for the export of any type of software, hardware or technology to China if there is knowledge that it would be used to develop a missile or other item used for weapons of mass destruction,\u201d said Kevin Wolf, a former senior official at the Commerce Department\u2019s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) who is now a partner at Akin Gump and advises clients on export controls. \u201cAnd that license would generally be denied.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Other experts said CAAA should be on the Entity List.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u201cFor at least the past seven years, CAAA has been a core contributor to the development of China\u2019s hypersonic and other advanced missile programs as a hub of rocket design, test and wind tunnel expertise in China,\u201d said Nathan Picarsic, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and co-founder of the geostrategic consulting firm Horizon Advisory. \u201cSimply put, CAAA helps the Chinese military develop advanced missiles.\u201d<\/p>\nWorkers stand near missiles produced by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. displayed during the 13th China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai in southern China’s Guangdong province in September 2021. (Ng Han Guan\/AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n
Zona chief executive P.C. Chen said he had no knowledge of a sale of\u00a0<\/b>its aeroelasticity simulation software \u2014 a type of aerodynamics software \u2014 directly to CAAA. He said that Zona had in the past sold the software to Hifar Technologies, the Beijing-based military technology supplier that,\u00a0<\/b>according to a contract award document,\u00a0<\/b>resold it\u00a0<\/b>to CAAA. Zona\u2019s China distributor, Jon Ding, who runs Georgia-based 2D Technology, said he licensed Zona software to Hifar in 2019.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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Hifar makes no secret that it sells software and consulting services to Chinese missile groups. It lists more than 50 military groups and suppliers as \u201ccooperation partners\u201d on its website, including CAAA, the China Air to Air Missile Research Institute, the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, and the People\u2019s Liberation Army\u2019s missile group, the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Asked whether he checked that all the clients Hifar has sold Zona software to weren\u2019t military entities, Ding said, \u201cI didn\u2019t, because they promised me and I trust them, so I don\u2019t do this kind of tracking.\u201d He said he warned Hifar not to sell to restricted groups.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Wolf, the former BIS official, said that if a distributor listed a number of military groups, including missile groups, in China as partners, that would be a \u201cbright, bright, bright red flag.\u201d If the company shipped software to such a distributor without addressing the red flags or getting a license, there could be a\u00a0<\/b>violation of the regulation, he said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
\u201cAn additional question is whether the distributors in China had knowledge that the software would be used to help develop a missile,\u201d Wolf said. \u201cIf so, they could be\u00a0<\/b>liable because even foreign persons are required to comply with the U.S. export control rules when dealing with U.S.-origin items.\u201d<\/p>\nA projectile is launched from an unspecified location in China during long-range live-fire drills by the People’s Liberation Army, in a photo released on Aug. 4 by Xinhua News Agency. (Lai Qiaoquan\/Xinhua\/AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n
Experts said U.S. exporters should not rely on Chinese resellers to conduct due diligence and obtain the licenses required. \u201cIf your distributor, frankly, is in China, take what they tell you with a grain of salt and ensure you do your own due diligence,\u201d said Marwa Hassoun, a national security lawyer at ArentFox Schiff law firm who specializes in export controls.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Hifar did not respond to repeated requests for comment.\u00a0<\/b>The Post was unable to reach CAAA and other Chinese military groups named in this article.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
David Habib, legal counsel for Metacomp, said the firm has \u201cno knowledge of whether or how those companies have acquired Metacomp software or transferred it to others,\u201d referring to CAAA and another military group that government contract awards show received the technology, as well as two Chinese intermediaries that,\u00a0<\/b>according to award notices, sold the software. He said the firm is \u201cscrupulous in complying with U.S. export control laws and demands its customers comply as well.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
The Commerce Department, citing business confidentiality regulations, would not comment on any specific firm and whether it sought or was granted a license to export, or whether it was being investigated for a violation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Both Zona and Metacomp have contracts for research and development services with the U.S. Air Force, according to federal documents. Defense Department contractors are required to comply with applicable export controls and sanctions or risk losing the contract or even being blacklisted as a contractor.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Both companies have received grants from the Pentagon\u2019s Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR), which awards money to help develop technologies that the department hopes one day will aid America\u2019s own defense capabilities. Most of the SBIR-funded technologies are \u201cdual use,\u201d or have both civilian and military applications. Most SBIR contracts are for a three-month or up to two-year period, which covers the research and development phase and typically expires before the technologies go to market, according to officials at the Air Force, which runs the U.S. government\u2019s largest SBIR program.\u00a0<\/b>Zona and Metacomp have received $31.6 million and $13.9 million, respectively, from the program, according to award records.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
In a phone interview, Zona CEO Chen said he founded the company in 1988. In the mid-1990s, he said, with the help of SBIR grants, Zona began developing aeroelasticity software that is now marketed as Zaero and Zonair, the same technology that was sold through military supplier Hifar\u00a0<\/b>to CAAA.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
A \u2018technical blockade\u2019<\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n
The Post\u2019s analysis found that at least 50 purchasers in China were on Commerce\u2019s Entity List. Several of the sales were made through China intermediaries such as Hifar that acknowledge supplying Chinese military clients, according to an examination of their websites.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Some transactions involved software from the most prominent American companies in commercial aerospace design technology.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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In 2020, software made by the Pennsylvania firm Ansys Inc. was sold to the Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) through a subsidiary of its Chinese partner, Pera Global, according to procurement documents and company filings.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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BIT is one of China\u2019s top defense universities and\u00a0<\/b>was placed on the Entity List shortly before the sale occurred. In December, its research on the advanced physics of hypersonic vehicles was designated a \u201ckey research and development project\u201d by China\u2019s Science and Technology Ministry.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
The Pera Global subsidiary, Beijing Iwintall Technology Co. Ltd., won the contract to sell Ansys technology to BIT, according to contract award documents. On its website, Iwintall states that the computer-aided engineering technology it sells helps Chinese researchers, including those involved in hypersonics, more quickly develop domestic versions of foreign technology that is currently restricted under a \u201ctechnical blockade\u201d by \u201cdeveloped\u201d nations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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The software, Iwintall states, \u201ccan support research and development at a product\u2019s conceptual design stage and greatly expand the innovative solutions.\u201d The company also states that it has a \u201ccooperation alliance\u201d with Ansys and lists BIT as a client.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Pera and its subsidiary did not respond to repeated requests for comment.<\/p>\n
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The Post reviewed procurement documents related to seven other sales since 2020 of Ansys technology to Chinese groups that are either on the export blacklist or have known missile links,\u00a0<\/b>including through three other Chinese intermediaries that had no apparent link to Pera Global. These groups include the National University of Defense Technology, which is on the Entity List, and the China Air to Air Missile Research Institute in Luoyang, which develops long-range, high-precision missiles.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
In a statement to The Post, Ansys said it and its subsidiaries \u201chave no records of the indicated sales or shipments of our software products to, nor have we authorized the end-use by, the National University of Defense Technology, Luoyang Air to Air Missile Research group, or the Beijing Institute of Technology.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Ansys \u201cis committed to complying with all applicable U.S. export control laws and regulations\u201d and \u201cmaintain[s] a rigorous global trade compliance program,\u201d it said. The company said, however, that software \u201cpiracy has unfortunately become an industry-wide problem,\u201d suggesting that theft is one way the software might be winding up in the hands of unauthorized users.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Another major firm in this specialized industry is Siemens Digital Industries Software, an American unit of the German firm Siemens. Some of its software was purchased by the Beijing Institute of Technology in December 2020 through a Chinese reseller that is a Siemens partner, Transemic Information Technology Ltd., procurement documents show. The announcement that Transemic had won the contract for the sale was made a few days after the entity listing, according to a contract awards database. Beihang University, which like BIT is on Commerce\u2019s blacklist, also purchased Siemens technology in 2021 through a different reseller, according to the documents.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Transemic, like Hifar, openly advertises its work with China\u2019s military, and on its website said it is Siemens\u2019s \u201cfirst military industry partner\u201d in China to pass the company\u2019s certification process. It posted images of an August 2017 \u201cMilitary Industry Digitization Seminar\u201d it hosted for defense industry clients in Chengdu, which featured a speech from a Siemens China sales director.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Siemens declined to comment on its relationship with Transemic, the conference or sales to specific customers in China. In a statement, Siemens said it \u201cis committed to compliance with applicable national export controls regimes. We monitor our customer base to facilitate compliance with these regulations and proactively and routinely discontinue selling our software portfolio to entities subject to U.S. government restrictions.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Siemens Digital Industries Software announced an agreement in July to acquire Zona. In an email this month, Siemens said the sale was still pending. \u201cAll we can say at this time is all of our sales are governed by Siemens\u2019 comprehensive export compliance practices and our commitment to comply with U.S. export laws,\u201d the company said in a statement.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u2018Controls need to be expanded\u2019<\/strong><\/div>\nA second Chinese scientist involved in hypersonics research said that foreign technology acquired by one military research institute or private military supplier often flows freely to other research institutes, circumventing commercial transactions with U.S. suppliers. \u201cSo if one [researcher] says, \u2018Hey, I need some [software] for this project or this time period,\u2019 it\u2019s easy to share,\u201d the scientist said.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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The Post also found evidence of high-end optical hardware going to Chinese missile and military groups. Arizona-based 4D Technology Corp. makes interferometers \u2014 devices used to capture extremely accurate measurements in turbulent conditions. American researchers say they are used to gather data in hypersonic tests.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u201cThere\u2019s a bunch of different techniques in hypersonics where you use an interferometer to basically make measurements of turbulence and high-speed flow,\u201d said Chris Combs, an assistant professor at the University of Texas at San Antonio who specializes in hypersonic aerodynamics and wind tunnel testing.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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The company \u2014 which received more than $2.5 million in Pentagon SBIR grants from 2010 to 2017, according to the program\u2019s database \u2014 sold interferometer technology to the China Air to Air Missile Research Institute in January through its China distributor Opturn Company Ltd., according to a notice posted by the institute. The institute is not on the Entity List.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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4D and Opturn did not respond to requests for comment.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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\u201cIt\u2019s clear that controls need to be expanded for software and technology with uses in hypersonics,\u201d said Ian Stewart, executive director of Middlebury College\u2019s Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington. \u201cMore strategic entities need to be placed on the Entity List. And as a rule, sensitive goods or technology should never be sent to or sold through distributors.\u201d<\/p>\n
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The use of American software is also documented in presentations at military industry conferences in China.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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At a 2019 hypersonics conference in Inner Mongolia, a group of Chinese scientists listened to a Hifar Technologies representative give a keynote presentation on recent advances in Zona\u2019s aeroelasticity software Zonair and Zaero, according to a participant and an event description posted on Hifar\u2019s website.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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The conference was hosted by the China Aerodynamics Research and Development Center, a secretive organization headed by a PLA general that houses 18 wind tunnels. CARDC, which is located in a zone off-limits to foreigners in Mianyang, a city in southwest China known for nuclear weapons research, was placed on the Entity List in 1999 for aiding missile proliferation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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Members of the Chinese Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics \u2014 one of the groups behind the 2021 hypersonic test \u2014 were at the event, according to the participant. A month after the conference, the group purchased Zona aeroelasticity software through Hifar.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
Fuente:<\/strong> https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u201cEn este caso, la tecnolog\u00eda estadounidense es superior: no podemos hacer ciertas cosas sin tecnolog\u00eda extranjera\u201d, dijo un cient\u00edfico chino que trabaja en un laboratorio… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":11071,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,37],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11070"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11070"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11070\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11074,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11070\/revisions\/11074"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/11071"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11070"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11070"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11070"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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