M\u00e1s de 200 bombas de plutonio. El conglomerado nuclear estatal ruso Rosatom construy\u00f3 Bushehr y ha ayudado a operarlo durante 15 a\u00f1os. El director general de Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev, afirma que actualmente se almacenan 210 toneladas de combustible nuclear gastado en Bushehr. El\u00a0Sistema de Informaci\u00f3n de Reactores de Potencia del Organismo Internacional de Energ\u00eda At\u00f3mica (OIEA)\u00a0indica que Bushehr ha producido un total de 7.851.750 megavatios-d\u00eda de energ\u00eda t\u00e9rmica (MWd-t\u00e9rmica). Utilizando una tasa de producci\u00f3n promedio de plutonio de 0,25 gramos de plutonio producidos por MWd-t\u00e9rmica\u00a0, la planta ha producido 2.000 kilogramos de plutonio.<\/p>\n
Two days after Vice President JD Vance tried to get Tehran to give up its nuclear program in Pakistan earlier this month, Iran\u00a0offered to suspend<\/a>\u00a0its uranium enrichment activities for five years. Vance demanded 20. The Iranians said no. Vance left.<\/p>\n Now, President Donald Trump says nothing less than a\u00a0permanent ban<\/a>\u00a0will do. That certainly would be desirable for the United States. But even if the President got this injunction, it would leave a major nuclear weapons loophole: Iran still could make a significant number of bombs from the\u00a0plutonium<\/a>\u00a0that sits at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.<\/p>\n Whatever final agreement the Trump administration reaches with Iran, it should eliminate this option. The United States should demand increased inspections and the routine removal of spent fuel from Bushehr.<\/p>\n More than 200 plutonium bombs.<\/strong>\u00a0Russian state-owned nuclear conglomerate Rosatom\u00a0built Bushehr and has helped operate it\u00a0for 15 years.\u00a0Rosatom\u2019s Director General Alexey Likhachev says that\u00a0210 tons of spent nuclear fuel<\/a>\u00a0are now stored at Bushehr. The International Atomic Energy Agency\u2019s (IAEA)\u00a0Power Reactor Information System<\/a>\u00a0indicates Bushehr has produced a total of 7,851,750 megawatt-days of thermal power (MWd-thermal). Using an average plutonium production rate\u00a0of\u00a00.25 grams of plutonium produced per MWd-thermal<\/a>,\u00a0the plant has produced\u00a02,000 kilograms\u00a0of plutonium.<\/p>\n The very first batch of uranium fuel loaded into Bushehr, however, was not as enriched as subsequent batches and was unloaded much sooner. As a result, it produced more plutonium\u20140.4 grams of plutonium per MWd-thermal. Also, it produced plutonium containing a higher percentage of\u00a0plutonium 239,\u00a0which is optimal for building the most efficient plutonium bombs. (The Energy Department concluded in the 1990s that\u00a0all reactor-grade plutonium<\/a>\u00a0is usable for weapons.)<\/p>\n Adjusting for the plutonium\u00a0from\u00a0this initial fuel loading,\u00a0Iran probably has\u00a0roughly 2,100 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium. Assuming\u00a0Tehran needs 10 kilograms of this plutonium\u00a0per bomb (although an advanced weapon design would require\u00a0much\u00a0less), that\u2019s enough to make more\u00a0than 200 bombs\u2014more than twice as many nuclear weapons as experts believe\u00a0Israel possesses<\/a>.<\/p>\n Iran has the chemistry.<\/strong>\u00a0Why is nobody talking about Iran\u2019s plutonium at Bushehr? The technical difficulty and time required to convert uranium hexafluoride into an insertable bomb core isn\u2019t all that different from what\u2019s required to make bomb cores out of plutonium.<\/p>\n To make a uranium bomb core, one needs to turn the hexafluoride into an oxide, then into a\u00a0metal<\/a>, cast it, and machine it. The same is true to make a plutonium bomb core. The key difference is that plutonium initially is contained in spent fuel rods with other radioactive materials. To get at the plutonium, one needs to cut open the zirconium-clad fuel rods and chemically strip out the plutonium. Iran\u00a0mastered this chemistry<\/a>\u00a030 years ago with gloveboxes at their Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Iran could cheaply and quickly scale up this process again.<\/p>\n In 1977, the US General Accounting Office (renamed since then as the US Government Accountability Office)\u00a0examined<\/a>\u00a0how such a facility could be built within a relatively small warehouse of 130 feet long (39.6 meters) by 60 feet wide (18.3 meters) by 30 feet high (9.1 meters). The design examined would take no more than six months to build and would require technology no more advanced than that needed to produce dairy or pour concrete. Once built, it could separate a bomb\u2019s worth of plutonium after only 10 days of operation. After that, the plant could separate a bomb\u2019s worth of plutonium every day.<\/p>\n After all of the facilities noted are in place, the timelines for making a uranium or plutonium bomb core are essentially the same\u2014two<\/a>\u00a0to\u00a0three<\/a>\u00a0weeks. We don\u2019t know if Iran has all of these facilities, but these uncertainties are the same for making uranium or plutonium bombs.<\/p>\n Addressing Iran\u2019s plutonium problem.<\/strong>\u00a0Whereas the IAEA believes a significant amount of Iran\u2019s most-enriched uranium is stuck\u00a0under the rubble<\/a>\u00a0at facilities damaged by US and Israeli strikes, almost all of Iran\u2019s plutonium is above ground in an accessible spent fuel storage pool at Bushehr. This plutonium can make at least an order of magnitude more bombs than the uranium Iran has on hand.<\/p>\n As President Trump is pushing to\u00a0reopen talks<\/a>\u00a0with Iran, the US negotiators should make four minimal demands to reduce the proliferation risks of military diversions of this plutonium:<\/p>\n First, require the IAEA to impose near real-time surveillance at Bushehr.<\/em>\u00a0Currently, IAEA cameras run for\u00a090 days<\/a>\u00a0before inspectors can access the footage. Three months is enough time to divert the spent fuel and make it into a plutonium bomb. The last time the IAEA inspectors\u00a0were at Bushehr<\/a>\u00a0was eight months ago. To eliminate such inspection gaps, near real-time surveillance cameras should be installed to send images securely back to Vienna or some other safe location every 5 or 10 minutes. If there\u2019s a blackout at the plant or if the camera\u2019s view is otherwise obscured, the IAEA will know immediately and be able to send inspectors to the site.<\/p>\n The United States\u00a0failed to demand<\/a>\u00a0near real-time surveillance of Bushehr when it negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015. The IAEA sought such surveillance after the fact. Iran said no. This time around, the United States should insist on such scrutiny. This would not only keep Iran from misbehaving and the United States and the rest of the world from worrying, but would set an example for the region and beyond. Near real-time surveillance should be a requirement for all large reactors under IAEA safeguards.<\/p>\n Second, the United States should insist on the routine removal of the spent fuel from Bushehr.<\/em>\u00a0In 2005, Russia\u00a0agreed to fuel Bushehr<\/a>\u00a0and promised to take back the spent fuel. But it never did. Now, the spent fuel has piled up. The fix is to get Saudi Arabia or another Gulf Cooperation Council member to assume responsibility, including the cost of routinely shipping this material back to Russia. After the spent fuel has cooled for 36 months, it should be shipped out. Likewise, removing spent fuel at Bushehr would set a useful precedent for reactors outside of Iran. When the IAEA was first created, the United States\u00a0proposed<\/a>\u00a0that the agency take back spent fuel. That idea is worth revisiting.<\/p>\n Third, Iran must halt construction of its second reactor at Bushehr.<\/em>\u00a0This construction suspension should last until the negotiated enrichment moratorium period is over, in 5, 10, 20, or more years. After the first Bushehr reactor was nearly complete, analysts\u00a0discovered<\/a>\u00a0that Iran had used this peaceful, \u201csafeguarded\u201d nuclear project as a procurement front to secretly acquire much of the technology needed to make nuclear weapons. The United States should not allow this to happen again.<\/p>\n Finally, to seal the deal, Iran must forswear producing oxides or metallic forms of plutonium and uranium or reprocessing of any spent fuel.<\/em>\u00a0The United States also should demand no-notice inspections to verify compliance. Verification would be difficult, but without this prohibition in place, it would be virtually impossible. At the very least, this requirement would help deter Iran from further weaponization.<\/p>\n In Washington, it\u2019s said that every crisis presents an opportunity to make sounder policy. The Trump administration is now in the midst of such a crisis. Taking these minimal actions is what is now required.<\/p>\n