It’s not clear whether Iran has put naval mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but its longstanding\u00a0ability to do so\u00a0is part of the reason ships have all but\u00a0stopped moving<\/a>\u00a0through the critical global chokepoint. The time may come for the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships to demonstrate their long-touted ability to hunt mines.<\/p>\n According to a March 2026 congressional\u00a0report<\/a>, Iran is believed to possess roughly 6,000 naval mines. Although\u00a0CENTCOM commander\u00a0Admiral Brad Cooper has said\u00a0that Iran\u2019s conventional navy has been rendered\u00a0combat-ineffective<\/a>, some reports indicate that Iran has\u00a0deployed<\/a>\u00a0mines in the strait.\u00a0The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy\u00a0has hundreds of speedboats with which to rapidly deploy mines across the narrow waterway.<\/p>\n Last fall, the Navy decommissioned the backbone of its minehunting capabilities: the four\u00a0Avenger-class minesweepers<\/a>\u00a0stationed in Bahrain; four more remain elsewhere in the fleet. Purpose-built for mine warfare, the Avengers have wooden hulls wrapped in fiberglass to reduce magnetic signatures that trigger mines. But the Avengers are slow, outdated, lack any meaningful self-defense systems, and can\u2019t launch helicopters or unmanned systems.<\/p>\n The Avengers were\u00a0replaced<\/a>\u00a0in the Persian Gulf by the\u00a0long-controversial<\/a>\u00a0littoral combat\u00a0ships<\/a>:\u00a0high-speed, agile surface combatants designed for near-shore surface warfare, anti-submarine operations, and mine countermeasures. The Gulf LCSs\u2014all Independence-class vessels\u2014are equipped with minesweeping and mine-hunting capabilities: the LCS Mine Countermeasures Mission Package.\u00a0The\u00a0MCM MP<\/a>\u00a0supports mine warfare operations using aviation assets and unmanned systems equipped with an array of sensors to detect, localize, and neutralize surface, near-surface, moored, and bottom mines in the littorals. To date, the USS Canberra (LCS 30), USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32), and USS Tulsa (LCS 16) are known to have received the MCM MP. A fourth LCS, the USS Kansas City (LCS 22), is\u00a0equipped<\/a>\u00a0with MCM MP for crew training and relief support.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n With aluminum hulls, Independence-class LCSs must stay outside minefields, sending in\u00a0MH-60S Seahawks<\/a>, unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to hunt the underwater weapons.<\/p>\n USVs can tow the\u00a0AN\/AQS-20<\/a>\u00a0mine-hunting sonar system, which uses sensors to find\u00a0bottom and moored mines. The USVs can also deploy the unmanned influence sweep system (UISS<\/a>), which mimics the magnetic and acoustic signature of a ship to detonate mines safely. LCSs can also deploy the\u00a0Knifefish UUV<\/a>, which can find buried and proud mines using low-frequency broadband sonar.<\/p>\n Crewed MH-60S Seahawks can be equipped with the AN\/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS<\/a>), which detects floating and near-surface moored mines, as well as the AN\/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine-Neutralization System (AMNS<\/a>), whose\u00a0expendable Archerfish UUV can\u00a0destroy mines.<\/p>\n How might the U.S. Navy conduct counter-mine operations in the Persian Gulf? As of March, the four remaining Avengers were in Japan. The USS Tulsa and USS Santa Barbara were\u00a0spotted<\/a>\u00a0at port in Malaysia on March 15, reportedly conducting brief logistical stops. The USS Canberra was\u00a0reportedly<\/a>\u00a0in the Indian Ocean around the same time. The absence of these vessels in the Persian Gulf is surely no accident. Moving U.S. warships, particularly the three LCSs, out of port in Bahrain ahead of the conflict was likely a calculated decision to keep these vessels well out of the range of Iranian drones and missiles. Moreover, the U.S. military\u2019s strikes on Iranian vessels in port have demonstrated the vulnerability of ships docked in the Gulf.<\/p>\n Yet, even if the LCSs are sent\u00a0to the Persian Gulf, there are\u00a0concerns<\/a>\u00a0around the capability of the LCS MCM MP. The unmanned assets require hours of pre-mission calibration. They cannot operate beyond line of sight ot\u00a0the LCS. The AN\/AQS-20 has struggled to identify g mines, even when tested in the relatively benign waters of Southern California. Perhaps most concerning, the Pentagon\u2019s testing office said\u00a0in\u00a0March 2026<\/a>\u00a0that\u00a0it could not determine the operational effectiveness of the LCS equipped with the MCM MP.<\/p>\n Finally, mine-clearing is a slow, deliberate process made even more arduous when occurring in an environment contested by Iranian missiles and drones. Neither the purpose-built Avenger-class nor the LCS equipped with a relatively unproven MCM mission package would likely prove effective without a robust military escort.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n