Over the course of 2017-19, non-profit analytics group C4ADS catalogued about 10,000 similar incidents affecting 1,300 vessels, most in or around areas of Russian influence. The report also drew a correlation between the movements of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the mass spoofing events, noted contributor and cybersecurity expert Dana Goward.<\/p>\n
In June and July 2021, three NATO warships – the Royal Navy’s USS\u00a0Defender<\/em>, the U.S. Navy’s USS\u00a0Ross\u00a0<\/em>and a Royal Dutch Navy vessel – all had their locations\u00a0spoofed<\/a> to\u00a0positions off Russian-occupied Crimea. The reason and culprit remain unknown.<\/p>\n “It is highly likely that this is a deliberate information operation by a pro-Russian actor (possibly Russian military psychological operations) ahead of an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive and\/or in celebration of Russia’s proclaimed victory over Bakhmut,” assessed Geollect.<\/p>\n The pattern began to show up on AIS on the 14th, and strengthened from May 19-21. Putin declared victory over Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut on May 22. In a clear sign of spoofing, merchant vessel “speeds” between these erroneous AIS positions were as high as 100 knots, Geollect reported.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/05\/Geollect-z-2.webp\")
This month, a large number of merchant ships along the southern coast of Ukraine had their AIS locations remotely spoofed to the coastal waters of Russian-occupied Crimea. However, instead of a random pattern or a cluster, the AIS positions form a clear “Z” shape, the de facto symbol of support for the Russian invasion. This\u00a0AIS spoofing pattern was almost certainly created by\u00a0transmitting false AIS signals, mimicking the ships’ actual AIS transmissions with corrupted duplicates, according to Geollect.<\/p>\n