El presente art\u00edculo de National Interest expresa que diversos acontecimientos geopol\u00edticos y desarrollos tecnol\u00f3gicos, est\u00e1n socavando los cimientos de larga data, logrados por la pol\u00edtica de defensa antimisiles de EEUU. Y que la nueva administraci\u00f3n de ese pa\u00eds, deber\u00eda realizar una profunda revisi\u00f3n de las amenazas misil\u00edsticas que en el corto plazo se deber\u00edan enfrentar, frente a los avances alcanzados en el \u00e1rea por potenciales adversarios como China, Rusia, Ir\u00e1n y otros. Se observa adem\u00e1s, que conflictos como el de Ucrania o Israel \/ Gaza \/ L\u00edbano \/ Siria \/ Yemen, muestran que las tecnolog\u00edas misil\u00edsticas, est\u00e1n trascendiendo las delimitaciones cl\u00e1sicas entre misiles para su empleo en conflictos regionales o para la defensa del propio territorio. Entre los aspectos destacados, se afirma que el Pent\u00e1gono desplegar\u00e1 hacia finales de la presente d\u00e9cada, la Nueva Generaci\u00f3n de Interceptores (NGI) que integrar\u00eda el Ground-based Midcourse Defense System (GMDS).<\/p>\n
Shortly after assuming office, the new Trump administration will undertake a comprehensive review of the\u00a0missile threats<\/a>\u00a0confronting the United States. Geopolitical and technical developments are undermining the longstanding foundations of U.S. missile defense policy. Potential adversaries such as\u00a0Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea<\/a>\u00a0are deploying an expanding portfolio of ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles\u2014supplemented by large fleets of reconnaissance and strike drones. These countries are\u00a0pooling their resources<\/a>\u00a0in the missile domain. Both Iran and North Korea give Moscow\u00a0missiles and drones<\/a>\u00a0to use against Ukraine, while Russia is assisting these partners\u2019 aerospace programs. Meanwhile, technology is transcending delineations between regional and homeland missile systems.<\/p>\n Some beneficial changes have already occurred. The Pentagon is deploying a\u00a0Next-Generation Interceptor<\/a>\u00a0before the end of this decade. The new interceptor will make the\u00a0Ground-based Midcourse Defense system<\/a>\u00a0protecting North America from intercontinental ballistic missiles more effective. The Missile Defense Agency has launched a\u00a0new Transformation Task Force<\/a>\u00a0to evaluate options for realigning missions and responsibilities, integrating cross-domain capabilities,\u00a0modernizing<\/a>\u00a0digital technologies, improving internal agency processes, and enhancing cooperation with operational forces and other partners.<\/p>\n Advances in\u00a0U.S. missile defense capabilities<\/a>\u00a0have been evident in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The United States can leverage these technologies to build a more comprehensive missile shield. However, budget constraints and competing priorities could degrade capabilities and increase risks.<\/p>\n In particular, U.S. defenses against hypersonic missiles are lagging. The Chinese and Russian militaries are constructing several types of hypersonic conventional and nuclear delivery systems capable of traveling at many times the speed of sound. The Defense Department\u2019s latest China military power report\u00a0assesses<\/a>\u00a0that \u201cThe PRC has the world\u2019s leading hypersonic missile arsenal.\u201d Russia has employed several hypersonic missiles against Ukraine, including its new\u00a0Oreshnik<\/a>\u00a0intermediate-range ballistic missile in December.<\/p>\n Chinese and Russian leaders perceive hypersonic weapons as providing their countries with\u00a0critical strategic and operational capabilities<\/a>. At the strategic level, long-range hypersonic glide vehicles flying unpredictable trajectories in the upper atmosphere can circumvent existing U.S. national missile defenses. At the regional level, hypersonic cruise and ballistic can quickly destroy high-value targets such as U.S. command centers, military bases, and forward-deployed forces.<\/p>\n The United States needs a well-constructed plan to parry these hypersonic threats. The Defense Department is developing constellations of\u00a0Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor satellites<\/a>\u00a0to provide continuous coverage of hypersonic vehicles in flight. The Pentagon is further\u00a0assessing<\/a>\u00a0a software program to upgrade the\u00a0Long-Range Discrimination Radar<\/a>\u00a0under construction to identify hypersonic targets.<\/p>\n But seeing and tracking fast maneuvering gliders in the upper atmosphere is only half the problem. The United States also needs to shoot them down. Congress has established a deadline for the United States to field an initial hypersonic interceptor capability by the end of this decade. The Pentagon is accordingly building the first system optimized to attack hypersonic gliders. Though a novel capability, this\u00a0Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI<\/a>) leverages proven technologies that the Navy has used to shoot down hundreds of missiles and drones in the Middle East.<\/p>\n Unlike U.S. offensive hypersonic missile programs, which have experienced repeated technical setbacks, defensive efforts have been primarily budgetary rather than technologically constrained. The Pentagon spends less annually on\u00a0hypersonic interceptors<\/a>\u00a0than it does on a pair of new F-35 fighters. Funding limits have\u00a0compelled<\/a>\u00a0the Pentagon to curtail R&D contacts for engaging hypersonic gliders.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, proposals to divert the limited funding to build a \u201cgap-filler\u201d terminal interceptor with constrained capabilities have arisen to provide patchwork protection until the GPI is deployed. Though terminal interceptors shielding a few critical sites could help build a layered defense, funding for any gap filler should supplement rather than divide the budget for the GPI, which will protect a much wider area.<\/p>\n The GPI program also has built-in burden sharing. The Japanese government is allocating $368 million to support its development through a\u00a0Cooperative Development<\/a>\u00a0agreement with the United States and\u00a0other means<\/a>. The president and Congress should leverage these matching funds to support a rigorous GPI development, testing, and deployment program.<\/p>\n