{"id":14006,"date":"2024-02-01T08:18:26","date_gmt":"2024-02-01T11:18:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=14006"},"modified":"2024-02-01T08:18:26","modified_gmt":"2024-02-01T11:18:26","slug":"el-comando-de-material-del-us-army-analiza-las-lecciones-aprendidas-de-la-guerra-en-ucrania","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=14006","title":{"rendered":"El Comando de Material del US Army analiza las lecciones aprendidas de la guerra en Ucrania"},"content":{"rendered":"

Las lecciones aprendidas de la Guerra en Ucrania a\u00fan en curso, as\u00ed como la posibilidad de futuros conflictos en Medio Oriente o en el Mar del Sur de China, han dado lugar a serios debates en el \u00e1mbito pol\u00edtico \u2013 militar de EUA, en relaci\u00f3n con la alternativa de: \u201cTener grandes stocks de esos materiales y equipos versus disponer de una Base Industrial de Defensa en condiciones de producir en grandes cantidades en poco tiempo\u201d<\/em>. A ello se agrega la necesidad de realizar el sostenimiento y mantenimiento de armas y equipos que EUA tiene \u201cpre \u2013 posicionados\u201d en muchas regiones del mundo. En tiempos de escasos recursos, conflictos que escalan r\u00e1pidamente y con consumos de armas y municiones que agotan los stocks, la falta de previsi\u00f3n se puede transformar en una gran debilidad para cualquier naci\u00f3n.<\/p>\n

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WASHINGTON \u2014 From maintaining platforms from afar to a deep-seated demand for mass quantities of munitions, Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine is providing US Army Materiel Command with a wealth of insights into what it needs to do to prepare for contingency in the Indo-Pacific region, according to a three-star general there.<\/p>\n

\u201cThink about Ukraine as an island \u2026 we are not allowed to cross the border,\u201d\u00a0the AMC\u2019s deputy Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan told Breaking Defense during a December 2023 interview.<\/p>\n

\u201cTheir lines of communication are contested, like we know we\u2019re going to have in the South China Sea, so we should look at it from that same lens,\u201d he later added.<\/p>\n

The AMC team has spent the past two years, in part, overseeing the transfer of more than $13 billion in\u00a0equipment and weapons to Kyiv and helping the Eastern European nation maintain those weapons from a distance. Some of that maintenance support has included a phone-a-friend model, or\u00a0telemaintenance<\/a>, a setup Mohan and some acquisition officials contend will be critical to supporting the US force in the Indo-Pacific, and potentially partner nations using US equipment.<\/p>\n

While walking a friendly nation through repairs by phone is hardly a new model, Mohan said the service previously didn\u2019t have a \u201ccodified\u201d process in place, and leaders are now reflecting on just what doctrinal changes they need to make to take this model down to the tactical level.<\/p>\n

\u201cHow do we sustain exquisite weapons systems, future weapons systems and current weapon systems in a highly lethal, very dispersed battlefield?\u201d the three-star general asked. \u201cAnd then, how do you couple that ability to do that over-the-shoulder telemaintenance with autonomous delivery, for example?\u201d<\/p>\n

That potential use of drones, autonomous vessels and robots to provide spare parts to the battlefield is one area Mohan is keen on diving deeper into this year. He said he is looking to \u201cbake\u201d them into exercises in the Indo-Pacific region in 2024.<\/p>\n

Pieces Already On The Board<\/strong><\/p>\n

In addition to a look at telemaintenance procedures, Mohan and other leaders are continuing to grapple with an array of stockpile questions after watching Ukraine burn through munitions provided by US and other friendly nations. One key to any future US engagement could be, for instance, US\u00a0Army Prepositioned Stockpiles [PDF<\/a>], or APS, that the service currently has seven spread out around the globe.<\/p>\n

Those are designed to be used for everything from large-scale exercises to quickly outfitting soldiers with items like M1 Abrams tanks or wheeled vehicles if a military conflict arises.\u00a0That list includes APS-1 designated for the US, APS-2 for Europe,\u00a0APS-3 afloat<\/a>, APS-4 for Northeast Asia, APS-5 for Southwest Asia, APS-6 for Army South and APS-7 for Army Africa.<\/p>\n

Mohan said he is a proponent for expanding land-based equipment numbers in the Indo-Pacific region to reduce transit times and avoid hurdles like agricultural inspections. But it has to be done very \u201ccarefully.\u201d (The service recently said it plans to keep\u00a0additional<\/a>\u00a0military equipment in Australia for that very reason).<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen that APS is floating around on a ship that says, \u2018US Navy\u2019 on the side of it, we have a lot of decision space [but] when put it in other countries, the complexity from a geopolitical standpoint, goes up,\u201d Mohan said.<\/p>\n

Part of that calculus, he added, involves simply drilling down to what APS is and isn\u2019t, and reducing the logistical footprint and\/or need for fuel, water and even ammunition. Then enters in the geopolitical work of striking bilateral deals with countries in the region over what they will allow on their shores and how it\u2019s sustained.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019ll have a different formula for each country that we want to operate in from a sustainment standpoint,\u201d he added. \u201cCountry X [may be] really interested in us being able to put humanitarian assistance, disaster relief stuff on the ground \u2026 [but] not so much for lethal aid. We\u2019re gonna have to work through that.\u201d<\/p>\n

Stockpiling Vs. Rapid Production<\/strong><\/p>\n

While prepositioning stocks in key areas will remain a topic for internal and external stakeholders, the Army and senior most Pentagon leaders are also debating just what equipment levels it needs to have on hand versus having the ability to quickly scale production.<\/p>\n

As one senior US\u00a0senior defense official put it, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have only propelled that debate.<\/p>\n

\u201cIs it a stockpile or is it a production line that\u2019s hot or cold or warm?\u201d the official told a small group of reporters at the Pentagon in early December. \u201cIs it one or the other? It\u2019s probably a mix.\u201d<\/p>\n

That conundrum is not relegated to the Army, but senior leaders inside the service are focusing on that question as they weigh just how much to invest buying weapons and ramping up production lines like the\u00a0155mm rounds used in Ukraine and ones better suited for the vast distances in the Indo-Pacific region. Those investments include boosting the service\u2019s\u00a0organic industrial base<\/a>\u00a0(OIB) and enabling industry to\u00a0increase\u00a0<\/a>production capacity.<\/p>\n

Army acquisition chief Doug Bush is one of those people working the issue. Although he is a proponent for\u00a0boosting Army stockpiles as an \u201cinsurance policy\u201d and deterrence, at a\u00a0Defense One event on Dec. 7, 2023, he discussed the tradeoffs between manufacturing and storing those weapons and having the machines and components in place to quickly produce them if needed.<\/p>\n

When it comes to supporting a larger munitions stockpile, he explained that it comes at a cost for housing them, moving and maintaining the rounds, especially those precision rounds.<\/p>\n

\u201cArtillery shells are relatively easy to maintain over time but when you get into precision weapons and have a lot of computer parts \u2026 that\u2019s not an insignificant cost,\u201d Bush told the audience.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere\u2019s a balance there between how much you want on the shelf that you have to kind of pay for keeping in inventory \u2026 versus what you can start producing when you need it,\u201d he later added.<\/p>\n

The \u201clong-pole in the tent\u201d to this latest munition ramp up, has been acquiring the machines and tooling to produce them, Bush said. There\u2019s always concern, though, over having to \u201cmothball\u201d those machines and subcomponents, and if the service doesn\u2019t need to scale production for 30 years, an entirely new weapon system is needed.<\/p>\n

One potential way to reach a compromise between stockpiling and production: production outside the US.<\/p>\n

Mohan pointed to Pentagon plans to support additional US weapons and parts being\u00a0produced abroad<\/a>\u00a0like the recent announcement with Australia to produce Lockheed Martin\u2019s Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions down under. Or a recent deal with India to co-produce\u00a0Stryker\u00a0<\/a>armored vehicles there.<\/p>\n

Such future deals in the Indo-Pacific region could also be less sexy and focus more on niche manufacturing capability to help support the prepositioned stocks and lessen the strain on domestic production, the three-star general said.<\/p>\n

\u201cThat might not be perfect, but it could be just good enough,\u201d Mohan added.<\/p>\n

Fuente: <\/strong>https:\/\/breakingdefense.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Las lecciones aprendidas de la Guerra en Ucrania a\u00fan en curso, as\u00ed como la posibilidad de futuros conflictos en Medio Oriente o en el Mar… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14007,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[37,28],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14006"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=14006"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14006\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14008,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14006\/revisions\/14008"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/14007"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=14006"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=14006"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=14006"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}