En Dic24 EEUU sancion\u00f3 a cuatro entidades pakistan\u00edes involucradas en el Programa de Misiles Bal\u00edsticos de ese pa\u00eds. Se fundamentaron las sanciones, en que el citado programa acarrea severos riesgos de proliferaci\u00f3n de Armas de Destrucci\u00f3n Masiva (ADM) y sus vectores en la regi\u00f3n. Pakist\u00e1n mantiene un conflicto latente con India, la que tambi\u00e9n contin\u00faa avanzando en su programa misil\u00edstico, pero que no ha sido objeto de ning\u00fan tipo de sanciones, considerando sus estrechos lazos en el \u00e1rea de defensa con EEUU. Por esta raz\u00f3n, Pakist\u00e1n ha protestado severamente las sanciones impuestas, que ponen a su pa\u00eds en gran desventaja frente a India, en t\u00e9rminos de poder militar. El presente art\u00edculo expresa, que las consecuencias de estas medidas pueden acarrear un riesgo a\u00fan mayor, al verse Pakist\u00e1n forzado a intentar nuevas alianzas con China, como una forma de continuar con sus programas de desarrollo, que inevitablemente requieren la asistencia tecnol\u00f3gica de los pa\u00edses l\u00edderes en el \u00e1rea.<\/p>\n
In December, the United States sanctioned four Pakistani entities involved in Pakistan\u2019s ballistic missile program. According to the US State Department, this action was taken\u00a0due to<\/a>\u00a0\u201cthe continuing proliferation threat of Pakistan\u2019s\u00a0long-range missile development.\u201d While this is not the first round of sanctions on Pakistan\u2019s ballistic missiles under the Biden administration, it is certainly more significant because it directly targets the\u00a0National Defense Complex<\/a>\u2014Pakistan\u2019s missile production facility sometimes called the National Development Complex.<\/p>\n Pakistan took strong exceptions to this new installment of US sanctions. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs\u00a0dubbed the decision<\/a>\u00a0\u201cunfortunate and biased,\u201d adding that it aims to \u201caccentuate military asymmetries\u201d affecting strategic stability in the region.<\/p>\n This war of words escalated after US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0that Pakistan\u2019s development of long-range ballistic missiles raised \u201creal questions\u201d about its aims: \u201cPakistan has developed increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems to equipment that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.\u201d According to Finer, if such trends were to continue, \u201cPakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.\u201d Through these words, Finer became the first US official to label Pakistan\u2019s ballistic missiles as potentially a direct threat to the United States. Pakistan\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to give an\u00a0official response<\/a>, contending that such claims are \u201cdevoid of rationality.\u201d The ministry added that \u201cPakistan\u2019s strategic capabilities are meant to defend its sovereignty and preserve peace and stability in South Asia.\u201d<\/p>\n These policy statements underline the enduring importance for Pakistan of its nuclear and missile capabilities. This suggests that Islamabad will likely resist US attempts to undermine such capabilities, which in Pakistani eyes are critical to maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent vis-\u00e0-vis India. This resistance will have at least two negative implications for the United States.<\/p>\n Erosion of US sanctions\u2019 coercive value.\u00a0<\/strong>Pakistan will likely seek to evade US sanctions to enhance and diversify its missile forces, which are\u00a0seen as necessary<\/a>\u00a0to deter external aggression from India. Pakistan\u2019s bolstering of its missile force is aimed at plugging any gaps in its deterrence mosaic that India might exploit at\u00a0all levels of conflict<\/a>. Pakistan\u2019s objective\u2014formally known as \u201cfull-spectrum deterrence\u201d\u2014is to ensure that all Indian targets and territories are within reach of its missile force. Pakistan, therefore, will see US sanctions as a hurdle that must be leapt over.<\/p>\n Voices in support of this view will likely become louder in Pakistan as these new US sanctions against Islamabad are contrasted with Washington\u2019s growing partnership with New Delhi.<\/p>\n In recent years, the United States and India have taken their defense and strategic partnerships to the next level, ostensibly to counter China. This partnership gave India greater access to\u00a0advanced US defense technologies<\/a>. The two countries have also\u00a0expanded<\/a>\u00a0their cooperation in the space domain, which is concerning to Pakistan for two reasons: India has a\u00a0history<\/a>\u00a0of using space-launch vehicles to augment its ballistic missile capabilities, and this collaboration will likely also accelerate India\u2019s\u00a0development<\/a>\u00a0of military capabilities in space. All this will not only increase Pakistan\u2019s anxiety but might also push it to take measures to counter India\u2019s militarization of space. For instance, it could compel Pakistan to develop large-diameter solid rocket motors that are important for\u00a0space-launch vehicles<\/a>.<\/p>\n Pakistan\u2019s concerns vis-\u00e0-vis the US-Indian partnership will likely leave little room for Islamabad to accept US sanctions. The costs of scaling back its ballistic missile program would be too prohibitive, in Pakistan\u2019s eyes, compared to those that these sanctions could generate.<\/p>\n Advancements in Pakistan\u2019s India-specific ballistic missile program, despite sanctions, will add to the existing\u00a0skepticism<\/a>\u00a0about the coercive value of such tools. Should Pakistan, which is not even a US adversary, successfully dodge sanctions, it will reinforce the idea that such measures might not work against other countries, such as Iran and North Korea, exactly\u00a0at a time<\/a>\u00a0in which the United States would like to see its sanctions be effective. Because the United States appears insensitive to Pakistan\u2019s security concerns, sanctions could backfire: Pakistan will likely circumvent them while telling the world that its nuclear and missile programs are non-negotiable.<\/p>\n Pakistan might get closer to China.<\/strong>\u00a0Any US attempt to target Pakistan\u2019s nuclear weapons and missiles will contribute to alienating Pakistan from the United States, which might cause Islamabad to strengthen its relations with China in response. As Washington and New Delhi are\u00a0committed<\/a>\u00a0to countering Beijing, Islamabad could argue that India gaining a strategic advantage over it will ultimately jeopardize China\u2019s investments and interests in the region. This argument could resonate well with China, not least because of its growing\u00a0stakes<\/a>\u00a0in Pakistan.<\/p>\n Another reason that Pakistan-China relations might further mesh is the confidence they have gained from their record of navigating US sanctions. Their cooperation in the field of missile development started in\u00a01989<\/a>, coinciding with the end of the halcyon days of Pakistan-United States relations. A year after Islamabad and Beijing signed a 10-year defense production contract, the United States imposed sanctions under the 1985 Pressler Amendment on Pakistan. These sanctions, however, did not stop China from\u00a0transferring<\/a>\u00a0its M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, even though the shipment of these short-range ballistic missiles later triggered two rounds of US sanctions on Chinese and Pakistani entities in 1991 and 1993. But these steps did nothing to sever close cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing, which proved to be critical for Pakistan in successfully\u00a0fielding<\/a>\u00a0its first ballistic missiles, Ghauri and Shaheen. These launches coincided with those of India\u2019s Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles, highlighting the failure of sanctions to impede Pakistan\u2019s missile development.<\/p>\n Today, with Pakistan not being a foreign policy priority for the United States, it will be much easier for it and China to stave off sanctions that the Biden administration has imposed since 2023. Washington\u2019s efforts to contain Beijing and sanction Pakistan might result in solidifying Pakistan-China relations and pushing China to firmly protect its burgeoning interests in the region. Such an outcome could present an even bigger conundrum for Washington because Beijing has also entered into a\u00a0strategic partnership<\/a>\u00a0with Iran.<\/p>\n Meaningful, sincere engagement is important.\u00a0<\/strong>So long as the India-Pakistan acrimony continues to fester, India\u2019s nuclear and missile capabilities will drive those of Pakistan. US sanctions will do little to change this. If anything, sanctions will only boost Pakistan\u2019s nuclear force modernization. More important, however, such measures might rupture Pakistan-United States relations for good and bring Islamabad closer to Beijing.<\/p>\n The United States can avoid the undesired effects of its sanctions by engaging in more substantive conversations with Pakistan across tracks. Track II diplomacy through engagements between think tanks and universities must be rejuvenated to allow for both sides to share their concerns.<\/p>\n For Pakistan, it is important to reassure US interlocutors that all present and future modernization plans are meant solely to deter India. It would also be useful for Pakistan to discuss why testing large-diameter solid rocket motors does not represent an increased threat to the United States. For its part, the United States should acknowledge Pakistan\u2019s threat perceptions. A refusal to recognize those will only reduce the prospect of cooperation and contribute to arms racing in South Asia.<\/p>\n At a time of increased nuclear risk, US policy in South Asia should commit to strengthening, not weakening, strategic stability in the region. Dialogue, not sanctions, should lie at the heart of any such commitment.<\/p>\n