{"id":13983,"date":"2024-01-30T08:01:11","date_gmt":"2024-01-30T11:01:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=13983"},"modified":"2024-01-30T08:01:11","modified_gmt":"2024-01-30T11:01:11","slug":"la-disposicion-de-la-ndaa-busca-cerrar-las-brechas-de-ciberseguridad-en-los-sistemas-de-armas-nucleares","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=13983","title":{"rendered":"La disposici\u00f3n de la NDAA busca cerrar las brechas de ciberseguridad en los sistemas de armas nucleares"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>La medida crear\u00e1 un \u201cGrupo de Trabajo de Mitigaci\u00f3n, Evaluaci\u00f3n, Inventario de Riesgos y Ciberseguridad\u201d dentro del Departamento de Defensa de los EE UU encargado de desarrollar una \u201cestrategia integral para inventariar la gama de sistemas de la Administraci\u00f3n Nacional de Seguridad Nuclear que est\u00e1n potencialmente en riesgo en el entornos de tecnolog\u00eda operativa y tecnolog\u00eda de la informaci\u00f3n sobre armas nucleares, evaluando los sistemas en riesgo en funci\u00f3n del impacto de la misi\u00f3n e implementando acciones de mitigaci\u00f3n de riesgos.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"drop-cap\">A bipartisan proposal in the recently passed defense policy bill will establish a working group tasked with mitigating previously identified cybersecurity gaps in the nation\u2019s nuclear weapons systems.<\/p>\n<p>The provision \u2014\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nextgov.com\/cybersecurity\/2023\/06\/lawmakers-propose-shoring-nuclear-cyber-standards-ahead-ndaa-markup\/387632\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">first introduced in June<\/a>\u00a0by Reps. Salud Carbajal, D-Calif., Don Bacon, R-Neb., and Mike Gallagher, R-Wis. \u2014 was included in the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/docs.house.gov\/billsthisweek\/20231211\/FY24%20NDAA%20Conference%20Report%20-%20%20FINAL.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act,<\/a>\u00a0which is headed to President Joe Biden\u2019s desk following its passage in the Senate on Wednesday and in the House on Thursday.<\/p>\n<p>The measure will create a \u201cCybersecurity, Risk Inventory, Assessment and Mitigation Working Group\u201d within the Department of Defense charged with developing a \u201ccomprehensive strategy for inventorying the range of systems of the [National Nuclear Security Administration] that are potentially at risk in the operational technology and nuclear weapons information technology environments, assessing the systems at risk based on mission impact and implementing risk mitigation actions.\u201d<\/p>\n<div class=\"container\">\n<div class=\"l-content-row l-relative\">\n<div class=\"content-body wysiwyg l-content-well wysiwyg-article\">\n<p>The National Nuclear Security Administration \u2014 or NNSA \u2014 is a component of the Energy Department that works to safeguard the nation&#8217;s stockpile of nuclear weapons. NNSA\u2019s deputy administrator for defense programs is tasked with chairing the new working group, although they retain the right to designate another member of the group as chairperson.<\/p>\n<p>In an interview with\u00a0<em>Nextgov\/FCW<\/em>, Carbajal said previous oversight of NNSA\u2019s cybersecurity practices conducted by the Government Accountability Office \u201cgave us an opportunity to be at the forefront of understanding our weaknesses\u201d when it comes to better securing the U.S. nuclear stockpile from outside threats.<\/p>\n<p>A September 2022 GAO\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/products\/gao-22-104195\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">report<\/a>\u00a0found that NNSA and its contractors had not fully implemented \u201cfoundational cybersecurity risk practices,\u201d including in the agency\u2019s traditional IT environment and \u201cin its operational technology and nuclear weapons IT environments.\u201d The congressional watchdog made nine recommendations for the agency to enhance its cyber standards.<\/p>\n<p>A subsequent GAO\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/products\/gao-23-106309\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">report<\/a> released in June 2023 also found that \u201cNNSA&#8217;s efforts to identify, assess and mitigate cyber risks \u2014 to specific weapons or manufacturing equipment \u2014 are still in the early stages of development,\u201d and noted that the agency \u201cis still trying to inventory systems with potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"container\">\n<div class=\"l-content-row l-relative\">\n<div class=\"content-body wysiwyg l-content-well content-body-last\">\n<p>Allison Bawden \u2014 a director of GAO&#8217;s natural resources and environment team who co-authored the previous NNSA-focused reports \u2014 said the watchdog was \u201chappy to see the congressional attention to and support for improvements in NNSA\u2019s cybersecurity practices.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe working group that the legislation creates will help to strategically drive progress on the critical activities to inventory systems potentially at risk and move the agency toward achieving foundational cybersecurity risk practices,\u201d she added.<\/p>\n<p>Within 120 days of the NDAA\u2019s enactment, the working group must\u00a0brief relevant congressional defense committees on its plan for addressing identified cybersecurity gaps within NNSA\u2019s nuclear systems. The group\u2019s plan will be required to \u201cincorporate key elements of effective cybersecurity risk management strategies\u201d that were identified by GAO. The working group will also be required to submit its completed strategy to the congressional defense committees no later than April 1, 2025.<\/p>\n<p>Carbajal said the working group-based approach to enhancing NNSA\u2019s cybersecurity practices will provide \u201ccollaborative expertise that will ensure that we have the framework moving forward, and the milestones and timelines to effectively \u2014 and sooner rather than later \u2014 be successful in achieving the objective\u201d of better securing U.S. nuclear weapons from potential risks.<\/p>\n<p>The congressman added that growing cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure services and sensitive weapons capabilities necessitate the need for stricter security standards, particularly when those shortcomings have already been pointed out.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe&#8217;ve already seen threats to essential infrastructure throughout our country by other actors \u2014 in some cases, countries; in some cases, terrorist groups \u2014 that do want to infiltrate and disrupt, destroy and hurt the American people,\u201d Carbajal said, adding that \u201cI&#8217;m just glad that this was identified and I was able to move it forward in a bipartisan fashion.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>An NNSA spokesperson said the agency \u201ccontinually collaborates across the Nuclear Security Enterprise on cybersecurity-related matters,\u201d referencing\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.acq.osd.mil\/ncbdp\/nm\/NMHB2020rev\/chapters\/chapter5.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">the national network<\/a>\u00a0of labs, testing facilities and other sites involved in researching, developing and overseeing the U.S. nuclear stockpile.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cNNSA intends to comply with the NDAA and ensure this foundational work will continue to mature and develop into a comprehensive strategy for inventorying and assessing systems, particularly for operational technology and nuclear weapons information technology environments,\u201d the spokesperson added.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p><strong>Fuente:<\/strong> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nextgov.com\/cybersecurity\/2023\/12\/ndaa-provision-looks-close-cybersecurity-gaps-nuclear-weapons-systems\/392813\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>https:\/\/www.nextgov.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La medida crear\u00e1 un \u201cGrupo de Trabajo de Mitigaci\u00f3n, Evaluaci\u00f3n, Inventario de Riesgos y Ciberseguridad\u201d dentro del Departamento de Defensa de los EE UU encargado&hellip; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":13984,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[2,23],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13983"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=13983"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13983\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13985,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13983\/revisions\/13985"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/13984"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=13983"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=13983"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=13983"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}