{"id":16365,"date":"2025-01-18T06:41:41","date_gmt":"2025-01-18T09:41:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=16365"},"modified":"2025-01-18T06:41:41","modified_gmt":"2025-01-18T09:41:41","slug":"para-el-2050-los-misiles-de-defensa-aerea-tendrian-alcances-de-hasta-1-000-millas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=16365","title":{"rendered":"Para el 2050 los misiles de defensa a\u00e9rea tendr\u00edan alcances de hasta 1.000 millas"},"content":{"rendered":"

En un informe presentado por la US Air Force al Congreso de EEUU, se estima que para el a\u00f1o 2050 los sistemas de Def Ae dispondr\u00e1n de misiles guiados con alcances de hasta 1.600 km, los que ser\u00e1n apoyados por multiplicidad de sensores y constelaciones de sat\u00e9lites, para la detecci\u00f3n, seguimiento y adquisici\u00f3n de las amenazas a\u00e9reas. Se afirma que esto redefinir\u00e1 el concepto, doctrina y empleo de los medios en el futuro campo de batalla aeroespacial. El dominio del espacio a\u00e9reo seguir\u00e1 siendo vital para la victoria, pero el \u201cComo \u2013 Cuando \u2013 Donde\u201d esto ser\u00e1 logrado<\/em>, son todos temas que requieren una completa revisi\u00f3n. Las zonas en que las aeronaves propias pueden ser alcanzadas se agrandan enormemente, as\u00ed como el riesgo de las bases a\u00e9reas adelantadas o la operaci\u00f3n de los aviones \u201ctankers\u201d de reabastecimiento, son algunas de las nuevas vulnerabilidades a considerar.<\/p>\n

\n

By 2050, the U.S. Air Force will face the challenge of missiles that can target its aircraft at ranges as great as 1,000 miles \u2014 a huge advance in anti-access capabilities compared to the distances air defense missiles can reach today. This is one of the standout predictions from a new report to Congress by the Department of the Air Force, which aims to present a vision of what the Air Force and Space Force should look like by the middle of the century.<\/p>\n

The understanding that air defense missiles will, by 2050, be able to hit their targets at such long ranges is presented in the report\u2019s assessment of how wars in the air will likely look very different at that point.<\/p>\n

\"\"
A Hawaii Air National Guard F-22 Raptor maneuvers away from a tanker while in flight near Hawaii during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2018. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Samantha Mathison JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii (July 17, 2018) \u2013 A 154th Wing Hawaii Air National Guard F-22 Raptor maneuvers away from a 434th Air Refueling Wing KC-135 Stratotanker from Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana, while in flight near Hawaii during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Samantha Mathison)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cControl of the air will still be critical to military success, but how, when, and where it will be achieved are all subject to change,\u201d the report notes. \u201cTwo fundamental developments make this necessary. The first is the vulnerability of forward-located fixed bases (and, to some extent, even remote air bases) to\u00a0attack by precision missiles<\/a>. The second is the extension of counter-air weapons engagement zones to unprecedented, almost unlimited, ranges.\u201d<\/p>\n

Specifically, by 2050, Air Force operations will be expected to be challenged by counter-air weapons \u201cwith ranges out to over 1,000 miles and supported by space-based sensors.\u201d In particular, such long-reaching weapons will threaten \u201caircraft, such as tankers, that have traditionally operated with impunity.\u201d<\/p>\n

For some time now, the Air Force has been looking to make its future aerial refueling tankers, specifically,\u00a0more survivable than they are today<\/a>, but longer-ranged counter-air missiles would threaten to push them even further away from where the aircraft they support need them to be.<\/p>\n

As well as these kinds of missile threats \u2014 which might be launched from platforms on the ground or at sea, or from other aircraft, or most likely a combination \u2014 it\u2019s worth noting the other key vulnerability identified in this part of the report. This is the fact that today\u2019s air forces \u201cdepend on a small number of\u00a0easily targeted, forward-based airfields<\/a>,\u201d something that \u201cwill not be viable in 2050, and may not be viable today.\u201d The susceptibility of these kinds of installations to attack, especially in the context of a future conflict in the Pacific, is something\u00a0TWZ<\/em>\u00a0has repeatedly addressed<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"\"
U.S. Marine Corps F-35B stealth fighters taxi down the flight line at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, in 2022. The vulnerability of this kind of forward-based infrastructure is another critical factor that will drive a change in how the U.S. is able to conduct air warfare operations by 2050. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Timothy Dischinat Four U.S. Marine Corps F-35B taxi down the flight line at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea, October 31, 2022. The aircraft traveled to Kunsan as a part of the Vigilant Storm training event. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Timothy Dischinat<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Returning to the long-range counter-air weapons, the Department of the Air Force doesn\u2019t mention any particular related programs, nor does it highlight any particular threat countries, although China is noted in the report as \u201cthe pacing challenge to the United States\u201d out to at least 2050.<\/p>\n

Indeed, it\u2019s abundantly clear from the report that China\u2019s rapid military developments are the primary reason why U.S. air dominance will be so threatened by 2050, although other countries, notably Russia, will likely have similar kinds of counter-air capabilities within reach.<\/p>\n

\u201cAgainst a pacing challenge, the current Joint Warfighting Concept already assumes that, in heavily contested airspace, air superiority can be achieved only episodically through pulsed operations,\u201d the report states, reflecting the degree to which the U.S. military\u2019s freedom of air operations is being eroded.<\/p>\n

The result of this is the expectation of an entirely different kind of air war by 2050, one in which the United States is far less able to establish control of the air, whether defensively (in its own airspace) or offensively (in an adversary\u2019s airspace).<\/p>\n

\"\"
Rapid developments in the Chinese military aerospace sector, including this stealthy, high-performance 6th generation crewed combat aircraft, tentatively known as the J-36, signal the significant investments that Beijing is making in air warfare. via X<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The realities of these new conditions, the report contends, include the removal of the U.S. Air Force\u2019s previously almost assured ability to have crewed fighters and bombers \u201coperating from relatively secure air bases and able to survive multiple sorties once air superiority was established\u201d and then to fly \u201cextended strike ranges efficiently against the full range of land and sea targets.\u201d<\/p>\n

Not only will this new reality affect the Air Force\u2019s \u201cability to deliver munitions at scale through bombing campaigns with acceptable loss rates,\u201d but no longer having control of the air \u2014 other than temporarily \u2014 will affect how the U.S. military and its allies are able to conduct operations in all domains: air, land, sea, and space.<\/p>\n

Returning to the very long-range counter-air missiles that will help bring about this change in air warfare, it should be noted that, while the report introduces these in terms of a new threat to the U.S. Air Force, there\u2019s no reason to presume that the U.S. military won\u2019t also be fielding weapons in this class by 2050 \u2014 or even before.<\/p>\n

\"\"
An artist\u2019s conception of a notional future air-to-air missile for the U.S. Air Force: the Long Range Engagement Weapon (LREW). DoD via FlightGlobal.com. Concept art of the Long Range Engagement Weapon, or LREW. U.S. Department of Defense<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the realm of air-to-air missiles, the United States\u00a0is already busy working<\/a>\u00a0on\u00a0new types of weapons<\/a>\u00a0that will out-range the furthest-reaching missiles\u00a0that it currently has in service<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As well as air-to-air missiles that are larger overall than those in use today, other ways of achieving longer range could include designs based around multi-stage rocket motors, as well as air-breathing engines, such as ramjets. In the past, we have also tracked U.S. interest in, among other things, throttleable \u201cmulti-pulse solid rocket motors<\/a>\u201d and novel \u201cpropellants, grain configurations<\/a>, cases, and liners,\u201d all of which would also be able to deliver greater range \u2014 as well as higher speed \u2014 compared to existing weapons.<\/p>\n

By way of comparison, the standard U.S. Air Force medium-range air-to-air missile, the\u00a0AIM-120 AMRAAM<\/a>, in its longer-range\u00a0D-model form<\/a>, is generally assumed to be able to hit targets at a distance of around 100 miles. The official performance figures are classified and, in practical applications, a whole range of factors impact a missile\u2019s reach, above all the energy and altitude state, as well as the direction of travel, of the launching aircraft and the target.<\/p>\n

\"\"
An F-16C assigned to the 85th Test Evaluation Squadron fires an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, or AMRAAM over testing ranges near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in 2019. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joshua Hoskins A USAF F-16C Viper fires an AIM-120 AMRAAM. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Joshua Hoskins)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The U.S. Navy has fielded, at least on a limited level, an air-launched version of\u00a0the Standard Missile-6<\/a>\u00a0(SM-6), designated\u00a0the AIM-174B<\/a>, the range of which is also classified but\u00a0should be far in excess<\/a>\u00a0of the AIM-120D, likely at least double and possibly triple the range. The Navy and Air Force are also\u00a0jointly developing the AIM-260<\/a>, another new air-to-air missile that will offer far greater range than current generation AMRAAMs, as well as other new and improved capabilities, but in a similarly sized package.<\/p>\n

When it comes to air-to-air missiles, the requirement for carriage by a fighter means that it will still be a big challenge to have an air-launched weapon able to achieve a range of 1,000 miles \u2014 roughly 10 times the reach offered by the latest AMRAAM \u2014 by 2050. It should be noted, however, that size would not be such an issue for the\u00a0B-21 Raider<\/a>, the Air Force\u2019s new stealth bomber that\u00a0may well also find itself in some kind of air dominance role<\/a>, or\u00a0the soon to be modernized B-52.<\/a>\u00a0The\u00a0F-15EX can also carry outsized weapons<\/a>\u00a0other fighters in the inventory cannot.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, developing a surface-to-air missile with this kind of prodigious range is less of challenge, although still a tall order. With far fewer restrictions on weight and dimensions, such a weapon could be conceivably built today, although limiting it to taking on larger, lumbering targets, like tankers, transports, and support aircraft would likely be necessary.<\/p>\n

When it comes to current threat capabilities, Russia claims its existing\u00a0S-400 surface-to-air missile system<\/a>\u00a0can engage targets up to 250 miles away, although even then, this would be under absolutely ideal conditions against very particular target types. Its\u00a0larger S-500<\/a>, which is designed to provide theater ballistic missiles and other\u00a0long-range air defense capabilities, has a purported maximum range of 370 miles. China has its own expanding array of similarly capable longer-ranged surface-to-air missile systems like\u00a0the HQ-18<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0HQ-19<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Whatever the launch platform, a counter-air missile with a 1,000-mile reach won\u2019t be of any use at all unless it\u2019s paired with and tied into a highly advanced and deeply networked \u2018kill web\u2019 of the kind\u00a0the U.S. military is rapidly developing<\/a>. Ultimately, it\u2019s envisaged that\u00a0advanced kill webs will play a critical role<\/a>\u00a0in rapidly identifying and selecting targets, before bringing effects to bear on them over very long distances. These kill webs are already increasingly meshing together multiple sensors, effectors, and support elements across air, land, space, surface, subsurface, and cyber domains and across the different military services.<\/p>\n

\"\"
An F-35A stealth fighter prepares to taxi out at Edwards Air Force Base, California, for Orange Flag, in 2021, an exercise designed to test long-range datalinking and targeting capabilities. U.S. Air Force\/Chad Bellay<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The space domain is going to be absolutely vital for engaging aerial targets at extreme ranges. In the future, an airborne early warning aircraft will not be able to survive within its radar\u2019s range of threat aircraft. Nor can it track targets a thousands miles away due to radar range limitations and, in many cases, the curvature of the earth.\u00a0This is where space comes in.<\/a><\/p>\n

The U.S. military is already working toward fielding new distributed satellite constellations that will be able to provide a global and persistent \u2018air picture\u2019 and generate targeting-grade tracks on threats anywhere, all networked in real-time. This, in turn, will mean missiles, air or surface launched, will not have to rely on the launch platform or existing intermediate nodes, especially increasingly\u00a0vulnerable airborne early warning and control aircraft<\/a>, to provide mid-course targeting and telemetry support. The weapons will be guided to their targets via the space-based tracking layer made up of hundreds or even thousands of satellites criss-crossing the globe.\u00a0TWZ<\/em>\u00a0has\u00a0explored in detail<\/a>\u00a0in the past how\u00a0these kinds of space-based capabilities<\/a>\u00a0will be a\u00a0major boon for American forces<\/a>.<\/p>\n

At the same time, China, especially, has been dramatically expanding its own space-based sensor architecture, including for long-range targeting purposes.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe ability of the entire [U.S.] joint force to project power depends upon our success in space,\u201d Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said today\u00a0during a talk<\/a>\u00a0that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank hosted. \u201cIf we do not deny China, in particular, its targeting capabilities \u2026 if we don\u2019t deny that precise and real-time targeting capability, the whole joint force is at grave risk.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Pentagon has been\u00a0increasingly voicing its concerns<\/a>\u00a0about the fast-expanding network of Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellites that \u201ccould support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific region.\u201d<\/p>\n

In its 2024\u00a0report on Chinese military capabilities<\/a>, the U.S. Department of Defense also discussed space-based targeting in the context of long-range precision strikes, noting that China \u201cemphasizes the importance of space-based surveillance capabilities in supporting precision strikes and, in 2022, continued to develop its constellation of military reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces.\u201d While this has, so far, been understood mainly in terms of the threat posed to targets on land and at sea, expanding the same satellite capabilities should also ensure that China is better able to ensure over-the-horizon targeting information in the air domain.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Global satellite totals as of 2018, according to an unclassified report from the U.S. Air Force\u2019s National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The color-coded breakdowns on the right-hand side are subtotals for the United States (blue), China (yellow), Russia (red), and the rest of the world (purple). U.S. Air Force<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

However the United States and its adversaries go about realizing their next generation of very long-range counter-air missiles, and whatever platforms end up using them, it\u2019s already highly significant that the Department of the Air Force considers that the 1,000-mile-range will be broken in the next 25 years, and with the help of space-based sensors. This prospect promises to help usher in an entirely new air warfare reality \u2014 for better or worse.<\/p>\n

Fuente:<\/strong> https:\/\/www.twz.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

En un informe presentado por la US Air Force al Congreso de EEUU, se estima que para el a\u00f1o 2050 los sistemas de Def Ae… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16366,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,2,28],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16365"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=16365"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16365\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16375,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16365\/revisions\/16375"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/16366"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=16365"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=16365"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=16365"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}