The decision to keep the space review under wraps is sprinkled\u00a0with more than a little irony.<\/p>\n
First, one of the issues on the table during the review itself was the\u00a0long-running DoD effort to\u00a0break down the wall of secrecy<\/a>\u00a0that long has surrounded national security space. The lack of an unclassified version also contrasts with the fact that the the Pentagon just Thursday released unclassified versions of the\u00a0Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the Missile Defense Review (MDR)<\/a>\u00a0that both included a focus on increased Chinese and Russian threats.<\/p>\n Further, the move seems fly in the face of the\u00a0recently unclassified version of the National Defense Strategy<\/a>, which includes a new section that focuses on the use of information both as a deterrent and a means to avoid sparking conflict during a crises.<\/p>\n \u201cDeterrence depends in part on competitors\u2019 understanding of US intent and capabilities. The Department must seek to avoid unknowingly driving competition to aggression. To strengthen deterrence as well as manage escalation risks, the Department will advance its ability to operate in the information domain \u2014 for example, by working to ensure that messages are conveyed effectively,\u201d the NDS states.<\/p>\n However, the DoD spokesperson explained that \u2014 unlike the NPR and the MDR \u2014 the Strategic Space Review was not required by law, and instead was an \u201cinternal, classified review\u201d from the get go.<\/p>\n \u201cAlthough the Space Strategic Review was conducted as an internal, classified review, there is a substantial amount of information released publicly about U.S. national security space activities,\u201d the spokesperson added. \u201cFor example, DIA released an excellent unclassified compendium of space threats in April 2022. There are also a number of unclassified documents that outline U.S. national security space policy, to include the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, U.S. Space Priorities Framework, National Space Policy, and Defense Space Strategy. We continue to assess our space-related classification policies.\u201d<\/p>\n Government officials and outside experts who spoke to Breaking Defense were not in the least shocked at the Biden administration\u2019s caution when it comes to talking about what the US can and can\u2019t do in space.<\/p>\n For one thing, the DoD\u2019s latest Space Policy,\u00a0issued in September,<\/a>\u00a0deliberately avoids any reference at all to \u201coffensive\u201d space capabilities and\/or operations, or \u201corbital warfare\u201d \u2014 language that\u00a0is<\/em>\u00a0found in DoD\u00a0space doctrine<\/a>\u00a0and Space Force\u00a0guidance<\/a>\u00a0papers crafted under previous administrations but still considered as official.<\/p>\n Perhaps the most similar review to the SSR in recent times, however, was the\u00a02009 Space Posture Review<\/a>\u00a0exercise mandated by Congress that eventually was wrapped into the Obama administration\u2019s\u00a02011 National Security Space Strategy<\/a>. Only a top-level summary of that strategy was released.<\/p>\n \u201cI guess I\u2019m not surprised that they aren\u2019t releasing an unclassified version of the Strategic Space Review and yet are managing to do so for the MDR and the NPR. Old habits die hard and much of space is knee-jerk reflexively classified. It\u2019s really hard to do strategic messaging when your policy documents are classified, so that seems shortsighted,\u201d said Secure World Foundation\u2019s Victoria Samson.<\/p>\n Her colleague Brian Weeden said the decision is understandable given the fact that the SSR was specifically aimed at trying to sort through what defensive and offensive capabilities the US needs to deter, and if necessary \u201cdefeat aggression\u201d in space, in the words of the DoD Space Policy.<\/p>\n The De-Classification Dilemma<\/strong><\/p>\n Top military brass\u00a0for several years<\/a>\u00a0has been waging both an internal and external campaign to reduce the secrecy surrounding the assessment of space threats and US space capabilities, as well as the security constraints that make it extraordinarily hard to share technology and requirements with industry and friendly national governments.<\/p>\n But each of those arguments begs a different risk-benefit analysis, as well as a potentially different answer to the question of what, if anything, should be publicly revealed, argued a former senior DoD official with long experience in the debate.<\/p>\n \u201cPeople talk about classification as if it\u2019s all one thing, but it\u2019s not all one thing. There\u2019s many different things going on here,\u201d said the former official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. \u201cYou actually have to do the work, analyze the situation, and then decide on a case-by-case basis what has to be declassified.\u201d<\/p>\n In particular, the ex-official said, when looking at US offensive and defensive capabilities, the pros and cons must be considered very carefully for each specific weapon system \u2014 because in some instances there will be deterrent value in revealing an ability to inflict harm on adversary systems, but in others such revelations may enable the enemy to \u201cengineer around\u201d that capability.<\/p>\n And up to now, the former official asserted, no one within DoD \u201chas decided that that\u2019s what they have to do, they just complain about classification.\u201d<\/p>\n \u2018In Space, We Over-Classify Everything\u2019<\/strong><\/p>\n Military leaders in recent years have made progress on pushing more information into the public domain about threat analysis, particularly regarding\u00a0growing Chinese and Russian\u00a0<\/a>space capabilities. And Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has both accelerated and solidified that trend, including easing the ability of DoD and the Intelligence Community to share information with allies, partner nations and industry partners.<\/p>\n \u201cI\u2019ve seen in the current crisis with Russia in Ukraine [that] the United States and its institutions have the ability to change and adapt rapidly when facing compelling need,\u201d said Gen. DT Thompson, vice chief of the Space Force, in an Oct. 25 keynote speech at the Mitchell Institute\u2019s\u00a0Spacepower Security Forum<\/a>.<\/p>\n However, he lamented the lack of progress in chopping through the layers of security-related red tape involved in sharing with industry technology \u2014 despite an ongoing effort by Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks on \u201cstreamlining\u201d and \u201cnormalizing\u201d the process.<\/p>\n \u201cSecurity remains probably one of our biggest challenges. And one of the things that while we own the ability to change it, we just have some form of bureaucratic inertia that will not let us do,\u201d Thompson said. \u201cI will also say this is not the first time we\u2019ve attempted to do this, and we have not really succeeded. \u2026 We\u2019ll have to see if we can end up delivering. It just continues to be a challenge and a sclerotic part of our bureaucracy.\u201d<\/p>\n Finally, despite all the high-powered military lobbying both in public and behind the scenes, the US military\u2019s offensive space capabilities that can hold Chinese and Russian on-orbit assets at risk remain firmly locked behind the\u00a0Green Door<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 with knowledge about a number of weapon systems restricted to\u00a0Special Access Protected (SAPs)<\/a>\u00a0programs that limit access to a handful of senior government officials.<\/p>\n The extreme measures may work as a counter-intelligence tactic, but they also restrict the US government\u2019s ability to deter both countries, and other potential adversaries, from deploying and using counterspace weapons against US and allied satellites, senior military leaders have argued.<\/p>\n \u201cIn space, we over-classify everything,\u201d former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. John Hyten told the National Security Space Association on Jan. 22, 2021. \u201cDeterrence does not happen in the classified world. Deterrence does not happen in the black; deterrence happens in the white.\u201d<\/p>\n Chris Stone, a fellow at the Mitchell Institute, agreed.<\/p>\n \u201cIf we want deterrence to be effective, it takes three things: 1. Capabilities 2. Credible threats in the mind of the adversary and 3. The will to communicate the first two,\u201d he told Breaking Defense. \u201cYou can\u2019t deter an adversary with a secret capability if you don\u2019t communicate what that is. Even the\u00a0B-21 will be revealed<\/a>\u00a0in December\u2026 but not some of our vital space capabilities? This need to change.\u201d<\/p>\n Even US commercial satellite systems are\u00a0increasingly being threatened<\/a>\u00a0by China, and especially Russia \u2014\u00a0 given the\u00a0support provided<\/a>\u00a0by US remote sensing and communications firms to the Ukrainian government in its ongoing war to prevent a Russian occupation.<\/p>\n On Oct. 26, during the ongoing annual meeting of the UN First Committee on international security issues, a\u00a0senior Russian official<\/a>\u00a0issued the most direct warning yet of Moscow\u2019s\u00a0potential for attacking<\/a>\u00a0US commercial satellites assisting Kyiv.<\/p>\n The \u201cuse by the United States and its allies\u201d of civilian and commercial space systems \u201cfor military purposes\u201d is not only \u201cprovocative\u201d and \u201cextremely dangerous trend,\u201d but also \u201cquestionable\u201d under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, alleged Konstantin Vorontsov, deputy head of Moscow\u2019s UN delegation.<\/p>\n \u201cApparently, these States do not realize that such actions in fact constitute indirect participation in military conflicts. Quasi-civilian infrastructure may become a legitimate target for retaliation,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n National Security Council spokesman John Kirby pushed back against the Russian statement in an Oct. 27 briefing for reporters.<\/p>\n \u201cAny attack on US infrastructure will be met with an appropriate response in an appropriate way,\u201d he said, adding that Washington will \u201chold Russia accountable for any such attack, should it occur.\u201d<\/p>\n White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre\u00a0later elaborated:<\/a>\u00a0\u201cWe will pursue all means to explore, deter, and hold Russia accountable for any such attacks. Clearly, I\u2019m not going to lay them down here in front of \u2014 in public. But we have made ourselves very clear.\u201d<\/p>\n But what that means about whether, when and how the US might fight in space actually remains largely unclear \u2014 to Russia, China and, perhaps most crucially, the American public.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/11\/TJS-3-PRC-counterspace-system.jpg\")