La Manufactura Aditiva (AM – 3D Printing) podr\u00eda tener un impacto significativo en el \u00e1rea de Seguridad Nuclear y sobre los esfuerzos de \u201cNo proliferaci\u00f3n\u201d implementados a nivel global. Los avances de la aplicaci\u00f3n de AM-3DP en el sector de manufactura del \u00e1mbito nuclear, pueden facilitar la forma en que los pa\u00edses adquieran en corto plazo capacidades espec\u00edficas, en especial las relacionadas con los componentes cr\u00edticos para el desarrollo y producci\u00f3n de armas nucleares. Al integrar AM-3DP a la \u201ccadena log\u00edstica nuclear\u201d, esto puede llegar a desestabilizar los acuerdos, reg\u00edmenes y mecanismos, destinados a controlar la \u201cno proliferaci\u00f3n\u201d de armas de destrucci\u00f3n masiva.<\/p>\n
Additive manufacturing \u2014 also known as 3D printing \u2014 promises to have a significant impact on nuclear security and nonproliferation in the 21st century. Advances in the manufacturing sector will complicate how states pursue nuclear capabilities and manage international relations, potentially making it easier to acquire nuclear weapons. Through integration into nuclear supply chains, additive manufacturing can destabilize nonproliferation regimes and complicate relations between states.<\/p>\n
Additive manufacturing represents a revolution in the efficiency of the manufacturing process. Supply chains that produce the components used in both nuclear weapons and reactors rely on a traditional process known as \u201csubtractive manufacturing<\/a>,\u201d in which parts are created from a larger block of material that is pared away, formed, and shaped into the necessary dimensions. This process inherently creates waste and inefficiencies. Alternatively, additive manufacturing involves the creation of three-dimensional objects through a layering process that adheres to a strict computer-guided model. Layers of\u00a0polymers, ceramics, and metals<\/a>\u00a0are applied by a precision-guided instrument according to precise dimensions until the object is completed. This process results in roughly\u00a070-90%<\/a>\u00a0less waste than traditional subtractive manufacturing means.<\/p>\n Additive manufacturing holds distinct advantages over traditional manufacturing. For example, tools and components can be designed to be compatible with specific applications that require\u00a0matching material signatures<\/a>. This holds anti-counterfeiting potential for nuclear-related uses, as anything from\u00a0centrifuge parts\u00a0to missile storage<\/a>\u00a0and construction could potentially be outfitted with unique parts that operate only under specific conditions. Another major advantage to additive manufacturing is that complexity of design is not tethered to\u00a0cost limitations<\/a>\u00a0in the same ways as\u00a0traditional manufacturing<\/a>. Conventional manufacturing is limited because increasing design complexity inevitably leads to greater costs. For additive manufacturing, on the other hand, design is optimized to produce products in the most economical way possible. Together, the anti-counterfeiting potential and design optimization represent two of the most distinct advantages that additive manufacturing brings to the table, and thanks to the reduced barriers to entry, there are now more seats at the table.<\/p>\n The dividing lines between access to additive manufacturing are increasingly blurring, as the technology is\u00a0closing the gap<\/a>\u00a0between innovation and production. It allows smaller, less resourced firms and entities the ability to produce goods at a faster pace and larger scale, while doing so at\u00a0relatively affordable cost<\/a>. This opens the floodgates for smaller, less wealthy states and actors to enter this emerging market and begin manufacturing localized goods \u2014 no longer dependent on major producers or governed by traditional limitations. In the nuclear realm, this could\u00a0incentivize investment<\/a>\u00a0into nuclear programs and research, as the\u00a0potential pathways<\/a> to successful nuclear capabilities are now greater and the ability to legitimize the industry now easier. With requisite access to materials and machinery, a nation could capitalize on indigenous innovation-production streams to build out the initial stages of a nuclear industry.<\/p>\n The United States has begun to research additive manufacturing\u2019s utility to civilian nuclear programs, exploring new designs of\u00a0nuclear fuel rods and large cylindrical pressure vessels<\/a>. The potential to further\u00a0optimize supply chains<\/a>\u00a0has also caught the industry\u2019s attention. As additive manufacturing proliferates internationally and begins to level the manufacturing playing field, other states will\u00a0likely<\/a>\u00a0begin investing in similar research and development. Competition to\u00a0out-innovate<\/a>\u00a0one another may ultimately sow instability as each actor becomes incentivized to\u00a0mask their research programs<\/a>. To limit the structural impact of additive manufacturing, nuclear states and international organizations must cooperate to ensure that the technology \u201cmatures into an asset rather than a liability for nuclear energy programs<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n Liabilities abound, however, as the combination of these emerging manufacturing techniques and novel production materials could create volatile pathways to\u00a0nuclear capabilities and weapons<\/a>. States could use additive manufacturing to make\u00a0detection of nuclear proliferation<\/a>\u00a0considerably more difficult. Those without nuclear capabilities could progress towards such abilities largely in secret\u00a0under the guise<\/a>\u00a0of commercial additive manufacturing industries as\u00a0access to sensitive nuclear technology<\/a>\u00a0becomes easier. The\u00a0dual-use nature<\/a>\u00a0of additive manufacturing means that genuinely benign investments into nuclear energy could become indistinguishable from weapons programs. The speed, secrecy, and relative ease with which non-nuclear states could potentially turn nuclear as this novel technology comes into maturity creates vulnerabilities that nonproliferation regimes must begin to consider. Export controls represent one such pressing area where international regulators could make progress.<\/p>\n Currently, a lack of\u00a0international export controls<\/a>\u00a0around additive manufacturing\u2019s role in the nuclear value chain constitutes an unmanaged proliferation pathway. Current controls fail to capture the democratizing nature of additive manufacturing and its ability to link previously unconnected markets. Specifically, the\u00a0sharing of CAD files<\/a>\u00a0that contain the design elements necessary to produce 3D-printed objects poses a cross-border concern that promises to grow more acute. In addition to file sharing, the sheer manufacturing power that additive technology surrenders to the general public has the potential to\u00a0overburden export controls<\/a>\u00a0currently in place, and means that anonymized products can be trafficked along illicit networks with greater ease. Should proliferators, whether they be state, military, or subnational in origin, decide to adopt additive manufacturing for illicit purposes, it could\u00a0prove difficult<\/a>\u00a0for export control regimes to stay abreast.<\/p>\n Additive manufacturing will gradually usher in an era of novel manufacturing means that will challenge current nonproliferation arrangements. It will create new pathways to nuclear capabilities along\u00a0accelerated timeframes<\/a>, while its dual-use nature will complicate distinguishability. Illicit production and procurement may find camouflage beneath legitimate nuclear networks and channels as the technology gains commercial popularity. Additive manufacturing harbors much disruptive potential. To prevent this technological disruption from sowing instability in the nuclear domain nonproliferation regimes will require\u00a0greater detection capacities<\/a>\u00a0and more robust export controls to stem the illicit flow of nuclear materials and equipment connected to additive manufacturing.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n