Syria\u2019s history of chemical disarmament efforts.<\/strong>\u00a0Syria\u2019s chemical arsenal was\u00a0developed<\/a>\u00a0in the 1980s to maintain \u201cstrategic parity\u201d with Israel. But it was not until the 2010s that the world\u00a0learned<\/a>\u00a0about the existence of these weapons. The risk of chemical weapons falling into the hands of terrorists has been at the top of the agenda of numerous countries since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.<\/p>\n In 2013, chemical attacks on Aleppo and Ghouta\u00a0claimed<\/a>\u00a0the lives of more than 1,400 people. These attacks were attributed to government forces, and an intense diplomatic crisis ensued. The worst has been averted, thanks to a\u00a0diplomatic settlement<\/a>\u00a0between the United States and Russia in September 2013. As part of that arrangement, Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) later adopted a schedule for the elimination of all chemical weapons precursors.<\/p>\n The UN Security Council approved the OPCW decision and\u00a0made all provisions binding<\/a>\u00a0upon Syria. The verification mission\u00a0confirmed<\/a>\u00a0the destruction of 1,300 tons of declared chemical warfare material by September 2014. It concluded its work promptly, partly because of the fear of repeating the sort of \u201ccat and mouse\u201d games that\u00a0plagued<\/a>\u00a0the work of inspectors in Iraq in the 1990s. Initially, disarmament seemed like a resounding success; the OPCW was even\u00a0awarded<\/a>\u00a0a Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, partly because of the publicity about its success in Syria. In the past decade, however, there has been significant skepticism about whether Syria\u2019s rushed declaration of its arsenal was a comprehensive and accurate description of all relevant information.<\/p>\n Flagrant violations.\u00a0<\/strong>In 2015 and 2016, after the alleged elimination of all chemical weapons, new reports\u00a0surfaced<\/a>\u00a0about chlorine attacks attributed to both rebels and government forces. At the time, most of these attacks did not involve nerve agents, which are considered the most dangerous chemical weapons. It was not until April 2017 that the nerve agent sarin, the one used in Ghouta, was\u00a0used again<\/a>\u00a0in Khan Shaykuhn, killing over 80 people. The OPCW monitoring body again identified the Syrian government as the culprit. Within a year, chemical weapons were\u00a0employed again<\/a>\u00a0in Douma by government forces, this time in an attack using chlorine.<\/p>\n Numerous instances of chemical weapons use after 2014 confirm that Syria\u2019s then-rulers did not fully declare and destroy all chemical agents and instead hid certain parts of the program. Some chemical agents and several sites were not officially disclosed and remained sealed to inspectors. The Syrian government continued to deny concealment or responsibility for the use of chemical arms until as late as last month\u2019s OPCW review conference, during which Syria\u2019s representative\u00a0made deceptive claims<\/a>\u00a0about its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention.<\/p>\n In light of the flagrant violations, the OPCW\u2019s Executive Council adopted a\u00a0decision<\/a>\u00a0in 2020 requiring Syria to declare all chemical weapons, disclose the locations of chemical weapons-related facilities, resolve all outstanding issues regarding implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and grant inspectors full and unfettered access. The OPCW gave Syria 100 days to comply, but Syria failed to do so.<\/p>\n In 2021, the OPCW\u00a0suspended<\/a>\u00a0Syria\u2019s rights and privileges, including, but not limited to, voting rights in the organization. At their 2023 annual meeting, state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention further\u00a0decided<\/a>\u00a0that, in light of the continuing breaches of the treaty by Syria, they would prevent the sale or transfer of dual-use chemical items. In a\u00a0statement<\/a>\u00a0published on December 9, after the fall of Assad, the OPCW reiterated that Syria\u2019s \u201cdeclaration of its chemical weapons programme still cannot be considered as accurate and complete\u201d and vowed its readiness \u201cto engage further on these matters with relevant Syrian authorities and international partners.\u201d<\/p>\n The next chapter.<\/strong>\u00a0Today, Syria remains noncompliant with the Executive Council\u2019s 2020 decision and the earlier Security Council resolution. Any engagement with the new Syrian government should, therefore, emphasize that it must fulfill these obligations by making a full and complete declaration of all chemical weapons and facilities, allowing inspectors to access any site of interest, and addressing any inconsistencies, gaps, or discrepancies that were identified during the previous regime.<\/p>\n Compliance would be preferable to military strikes like those already conducted by the\u00a0United States<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Israel<\/a>, since kinetic attacks can release toxic chemicals into the air, endanger the health of civilians, and contaminate the environment for years to come. Open-air detonations are also strongly\u00a0discouraged<\/a>\u00a0by the OPCW, which prefers incineration or neutralization as methods for destroying chemical weapons and their precursors. Chemical weapons must be disposed of safely and securely.<\/p>\n In the interests of reconciliation and transitional justice, the new government should also be encouraged to investigate instances of chemical attacks and bring their perpetrators to justice with the help of evidence-gathering entities such as the\u00a0International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism<\/a>\u00a0established by the UN General Assembly in 2016, and OPCW\u00a0bodies<\/a>\u00a0such as the organization\u2019s\u00a0Identification and Investigation Team<\/a>\u00a0and Fact-Finding Mission.<\/p>\n The use of chemical weapons is a war crime under the\u00a0Rome Statute<\/a>\u00a0and international criminal law. Syria, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute instituting the International Criminal Court. Still, the UN Security Council, under its exceptional powers, can refer the Syrian situation to the Court, as it previously did for\u00a0Darfur<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Libya<\/a>. As a court of last resort, the International Criminal Court would act only if the current Syrian authorities were unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute those responsible for chemical weapons use.<\/p>\n If Syria\u2019s new government wishes to start a new chapter, it would be well advised to forego the prohibited weapons of the preceding dictator and prosecute those implicated.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/12\/Ghouta_massacre1.jpeg-1024x525.webp\")