{"id":15411,"date":"2024-09-03T16:31:54","date_gmt":"2024-09-03T19:31:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=15411"},"modified":"2024-09-03T16:31:54","modified_gmt":"2024-09-03T19:31:54","slug":"lecciones-de-ucrania-o-que-estan-aprendiendo-los-funcionarios-de-inteligencia-militar-de-eeuu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=15411","title":{"rendered":"Lecciones de Ucrania, o que est\u00e1n aprendiendo los funcionarios de inteligencia militar de EEUU"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Desde la proliferaci\u00f3n de sistemas no tripulados hasta el espectro de campos de batalla saturados de guerra electr\u00f3nica , dos a\u00f1os y medio de guerra en Ucrania han ofrecido a los estrategas militares nuevas lecciones sobre c\u00f3mo se libra el combate moderno a gran escala.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>WASHINGTON \u2014 From the proliferation of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2023\/06\/dumb-and-cheap-when-facing-electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-small-drones-quantity-is-quality\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">unmanned systems<\/a>\u00a0to the specter of\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2024\/06\/inside-ukraine-startups-try-to-edge-russia-in-the-electronic-warfare-race\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">electronic warfare-saturated battlefields<\/a>, two-and-a-half years of warfare in Ukraine have offered military strategists new lessons in how modern large-scale combat is fought.<\/p>\n<p>Thousands of miles away from the deadly front lines, US military intelligence officials at the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA) annual conference were asked last week what lessons they, specifically, have taken away from watching Kyiv\u2019s defense of its homeland against Moscow\u2019s invasion. (An Air Force official had to cancel his appearance on the panel, but several officials\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2024\/02\/ukraine-war-turns-2-lessons-learned-and-what-comes-next\/#air-domain\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">have spoken before<\/a>\u00a0about the change they\u2019re seeing in aerial warfare.)<\/p>\n<p>\u201cSo listen, it\u2019s easy to sit at the Pentagon thinking you have a great ideas for innovation,\u201d Andrew Evans, the director of the Army\u2019s ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Task Force said. \u201cBut you know who the best innovators are? The people who have to innovate or they\u2019re going to die the next day.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cbattlefield innovation that\u2019s occurring in Ukraine,\u201d Evans added, \u201cis unprecedented.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>On The Water: \u2018Pretty Impressive\u2019 Asymmetric, Unmanned Capabilities<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>On paper, Russia\u2019s large naval fleet should have no problem dominating Ukraine\u2019s non-existent Navy. But the war has shown that using smaller, unmanned surface vessels and land-based strikes can hold a traditional navy at risk.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe first lesson we got out of there was the importance of anti-ship cruise missile defense, when the Slava got hit,\u201d Director of Naval Intelligence Vice Adm. Karl Thomas said, likely referring to the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2022\/04\/what-should-the-us-navy-learn-from-moskvas-demise\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">April 2022 sinking<\/a>\u00a0of the Slava-class Moskva, which the US said was hit with Ukrainian Neptune cruise missiles.<\/p>\n<p>As a follow-up to that shocking, symbolic victory, Thomas said, Ukraine went \u201cinto the unmanned world.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI think it\u2019s pretty clear that the asymmetric capabilities that the Ukrainians \u2014 who didn\u2019t even have a navy \u2014 has been able to levy on the Russians is pretty, pretty impressive,\u201d Thomas said. \u201cQuite frankly you\u2019ve got basically the Russian navy, the Black Sea navy, pinned to the eastern side of the Black Sea because [of] what the Ukrainians are doing with unmanned surface and unmanned underwater capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Thomas said he\u2019s \u201cexcited\u201d after seeing what Ukraine has been doing with unmanned capabiltiies in the maritime theater, especially the \u201cdirty and dangerous\u201d missions military planners wouldn\u2019t want to risk a crew to do, and how tactics are ever-evolving.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThere\u2019s a ton of lessons that we\u2019re pulling down from that, and you can translate into other theaters,\u201d he said. \u201cWhat I really like, it\u2019s expensive to build ships, and it takes a long time, and what we have today \u2014 but you might be able to build a lot of little things that don\u2019t cost as much [and have] kind of an outsized effect or help other people have an outsized effect.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Thomas\u2019 comments echo what Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, America\u2019s top general in Europe,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2024\/07\/ukraines-seaborne-success-an-arbiter-of-future-naval-warfare-nato-saceur\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">said over the summer<\/a>, when he called Ukraine\u2019s ability to counter Russia\u2019s superior navy an \u201carbiter of the future.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>In Space: Commercial Imagery For Intelligence-Infused Diplomacy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Sitting next to Thomas, Space Force Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Intelligence Maj. Gen. Gregory Gagnon said one of the most important lessons of the conflict for him came before hostilities actually broke out, in December 2021 and January 2022.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI think that another important element of this was remembering \u2026 the significant value that the commercial remote sensing industry played in enabling intelligence, supporting diplomacy,\u201d Gagnon said.<\/p>\n<p>Gagnon said that ahead of Russia\u2019s actual invasion, American officials were able to travel the world to talk to allies about what\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2022\/08\/before-russian-invasion-us-made-novel-use-of-intelligence-as-strategy\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">they were positive the Kremlin was planning<\/a>, shoring up international support before the first tanks rolled across Ukraine\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThey could say what they were seeing \u2026 [and] there was an image to show,\u201d he said. \u201cAnd much like in the past, inside secure facilities in foreign capitals, we convinced our allies. But this time, unlike other times, we then empowered our allies with the ability to show it to their public, because it was commercial, unclassified imagery. And they were able to share it with the European public and gain support.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Gagnon said it was \u201ccritical\u201d that the government was able to \u201cuse the commercial remote sensing industry to help empower and fortify US diplomatic initiatives prior to the war.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Online: The Race To Dominate The Information Space<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In a way Gagnon\u2019s story was one about information operations, a point US Marine Corps Brig. Gen. William Wilburn, Jr., doubled down after the war broke out.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe information space was dominant in this fight,\u201d he said. \u201cNever before have we seen in a modern fight the race to get to social media and put the message out, for all sides.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Wilburn, who is serving as the deputy director for Combat Support at the Cybersecurity Directorate in the National Security Agency, said even he was \u201csurprised\u201d at the amount of information the US government was willing to publicize in the fight for international public support.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cBut watching both sides, the Russians and Ukrainians, use that information space to try \u2026 amplify their message \u2014 in some cases they may even be some misinformation or disinformation out there,\u201d he said. \u201cThat was a case study in something that we hadn\u2019t seen, but that\u2019s a TTP [tactics, techniques and procedure] that we should expect to see moving forward, and those that are able to operate in that space are going to be good, and those that aren\u2019t are going to suffer quite a bit.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>On Land: Drones And Reprogrammable EW<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>For Evans, the Army ISR Task Force chief, the Ukraine conflict revealed two dominant capabilities \u2014 cheap aerial unmanned systems and intense, ever-evolving electronic warfare.<\/p>\n<p>He started by pointing to drones in situations where he says the Army is watching $500 UAVs defeat $20 million pieces of armor. \u201cThat\u2019s pretty good ROI [return on investment], if you\u2019re in Ukraine or if you\u2019re Russian from the other side,\u201d he quipped.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cSo we\u2019ve got to start thinking differently in how we acquire weapons systems, [and] we\u2019re doing that inside the Army today, trying to understand what that right acquisition looks like,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<p>As for EW, Evans said that\u2019s a \u201cunique area\u201d in which he fears the Army has under-invested, for \u201cprotection and offensive capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Specifically, he said his service was looking to focus more on EW \u201creprogramming\u201d \u2014 the ability to continually update EW tactics to stay one step ahead of an adversary who\u2019s doing the same thing.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cSo if you start to do battlefield innovation, and you see that your effects are being diminished? We have to be able to respond to that very quickly,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<p>Such a capability will be \u201cextremely vital\u201d in the \u201cnext fight.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fuente: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/2024\/09\/ukraine-lessons-in-many-domains-what-us-military-intel-officials-are-learning\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>https:\/\/breakingdefense.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Desde la proliferaci\u00f3n de sistemas no tripulados hasta el espectro de campos de batalla saturados de guerra electr\u00f3nica , dos a\u00f1os y medio de guerra&hellip; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":15412,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[2,23,28],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15411"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=15411"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15411\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15413,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15411\/revisions\/15413"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/15412"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=15411"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=15411"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=15411"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}