\u201cSeizing space superiority at the time and place of our choosing can offer advantages to military forces. \u2026 Space Doctrine Publication (SDP) 3-0, Operations, as keystone doctrine for the United States Space Force (USSF) describes official advice and best practices for supporting the joint force commander (JFC) in gaining and exploiting this position of advantage within the space domain,\u201d Maj. Gen. Shawn Bratton, head of\u00a0Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM)<\/a>, writes in the document\u2019s [PDF<\/a>] preface.<\/p>\n The role of doctrine is to set the foundational principles to guide military forces as they pursue national security objectives, as well as to establish agreed concepts and terms to prescribe the manner in which they will fight. There are various levels of doctrine, with that crafted by the Joint Staff to guide joint force operations at the top of the food chain. Each military service then writes its own hierarchy of doctrinal papers covering specific roles and missions.<\/p>\n The\u00a0Space Force<\/a>, as the newest military service, and\u00a0US Space Command<\/a>\u00a0since their creation in 2019 have been attempting to revamp US military space doctrine in a domain that over the past decade has become both more complex and more fraught with risk. (As a reminder, the Space Force organizes, trains and equips Guardians to operate space systems; SPACECOM runs actual military space operations.)<\/p>\n The Space Force\u2019s first formal doctrinal paper was the\u00a0Space Capstone Publication: Spacepower<\/a>, published in 2020 that sought to define space as a separate warfighting domain, and \u201cspacepower\u201d as vital to future joint operations. Building on that, STARCOM last year published a series of subordinate doctrine papers on personnel, sustainment and planning.<\/p>\n STARCOM published both SDP 3.0 on July 31, along with a new \u201cIntelligence\u201d doctrine, SPD-2.0, that \u201coutlines how intelligence contributes to space operations, enhances the body of intelligence data available to joint warfighters, and underscores the role of Guardians in the intelligence community,\u201d according to\u00a0a STARCOM fact sheet<\/a>.<\/p>\n Supporting the Joint Force Across the Conflict Spectrum<\/strong><\/p>\n SDP 3.0, however, arguably is one of the most important of the publications so far, in that represents the roadmap for\u00a0how<\/em>\u00a0Guardians will employ spacepower to support SPACECOM and the joint force across the spectrum of conflict \u2014 from what the Pentagon now sees as the ubiquitous \u201ccompetition\u201d phase (essentially a modern equivalent of the Cold War only with multiple adversaries) all the way through a hot war.<\/p>\n To that end, the new doctrine paper says, the Space Force will undertake operations in three baskets:<\/p>\n SDP 3.0 builds on the unofficial \u201cSpace Doctrine Note, Operations\u201d [PDF<\/a>] published by Space Force headquarters in January. While it also builds on\u00a0\u201cJoint Publication 3-14 Space Operations (JP 3-14)\u201d<\/a>, last updated by the Joint Staff in 2020, it also deviates somewhat from it. For example, the Space Force has subtly changed the definition of \u201cspace superiority\u201d from that in JP 3-14 to include not just ensuring US space systems are protected from interference, but also \u201cdenying\u201d opponents \u201cfreedom of action\u201d in space.<\/p>\n Interestingly, rather than seeking to align directly with joint space operations doctrine, the new Space Force doctrine is focused more closely on mapping space activities to the 12 principles of military operations writ large, as detailed in the Joint Staff\u2019s top-level doctrine publication, \u201cJP 3.0 Joint Campaigns and Operations\u201d, last updated on June 18, 2022.<\/p>\n \u201cI thought the discussion of how they\u2019re translating the principles of joint operations (objective, offense, mass, maneuver, etc.) to space was interesting. None of it was entirely surprising, but it was useful to see space operations being described using the same language that the US military uses to describe military operations in all the other domains and some of the distinct space differences,\u201d Secure World Foundation\u2019s Brian Weeden said.<\/p>\n For example, he said, the doctrine\u2019s interpretation of \u201cmass\u201d for the Space Force \u201cfocuses more on managing space applications and services rather than just the number of satellites themselves, because many of the satellites are still moving around in orbit and often support more than one theater at a time,\u201d he told Breaking Defense.<\/p>\n SPD 3.0 also specifically includes a section on how space operations fit into\u00a0\u201cJoint All Domain Operations\u201d,<\/a>\u00a0as articulated by the Department of the Air Force in \u201cSpace Doctrine Publication\/Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99\u2033<\/a>, published in November 2021. Noting the centrality of \u201cmutual support\u201d across domains, SPD 3.0 also recognizes that \u201cthe most effective operation to deny, disrupt, damage, or destroy an adversary\u2019s space capability, and preserve freedom of action in space, may originate from a domain other than space.\u201d<\/p>\n Defining Terms Of Art: Offensive Vs. Defensive; Mobility<\/strong><\/p>\n The new Space Operations doctrine further is notable for the fact that it articulates the 13 mission areas the Space Force sees as its own. These range from traditional ones such as\u00a0space domain awareness<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0positioning, navigation and timing<\/a>\u00a0to what might be seen as newer, or at least more expansively defined, missions such as \u201ccombat power projection\u201d and \u201cspace mobility and logistics.\u201d<\/p>\n In particular, the section on \u201ccombat power projection\u201d provides an official service view of offensive versus defensive operations in support of joint operations \u2014 something Space Force and Pentagon leaders\u00a0are often hesitant<\/a> to do in public:<\/p>\n The projection of combat power, as space combat power, includes offensive and defensive military force (fires and protection<\/strong>) in, from, or to the space domain (including navigation warfare). Offensive space operations attack the adversary in, from, or to space. These operations seek to impose cost on the adversary, compel a change in behavior, secure a position of advantage, or deny the adversary\u2019s military forces freedom of action. Defensive space operations seek to repel or defeat adversary attacks in, from, or to the space domain. These operations aim to maintain status quo, regain the initiative, deny the adversary a position of advantage, or protect freedom of action of friendly forces. The distinction between offensive and defensive operations is not always clear. \u2026\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n In planning, Guardians consider offensive and defensive fires in terms of which side is attempting to retain or exploit the initiative (offense) and which side is responding to the adversary\u2019s initiative (defense). All combat operations should include elements of offense and defense unified into coherent action to achieve desired effects.<\/em><\/p>\n The document also provides a first official definition of \u201cspace mobility and logistics\u201d \u2014 a Space Force-specific take on what is known as \u201cmaneuver\u201d in joint operations.<\/p>\n \u201cSpace mobility and logistics, also referred to as SAML, supports joint space operations\u00a0sustainment<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0through spacelift, satellite operations, force reconstitution, maintenance of a force of space operations personnel, and support to human space flight,\u201d SPD 3.0 explains. \u201cMobility (movement and maneuver<\/em><\/strong>) includes post-launch transport of space vehicles between orbits, within orbits, and augmented maneuvering to enhance mission effectiveness or maneuvering related to reconstitution, operational degradation or loss, and end-of-life actions. In the future, logistics on-orbit may include\u00a0spacecraft servicing<\/a>, disposition,\u00a0debris management<\/a>\u00a0capabilities, refueling, and in-space component installation.\u201d<\/p>\n Looking To The Future<\/strong><\/p>\n Finally, SPD 3.0 gives a nod to the fact that Space Force missions may expand in the future to deep space; that is, outside the confines of the Earth\u2019s gravitational field.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Space Force currently defines three nested orbital regimes for space operations,\u201d the document says.<\/p>\n Today\u2019s military space operations take place largely in what SPD 3.0 calls \u201cgeocentric regime\u201d \u2014 essentially, low Earth orbit, medium Earth orbit, and geosynchronous orbit.<\/p>\n The other two regimes are: the \u201ccislunar<\/a>\u00a0regime\u201d that includes the \u201ctranslunar space\u201d between the Earth and the Moon, the relatively stable Earth-Moon\u00a0Lagrange points,<\/a>\u00a0and orbits around the Moon; and the \u201csolar regime\u201d comprising orbits around the Sun, and \u201cthe Lagrange points characterized by the combined gravitational effects of the Sun and the planets.\u201d<\/p>\n However, the Space Force apparently is looking even farther out into the heavens. \u201cFuture military space operations may extend beyond these three regimes,\u201d SPD 3.0 states.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/08\/Screen-Shot-2023-08-02-at-3.webp\")
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