{"id":17460,"date":"2025-08-24T07:45:39","date_gmt":"2025-08-24T10:45:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=17460"},"modified":"2025-08-24T07:45:39","modified_gmt":"2025-08-24T10:45:39","slug":"los-drones-no-pueden-reemplazar-a-los-tanques-y-la-artilleria-de-campana","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=17460","title":{"rendered":"Los drones no pueden reemplazar a los tanques y la artiller\u00eda de campa\u00f1a"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>En este art\u00edculo de opini\u00f3n, su autor expresa que resultar\u00eda un grave error suponer que los hoy exitosos drones (UAS) empleados masivamente en el campo de batalla de Ucrania, podr\u00edan reemplazar completamente a los grandes sistemas de armas como los blindados o la artiller\u00eda campa\u00f1a, cohetes y misiles. Las lecciones aprendidas en el citado conflicto permiten afirmar que, m\u00e1s all\u00e1 del desgaste y las bajas que los UAS ocasionan, as\u00ed como el impacto psicol\u00f3gico sobre las tropas, el verdadero multiplicador de las capacidades de combate de una fuerza, se obtiene cuando se fusionan adecuadamente todos los sistemas citados, siendo los UAS elementos que contribuir\u00e1n y complementar\u00e1n la acci\u00f3n devastadora de las grandes armas y el fuego a\u00e9reo.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">As armies scramble to learn the lessons of the Russia-Ukraine war, one question looms above all: Have drones replaced traditional weapons such as tanks and artillery?<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">For NATO, the implications are more than tactical. As the alliance struggles to rebuild its long-neglected armies, it faces tough decisions about allocating scarce money and industrial capacity. If robots are the future, then doesn\u2019t it make sense to build $500 drones instead of $5 million tanks?<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Not so fast, warn some experts. Replacing old-fashioned firepower with a purely drone force would be a blunder.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cThere are several reasons why it would be a mistake for NATO forces to rely heavily on massed small UAS [unmanned aerial systems] and long range OWA [one-way attack] drones to replace traditional weapons systems in pursuit of improved lethality and thus deterrence against future Russian aggression,\u201d argues\u00a0<a title=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/rusi-defence-systems\/nato-should-not-replace-traditional-firepower-drones\" href=\"https:\/\/www.rusi.org\/explore-our-research\/publications\/rusi-defence-systems\/nato-should-not-replace-traditional-firepower-drones\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Justin Bronk<\/a>, a researcher at the British think tank Royal United Services Institute, in a recent essay.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Rather than exploiting Russia\u2019s weaknesses, a drone-centric NATO could be playing to Russia\u2019s strengths.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cRussian forces currently field the most formidable\u201d counter-UAS capabilities in the world, according to Bronk. In addition to jammers, modified infantry weapons and short-range air defense systems, Russian forces have become accustomed to using anti-drone measures such as netting to deflect unmanned aerial vehicles and armored cages to protect vehicles.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cIn most cases, only a small fraction of the huge volumes of drones launched by Ukrainian forces reach their targets, and a still smaller proportion achieve decisive damage when they do,\u201d Bronk wrote.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Indeed, one reason why Ukrainian drones have achieved success at all is the presence of legacy firepower that constrains Russia\u2019s ability to maneuver and to concentrate counter-UAS assets.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cThis attrition from UAS has been occurring in the context of a Russian force that is still constrained by minefields and forced to disperse by Ukrainian artillery, GMLRS [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems] and ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile Systems], Storm Shadow\/SCALP cruise missiles and glide bombs, Bronk explained. \u201cIf NATO forces were to pursue massed UAS at the expense of rebuilding stocks of these traditional fires, Russian forces would find it significantly easier to mitigate UAS lethality than they have up to now in Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_17462\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-17462\" style=\"width: 1024px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" class=\"size-full wp-image-17462\" src=\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/CXCR4NA5FJGRVJM23R67RCS7MI.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"1024\" height=\"682\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/CXCR4NA5FJGRVJM23R67RCS7MI.jpg 1024w, https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/CXCR4NA5FJGRVJM23R67RCS7MI-300x200.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/CXCR4NA5FJGRVJM23R67RCS7MI-768x512.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-17462\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Ukrainian soldiers from an air defense unit of the 59th Brigade fire at Russian strike drones in Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine, on Aug. 10. (Evgeniy Maloletka\/AP)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The impact of drones in Ukraine has been contradictory. On the one hand, they dominate the battlefield, with hordes of omnipresent attack and reconnaissance UAVs paralyzing maneuver and forcing troops and vehicles to remain within cover and fortification. Most recently, waves of unjammable Russian first-person view drones guided by fiber-optic cables have\u00a0<a title=\"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/fibre-optic-drones-reshape-ukraine-s-technological-war\" href=\"https:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/fibre-optic-drones-reshape-ukraine-s-technological-war\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">devastated Ukrainian supply lines<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">Yet despite enormous effort to innovate and manufacture drones, Ukraine has only been able to limit Russian advances \u2014 but not stop them. Advancing behind saturation bombardments by artillery, glide bombs and drones, Russian offensives are succeeding in capturing ground. The gains are meager and the cost is staggering. But the Kremlin doesn\u2019t care about losses, and Ukraine simply lacks sufficient quantities of manpower and traditional weapons to defeat the attackers.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cUkraine has achieved very impressive defensive results against larger Russian forces, but has not managed to retain the strategic initiative or operational momentum despite deploying millions of UAS that are constantly iteratively developed by a system honed by multiple years of desperate fighting,\u201d Bronk wrote.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">The best evidence is that Ukraine is clamoring for legacy weapons such as ATACMS and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, rocket launchers, guided artillery shells and anti-tank guided missiles.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">\u201cWhen available, high-end ATGMs [Anti-Tank Guided Missiles], anti-tank BONUS artillery rounds and regular artillery are still prized by many Ukrainian commanders for countering Russian attempts to break through the frontlines, because they are far more responsive and more reliably able to knock out vehicles and suppress massing infantry than FPV drones,\u201d wrote Bronk.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">While UAVs have inflicted significant casualties on Russian forces (as have Russian drones on Ukrainian troops), Bronk sees drones at their most valuable as enablers for traditional forms of firepower.<\/p>\n<p class=\"Paragraph-sc-1tqpf5s-0 bFwqVI body-paragraph body-paragraph\">For example, cheap decoy or kamikaze drones can saturate air defense radars and force the defender to expend interceptors that would otherwise target missiles and rockets.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Fuente: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/unmanned\/2025\/08\/20\/nato-beware-drones-cant-replace-tanks-experts-warn\/?utm_source=sailthru&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=dfn-dnr\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>https:\/\/www.defensenews.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En este art\u00edculo de opini\u00f3n, su autor expresa que resultar\u00eda un grave error suponer que los hoy exitosos drones (UAS) empleados masivamente en el campo&hellip; <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":17461,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,2],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17460"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=17460"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17460\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17463,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17460\/revisions\/17463"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/17461"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=17460"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=17460"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=17460"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}