{"id":16560,"date":"2025-02-18T07:56:06","date_gmt":"2025-02-18T10:56:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=16560"},"modified":"2025-02-18T07:56:06","modified_gmt":"2025-02-18T10:56:06","slug":"corea-del-sur-y-su-programa-para-el-desarrollo-de-un-submarino-con-propulsion-nuclear","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=16560","title":{"rendered":"Corea del Sur y su programa para el desarrollo de un submarino con propulsi\u00f3n nuclear"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Desde el a\u00f1o 2000, Corea del Sur (SK) ha explorado alternativas para el desarrollo local de submarinos con propulsi\u00f3n nuclear. El objetivo fue disponer de sistemas que contribuyan a disuadir a Corea del Norte (NK), su principal amenaza, que ha logrado importantes avances en su programa de submarinos nucleares con capacidades misil\u00edsticas. Las autoridades de SK anunciaron recientemente su inter\u00e9s en dar un fuerte impulso al programa. Por su parte, la nueva presidencia de EUA afirm\u00f3 que reducir\u00eda su presencia en esa regi\u00f3n y que los pa\u00edses deber\u00edan invertir m\u00e1s recursos para disponer sus propios medios de defensa, sin depender tanto de la ayuda de EUA. Tal vez esta sea una buena oportunidad para fortalecer sus capacidades en el \u00e1rea de defensa, un movimiento estrat\u00e9gico para disuadir a NK y adem\u00e1s fortalecer los lazos con sus aliados en esa zona del Pac\u00edfico.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>The art of the deal is back, and so is the price tag on alliances. In this context, South Korea\u2019s ambitions to develop nuclear-powered submarines could become a critical factor in shaping its alliance with the United States. While the program is primarily aimed at\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thesubmonitor.com.au\/the-strategic-implications-of-south-koreas-ssn-program-strengthening-the-rok-us-alliance-and-regional-stability\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">countering<\/a>\u00a0North Korea\u2019s advancing submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities, it also carries broader strategic implications.<\/p>\n<p>Despite\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/48614269\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">concerns<\/a>\u00a0about the shifting priorities of South Korea\u2019s political leadership \u2014 where transitions between conservative and progressive administrations\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.tandfonline.com\/doi\/full\/10.1080\/10357718.2024.2445077?src=\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">often lead to shifts in diplomatic priorities and strategies<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 its nuclear-powered submarine program represents a tangible commitment to strengthening the country\u2019s defense posture and assuming a greater share of regional security responsibilities. Even if enthusiasm within the Trump administration may be tempered by a focus on reducing U.S. military presence on the peninsula, South Korea\u2019s investment in advanced capabilities like nuclear-powered submarines aligns with Washington\u2019s long-standing demand for allies to contribute more to their own security.<\/p>\n<p><b>What You Need to Know About South Korean Nuclear Submarines<\/b><\/p>\n<p>South Korea has explored nuclear-powered submarines\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/09\/the-us-should-support-south-koreas-nuclear-submarine-aspirations\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">since the early 2000s<\/a>, primarily to counter North Korea\u2019s growing submarine and missile threats. In 2003, the secret \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/thebulletin.org\/2017\/06\/has-south-korea-renounced-nuclear-hedging\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">362 Project<\/a>\u201d aimed at developing a nuclear-powered submarine was canceled due to U.S. pressure and political concerns. Interest revived in the late 2010s, with President Moon Jae-in expressing\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/12\/13\/world\/asia\/south-korea-nuclear-submarines.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">support<\/a>\u00a0for an indigenous nuclear submarine program in response to North Korea\u2019s advancing missile capabilities. However, South Korea lacks domestic nuclear propulsion technology but has sought alternatives, including potential collaboration with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thebulletin.org\/2020\/11\/south-koreas-risky-quest-to-build-nuclear-powered-attack-submarines\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">the United States<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2018\/03\/south-koreas-navy-leans-toward-frances-barracuda-class-nuclear-attack-submarine\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">France<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Despite these efforts, progress remains limited due to technological, diplomatic, and nonproliferation challenges, particularly regarding fuel enrichment and international agreements. While South Korea continues to seek solutions, significant obstacles must be overcome before a nuclear-powered submarine becomes a reality.<\/p>\n<p><b>Nuclear-Powered Submarines as a Tool for Burden-Sharing and Alliance Strengthening<\/b><\/p>\n<p>South Korea\u2019s nuclear submarine program is not merely about acquiring a new military capability, it is a strategic move to reinforce deterrence against North Korea while demonstrating a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/blog\/the-buzz\/should-south-korea-start-building-nuclear-submarines-22480\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">commitment<\/a>\u00a0to shouldering a greater share of regional security. Nuclear-powered submarines, with their superior endurance, stealth, and operational range, would enable Seoul to enhance its maritime deterrence without requiring direct U.S. military reinforcement.<\/p>\n<p>From a U.S. perspective, this aligns with the Trump administration\u2019s previous\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/01\/23\/trump-eu-nato-europe-defense-spending-troop-deployments-burden-sharing\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">demands<\/a>\u00a0that allies invest more in their own defense rather than relying on American forces. Trump has historically emphasized reducing U.S. military commitments overseas \u2014\u00a0 South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarine program provides an opportunity to achieve this objective. By investing in a high-end military capability that reduces dependency on U.S. naval assets, South Korea is directly responding to Trump\u2019s calls for burden-sharing.<\/p>\n<p>While critics argue that South Korea\u2019s\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.armscontrol.org\/act\/2023-07\/features\/world-order-shifts-so-does-south-korean-security-policy\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">shifting<\/a>\u00a0political landscape introduces unpredictability in its defense policies, the nuclear-powered submarine program is a long-term investment that transcends short-term political fluctuations. Regardless of the administration in power, acquiring nuclear-powered submarines would mark a fundamental shift in South Korea\u2019s military posture \u2014 one that\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.realcleardefense.com\/articles\/2024\/06\/18\/supporting_south_koreas_nuclear_submarine_aspirations_1038725.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">strengthens<\/a>\u00a0the alliance by reinforcing deterrence and reducing Seoul\u2019s reliance on direct U.S. intervention in the event of a conflict.<\/p>\n<p><b>The 123 Agreement Challenge: A Test for U.S. Commitment<\/b><\/p>\n<p>One of the biggest hurdles for South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarine ambitions is the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.state.gov\/bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation\/releases\/2025\/01\/u-s-republic-of-korea-r-o-k-agreement-for-peaceful-nuclear-cooperation\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">U.S.-Republic of Korea Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation<\/a>, commonly known as the \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2024\/09\/south-koreas-nuclear-latency-dilemma\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">123 Agreement,<\/a>\u201d which prohibits South Korea from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. . Since nuclear-powered submarines require highly enriched uranium, moving forward with the program would require U.S. cooperation, either through exemptions or alternative arrangements.<\/p>\n<p>For Washington, this presents a critical decision: whether to support a key ally\u2019s security ambitions or prioritize strict adherence to nonproliferation norms. The Trump administration, which has historically taken a more flexible and transactional approach to alliances, could view the nuclear-powered submarine program as an opportunity to modernize the U.S.-South Korean partnership while reducing America\u2019s direct military commitments in the region.<\/p>\n<p>Instead of viewing South Korea\u2019s ambitions to develop nuclear-powered submarines as a challenge, the United States could utilize these efforts to enhance a broader alliance strategy. Facilitating access to nuclear propulsion technology \u2014 whether through a controlled framework similar to\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/nationalinterest.org\/feature\/how-ensure-aukus-success-213891\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">AUKUS<\/a>\u00a0or alternative agreements \u2014 would reinforce South Korea\u2019s role as a capable security partner. This would also provide tangible evidence of U.S. support for South Korea\u2019s defense modernization, countering the perception that Trump\u2019s transactional approach undermines alliance credibility.<\/p>\n<p><b>Beyond North Korea: Aligning with U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy<\/b><\/p>\n<p>While the primary justification for South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarine program is deterrence against North Korea, the broader strategic implications cannot be ignored. China\u2019s expanding naval power and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usni.org\/magazines\/proceedings\/2022\/may\/us-rok-alliance-indo-pacific-maritime-partnership\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">assertive maneuvers<\/a>\u00a0in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait pose long-term challenges to regional stability.<\/p>\n<p>A key shortcoming in America\u2019s ability to deter and counter China is\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usni.org\/magazines\/proceedings\/2023\/march\/submarines-will-reign-war-china?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">the insufficient number of U.S. submarines<\/a>\u00a0available for the Pacific theater. This gap has driven initiatives like\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2024\/12\/16\/submarine-stealth-aukus-nuclear-powered-china\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">AUKUS<\/a>\u00a0\u2014 particularly its submarine pillar \u2014 but U.S. submarine production has stagnated, leaving a critical vulnerability in undersea warfare capabilities. In this context, supporting South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarine program would align with\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2023\/05\/south-korea-can-play-a-more-active-role-in-the-south-china-sea\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">U.S. strategic interests<\/a>\u00a0by strengthening allied maritime power in the region. South Korea\u2019s ability to conduct extended-range submarine operations would complement U.S. efforts to deter\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/backgrounder\/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy-trump\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Chinese aggression<\/a>\u00a0without requiring additional American deployments.<\/p>\n<p>The Trump administration previously took a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/election2024\/candidate-tracker\/donald-trump\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">hardline<\/a>\u00a0stance on China,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.org.au\/doing-business-with-trump-the-perils-of-a-transactional-approach-to-alliances\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">emphasizing<\/a>\u00a0the need for allies to play a greater role in counterbalancing Beijing. South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarines would fit into this strategy, providing a crucial capability that enhances regional deterrence while allowing the United States to mitigate its submarine shortfall. Even if the Trump administration prioritizes deterring North Korea over its broader Indo-Pacific objectives, the nuclear-powered submarine program would contribute to both goals, ensuring greater stability while addressing a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/digital-commons.usnwc.edu\/nwc-review\/vol73\/iss1\/6\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">pressing gap<\/a>\u00a0in allied naval forces.<\/p>\n<p><b>Managing Costs, Public Perception, and Political Dynamics<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Developing and maintaining nuclear-powered submarines is a costly endeavor, and South Korea\u2019s defense budget is already under strain due to the need to counter immediate threats from North Korea. Some may argue that the Trump administration\u2019s insistence on greater burden-sharing could create\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rfa.org\/english\/news\/korea\/trump-usfk-sma-10162024034010.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">financial pressures<\/a>\u00a0that limit Seoul\u2019s ability to invest in nuclear-powered submarines while also meeting U.S. financial demands for hosting American forces.<\/p>\n<p>However, this challenge also presents an opportunity. By committing to a nuclear submarine program, South Korea is demonstrating its willingness to invest in high-end capabilities rather than simply increasing financial contributions for U.S. troop presence. This shifts the burden-sharing debate from a transactional \u201ccost-sharing\u201d model to one of strategic investment, reinforcing South Korea\u2019s role as a proactive security partner rather than a dependent ally.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.koreatimes.co.kr\/www\/nation\/2025\/01\/113_390577.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Public perception<\/a>\u00a0in South Korea remains an important factor. The first Trump administration generated\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2019\/12\/16\/just-percent-south-koreans-would-meet-trumps-demands-pay-billions-more-us-troops-new-poll-finds\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">concerns<\/a>\u00a0about the perceived imbalance in the alliance, with many South Koreans viewing his financial demands as undermining partnership equality. The nuclear-powered submarine program could counter this narrative by showcasing South Korea\u2019s independent military capabilities while still maintaining strong U.S. ties. If the United States actively supports the program \u2014 particularly by facilitating nuclear fuel access \u2014 it would strengthen public confidence in the alliance and mitigate concerns about American commitment.<\/p>\n<p><b>Conclusion: A Strategic Investment in the Future of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance<\/b><\/p>\n<p>Despite concerns about South Korea\u2019s shifting political landscape and the Trump administration\u2019s potential lack of enthusiasm for regional engagement, the nuclear-powered submarine program presents a unique opportunity to reinforce the U.S.-South Korean alliance in a way that aligns with Trump\u2019s strategic priorities.<\/p>\n<p>By investing in nuclear-powered submarines, South Korea is directly addressing Trump\u2019s calls for allies to take on a greater share of their defense burden. These submarines would enhance deterrence against North Korea, complement America\u2019s Indo-Pacific strategy, and reduce the need for additional American naval deployments. Moreover, U.S. support for the program \u2014 whether through nuclear fuel cooperation or strategic alignment \u2014 would reinforce the alliance\u2019s credibility and modernization.<\/p>\n<p>In a renewed Trump era, the success of the U.S.-South Korean alliance will depend not just on policies, but on both nations\u2019 ability to adapt to evolving security challenges. If managed effectively, South Korea\u2019s nuclear-powered submarine program could serve as a cornerstone of alliance modernization, ensuring that burden-sharing is not just a financial demand but a strategic investment in regional stability.<\/p>\n<p>Rather than viewing the nuclear-powered submarine program as a marginal issue, the Trump administration should recognize it as an opportunity to achieve its broader objectives \u2014 reducing U.S. military commitments, strengthening allied deterrence capabilities, and reinforcing a more balanced and resilient security partnership.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fuente: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/warontherocks.com\/2025\/02\/south-korea-should-lean-into-nuclear-powered-submarines\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>https:\/\/warontherocks.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Desde el a\u00f1o 2000, Corea del Sur (SK) ha explorado alternativas para el desarrollo local de submarinos con propulsi\u00f3n nuclear. El objetivo fue disponer de&hellip; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16561,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,28,24],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16560"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=16560"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16560\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16562,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16560\/revisions\/16562"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/16561"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=16560"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=16560"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=16560"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}