\u201cWhen you\u2019re looking at how the world might evolve, it\u2019s logically silly to put the U.S.<\/span> off to the side as if it\u2019s a neutral or passive actor,\u201d Stares told me. \u201cHow some of these contingencies evolve reflects very much what the U.S.<\/span> may do immediately before or during the crisis. [The United States is] just too important a player for it not to have that\u00a0effect.\u201d<\/p>\n This year\u2019s moderately likely, high-impact risks include not just a showdown between Russia and NATO<\/span>, but also a major cyberattack on U.S.<\/span> critical infrastructure\u2014a\u00a0prominent worry<\/a>\u00a0in Washington at the moment following Russia\u2019s suspected meddling in the U.S.<\/span> election. They also include a \u201cmass-casualty terrorist attack on the U.S.<\/span> homeland or a treaty ally.\u201d Trump has described terrorism as a much graver threat to the United States than Barack Obama has, and his administration looks set to wage\u00a0a broader battle<\/a>\u00a0against \u201cradical\u00a0Islam.\u201d<\/p>\n In this category as well is a crisis in North Korea \u201ccaused by nuclear or intercontinental ballistic missile weapons testing, a military provocation, or internal political instability.\u201d Obama\u00a0has reportedly warned<\/a>\u00a0Trump that the rapid development of North Korea\u2019s nuclear-weapons program\u2014especially the progress that Kim Jong Un\u2019s regime is making in placing a nuclear warhead on a long-range missile that could reach the United States\u2014should be the top national-security priority for the incoming administration. North Korea\u00a0has a tendency<\/a>\u00a0to take provocative actions during U.S.<\/span> political transitions, and any deal to halt the North Korean nuclear program\u00a0would require<\/a>\u00a0cooperation from the Chinese government, whose relations with Trump\u00a0have grown tense<\/a>\u00a0over the status of\u00a0Taiwan.<\/p>\n First-tier risks also encompass highly likely but only moderately impactful events such as the Taliban continuing to gain strength and the government collapsing in Afghanistan; violence escalating between the Turkish military and armed Kurdish groups in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria; and the Syrian Civil War intensifying as a result of increased\u00a0foreign involvement<\/a>\u00a0in the conflict. Notably, that last scenario has been slightly downgraded from\u00a0last year<\/a>, when it was considered both highly likely and high-impact, and thus the top concern for the United States in the\u00a0survey.<\/p>\n The Syrian war\u2019s \u201cperceived impact on U.S.<\/span> interests actually fell this year,\u201d Stares noted. \u201cNow I don\u2019t know whether that\u2019s because people feel that the worst is over, or that their earlier fears have not been realized, or that we\u2019re in the endgame\u201d of the\u00a0conflict.<\/p>\n High-Priority Threats to\u00a0America<\/strong><\/p>\n Among the second-tier risks in this year\u2019s survey are violent civil disorder stemming from the\u00a0political<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0economic<\/a>\u00a0crises in Venezuela, which the respondents considered highly likely but low-impact for the United States, and an armed confrontation between China and its neighbors over disputed territory in the East or South China Seas, which was deemed unlikely but high-impact. Stares said he was surprised that possible clashes between China and U.S.<\/span> treaty allies like Japan and the Philippines, which could draw the United States into a fight with its most formidable rival, weren\u2019t thought more likely, and that the further breakup of Iraq fell from a first-tier risk in past years to a second-tier risk this\u00a0year.<\/p>\n Other second-tier risks include turmoil in the European Union caused by the refugee crisis; a military confrontation between India and Pakistan over a terrorist attack or the contested region of Kashmir; a deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and greater political fragmentation in Libya. The coming year could also bring more violence from militant groups in Pakistan, Russian-backed militias and Ukrainian security forces in eastern Ukraine, and various foreign and domestic factions in Yemen\u2019s civil\u00a0war.<\/p>\n The respondents also pointed to two contingencies that didn\u2019t show up in past surveys: political instability in the Philippines from opposition to the new president\u2019s\u00a0brutal war on drugs<\/a>, among other policies, and in Turkey from the president\u2019s\u00a0growing authoritarianism<\/a>\u00a0following a failed coup against him. Turkey, for example, could witness widespread protests or another coup attempt. \u201cSometimes [U.S.<\/span> officials] look to stable authoritarian governments as being good partners for certain things\u2014they\u2019re predictable and so on\u2014but there is obviously also a downside risk if they are subject to domestic political challenges and unrest,\u201d Stares\u00a0said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/assets\/media\/img\/posts\/2016\/12\/PPP_Tier_1\/c53fc14b4.png\")
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In the\u00a02013<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a02014<\/a>\u00a0surveys, respondents wrote in the potential for Russia to interfere in former Soviet states including the Baltic countries, which, like the United States, are members of NATO<\/span>. In\u00a02015<\/a>, the scenario appeared for the first time among the survey\u2019s 30 \u201ccontingencies,\u201d with an \u201cunintentional or deliberate military confrontation\u201d between Russia and NATO<\/span> member states regarded as a second-tier risk. This year it was considered a first-tier risk, according to\u00a0the latest survey<\/a>, released Monday. A conflict in 2017 between one of the world\u2019s most powerful militaries and the world\u2019s most powerful military alliance was judged moderately likely and\u00a0high-impact.<\/p>\n One important caveat to the finding is that the survey was conducted from early to mid-November, meaning some respondents submitted their answers before the U.S.<\/span> election and others did so afterward. \u201cKnowing that [Donald] Trump generally has a positive view of Russia and is seemingly hopeful that U.S.-Russia relations will be better under his presidency, would the respondents have felt that a NATO<\/span>-Russia contingency deserved such high-level concern?\u201d asked Paul Stares, the director of CFR<\/span>\u2019s Center for Preventive Action, which produces the survey. \u201cI don\u2019t\u00a0know.\u201d<\/p>\n When I pointed out that you could just as well draw the opposite conclusion\u2014that Trump\u2019s\u00a0questioning<\/a>\u00a0of NATO<\/span>\u2019s utility and of America\u2019s commitment to defend fellow NATO<\/span> members from Russian aggression, along with his apparent fondness for Vladimir Putin and open-minded attitude toward Russian land grabs in Ukraine, could make the scenario\u00a0more<\/em>\u00a0likely\u2014Stares chuckled. That\u2019s also possible, he\u00a0conceded.<\/p>\n The uncertainty surrounding what a Trump presidency will mean for Russian behavior in Eastern Europe hints at a larger point: The biggest unknown for U.S.<\/span> interests in the world in 2017 may lie not in Russia or North Korea or the Middle East, but in the United States itself. Trump\u00a0has consistently suggested<\/a>\u00a0that he will depart dramatically, in style and substance, from decades of agreement among Republicans and Democrats on the general outlines of U.S.<\/span> foreign policy. We simply\u00a0don\u2019t yet know<\/a>\u00a0whether that will enhance or diminish U.S.<\/span> security and global stability. What can be said with more confidence is that Trump will introduce greater unpredictability into international affairs, perhaps reshuffling the way the world is ordered in the\u00a0process.<\/p>\n![\"Syrian](\"http:\/\/cdn.defenseone.com\/media\/img\/upload\/2016\/12\/14\/AP_16349059557013\/defense-large.jpg\" "\\"Syrian")
Over the last several years<\/strong>, concern about a particular threat to the United States has been steadily rising in a survey of American foreign-policy experts and government officials by the Council on Foreign Relations. On an annual basis, hundreds of respondents estimate the likelihood and impact on U.S.<\/span> interests of 30 possible conflicts in the coming year. These conflicts are then divided into three tiers of risk to the United States or its closest allies. The poll is an attempt to help U.S.<\/span> policymakers prioritize dangers in a dangerous\u00a0world.<\/p>\n