En la UE, los programas de financiaci\u00f3n distinguen claramente entre investigaci\u00f3n civil y militar, como lo demuestra el actual\u00a0 programa\u00a0Horizonte Europa -el programa marco de investigaci\u00f3n e innovaci\u00f3n en Europa para el per\u00edodo 2021-2027-, en el que solo la investigaci\u00f3n centrada exclusivamente en aplicaciones civiles\u00a0puede optar a financiaci\u00f3n. La investigaci\u00f3n militar se financia mediante un instrumento independiente, el Fondo Europeo de Defensa (FED), creado en 2017.<\/p>\n
Both European states and the European Union (EU) are trying to accelerate and support national rearmament and military modernization plans. As part of this, they are seeking to\u00a0<\/span>harness research and innovation<\/span><\/a>\u00a0from the civilian sector and increase engagement with actors beyond the traditional arms producers, including research organizations\u2014whether universities, research institutes or \u2018spin-offs\u2019 (companies founded by researchers to turn knowledge results into commercial products; also referred to as spin-outs). This has led to increased funding for so-called dual-use by design research: research in which both civilian and military applications are considered and enabled from the outset.<\/span><\/p>\n Efforts to incentivize dual-use by design research are largely under development and still being debated. It is therefore a good time to consider the questions raised by this shift\u2014not least about the expanding ways in which research organizations are being drawn into military production processes, and what this means for export controls and for organizations whose work is characterized by international research collaboration and openness.<\/span><\/p>\n This topical backgrounder examines how the increase in dual-use by design research blurs the traditional distinction between publicly funded civilian and military research in Europe. It highlights proliferation, diversion and misuse risks that the growth in dual-use by design research could bring, explores five challenges that need to be addressed in order for export controls to play a meaningful role in mitigating those risks, and stresses the need for a broader and more integrated governance framework.<\/span><\/p>\n The traditional distinction between civilian and military research in Europe<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n While the United States has a history of\u00a0<\/span>military<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>intelligence<\/span><\/a>\u00a0agencies funding fundamental and applied research that considers and enables both military and civilian uses, in Europe dual-use by design research has been\u00a0<\/span>far less common<\/span><\/a>. Instead, many European states have tended to fund military research that involves a restricted group of\u00a0<\/span>research institutes<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and universities, which takes place within separate ecosystems from civilian research.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the EU, funding programmes clearly distinguish between civilian and military research, as exemplified by the current\u00a0<\/span>Horizon Europe<\/span><\/a>\u2014the framework programme for research and innovation in Europe for the period 2021\u201327, under which only \u2018<\/span>research with an exclusive focus on civil applications<\/span><\/a>\u2019 is eligible for funding. Military research is funded through a separate instrument, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017. EDF-funded projects have\u00a0<\/span>included research organizations<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>as partners and, in a small number of cases, consortium leads, in collaborative European military research projects.<\/span><\/p>\n The separation of civilian and military research is not only a matter of funding. Some universities and research institutes have taken steps to limit or actively disassociate their research from any connection with the military. For example, the 1954 convention establishing the European Organization for Nuclear Research (<\/span>CERN<\/span><\/a>) states that it \u2018shall have no concern with work for military requirements\u2019. A majority of universities in\u00a0<\/span>Germany<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and some in\u00a0<\/span>Spain<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>have adopted so-called\u00a0<\/span>civil clauses<\/span><\/a>, which are commitments to perform research only for peaceful or \u2018<\/span>non-hostile<\/span><\/a>\u2019 purposes. Many of them did so in the early 2000s, when funding for military research was increasing.<\/span><\/p>\n While dual-use by design research has not been prevalent in Europe, even research exclusively focused on civilian uses can involve goods and technologies that have unintended applications in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military uses.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n To address proliferation, diversion and misuse risks associated with transfers of military and dual-use items, including in research contexts, states have developed export control measures. Export controls legally require research organizations, like companies, to request an authorization before exporting military items or dual-use items that could be used to produce, develop or deploy WMD or conventional military equipment.<\/span><\/p>\n Many\u00a0<\/span>states<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0<\/span>EU<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>have also taken steps towards adopting\u00a0<\/span>research security policies and guidelines<\/span><\/a>, usually in collaboration with academia and research institutes, to safeguard against the broader range of security risks related to international research collaboration.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Export control and research security policy frameworks are complemented by mechanisms that some research organizations have set up themselves, such as\u00a0<\/span>ethics committees<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>internal human rights policies<\/span><\/a>. Many also use and apply the concept of\u00a0<\/span>responsible research and innovation<\/span><\/a>\u00a0to help identify and mitigate the humanitarian and strategic risks related to the development, diffusion and use of research activities.<\/span><\/p>\n Policy incentives for dual-use by design research<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n In recent years, both the EU and individual European states have launched, or at least discussed, policy initiatives to encourage or incentivize dual-use by design research. Their justifications include strengthening\u00a0<\/span>economic security<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and driving technological innovation in emerging technology areas\u2014from artificial intelligence (AI) to quantum and hypersonic technologies\u2014that they\u00a0<\/span>increasingly view as strategic<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and in which research organizations are at the cutting edge of research and development. Another of the main drivers has been\u00a0<\/span>European rearmament plans<\/span><\/a>. Lessons from Ukraine\u2019s military innovation processes, which have systematically\u00a0<\/span>integrated civilian technologies<\/span><\/a>\u00a0into military procurement processes\u2014particularly when it comes to drone warfare capabilities\u2014have been an important influence.<\/span><\/p>\n The dual-use by design approach was mentioned in the 2025\u00a0<\/span>European Preparedness Union Strategy<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>and further detailed in two EU Commission reports drafted by independent groups of experts on why a dual-use by design approach\u00a0<\/span>is needed<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>how it might look<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Some EU states, including\u00a0<\/span>Germany<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>Sweden<\/span><\/a>, have taken more explicit steps towards incentivizing dual-use by design research than their peers by proposing initiatives to strengthen cooperation between civilian and military research ecosystems. That said, current and expected policy changes at the national and European levels will have implications across Europe.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In parallel, there have been calls in Germany from policymakers and in parliament to\u00a0remove or redesign the civil clauses adopted by German research organizations, which are seen as an obstacle to increasing dual-use by design research. A\u00a0<\/span>court case<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>in Bavaria\u00a0<\/span>concluded in March 2026<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>that while the State of Bavaria could not oblige universities to cooperate with the military establishment, it could nevertheless prohibit civil clauses. Meanwhile, some research organizations are considering\u00a0<\/span>removing the clause themselves<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Increased funding for dual-use by design research<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Policy initiatives are leading in turn to changes in existing civilian and military research funding mechanisms and to the creation of new mechanisms dedicated to dual-use by design research.<\/span><\/p>\n Several existing funding mechanisms for civilian research have already been adapted to enable dual-use by design research. A December 2025 EU\u00a0<\/span>regulation<\/span><\/a>\u00a0(Regulation 2025\/2653) incentivizing investment to support implementation of the ReArm Europe Plan includes modifications to a range of existing funding instruments designed to facilitate and encourage investment in dual-use and military research and innovation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n One of the instruments it modifies is the European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator, which funds\u00a0<\/span>critical emerging technology<\/span><\/a>\u00a0innovation close to commercialization. The regulation creates a\u00a0<\/span>targeted exception<\/span><\/a>\u00a0to the \u2018exclusive focus on civil applications\u2019 principle in order\u00a0to remove investment barriers for military and dual-use start-ups. While the EIC Accelerator is not open to non-profit entities, it is relevant for\u00a0<\/span>research spin-offs<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The regulation also modifies the Digital Europe Programme, established in 2021, to stress that support to dual-use actions is \u2018a general and specific objective of the instrument\u2019. The programme funds research and innovation in areas such as supercomputing, AI, cybersecurity and semiconductors, and includes\u00a0<\/span>many projects<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>that are led by research organizations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Further changes to major civilian research funding streams are also being considered. The most significant anticipated change is contained in the European Commission\u2019s July 2025\u00a0<\/span>proposal<\/span><\/a>\u00a0for a new iteration of Horizon Europe for the period 2028\u201334. The proposal, which has reportedly received\u00a0<\/span>positive feedback<\/span><\/a>\u00a0from member states, suggests that the scope of Horizon Europe be broadened to allow it to \u2018support dual-use actions\u2019. It thus goes beyond the \u2018options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential\u2019 outlined in a\u00a0<\/span>2024\u00a0<\/span>European Commission\u00a0<\/span>white paper<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Military funding streams have also been created for or adapted to dual-use by design research. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), operational since 2023, is designed to\u00a0<\/span>accelerate dual-use innovation<\/span><\/a>\u00a0capacity in \u2018deep technology\u2019 areas. Research organizations are not only\u00a0<\/span>participating<\/span><\/a>\u00a0in the programme but also becoming\u00a0<\/span>accelerator sites<\/span><\/a>, acting as hubs in different countries. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Defence has recently\u00a0<\/span>made funds available<\/span><\/a>\u00a0for the creation of dual-use research spin-offs to focus on technology development with both civilian and military applications. The Swedish armed forces put out a\u00a0<\/span>joint call<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>with the national innovation agency Vinnova in 2024 for proposals to strengthen synergies between civilian companies and universities and the military sector on technology innovation.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n New proliferation, diversion and misuse risks<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Research organizations<\/span><\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>others<\/span><\/a>\u00a0have highlighted the many questions and risks raised by the shift towards dual-use by design research.\u00a0These range from ethical concerns and calls for civil clauses to be strengthened, to doubts about the\u00a0<\/span>feasibility<\/span><\/a>\u00a0of dual-use by design given the very different processes for developing and procuring military and security technology on the one hand and civilian technology on the other. Other organizations have stressed the possible\u00a0<\/span>negative impacts<\/span><\/a>\u00a0for scientific progress if funding is redirected away from (purely) civilian funding programmes.<\/span><\/p>\n Beyond this, the growth of dual-use by design research could increase the risk of military- and security-relevant knowledge and technologies falling into the hands of unintended end users or used in ways that violate human rights or international humanitarian law, which in turn could pose national security risks.\u00a0<\/span>Reports<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>by national intelligence services indicate that knowledge in emerging technology areas with potential military applications is highly sought after by state and non-state actors for military and proliferation purposes. As funding pathways enable more research organizations to conduct dual-use by design research, the number of actors developing military- and security-relevant knowledge will increase, multiplying the possible avenues through which diversion could occur.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Research areas that pose misuse concerns include research in technologies that could be integrated into military or security systems that are then used to commit human rights or international humanitarian law violations. Such concerns have, for example, recently been flagged over research into surveillance technologies, such as facial recognition technology and\u00a0<\/span>AI-enabled computer vision<\/span><\/a>\u00a0capabilities.<\/span><\/p>\n Five challenges for export controls stemming from dual-use by design research<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Export controls play an important role in addressing risks of proliferation, diversion and misuse. They do this by regulating the transfer of military and certain dual-use items and by requiring exporters to establish internal compliance programmes (ICPs) to ensure they fulfil their obligations. However, current developments in dual-use by design research pose several challenges for export controls to achieve their full potential in this area. Five of these are explored below.<\/span><\/p>\n 1. Distinguishing between the multiple meanings of \u2018dual-use\u2019<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n A first challenge is that the term \u2018dual-use\u2019 is used to mean\u00a0<\/span>different things<\/span><\/a>. In the context of export controls, \u2018dual-use\u2019 refers to civilian goods,\u00a0<\/span>software and technology<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<\/span>that have potential applications in conventional military or WMD programmes. These are controlled either by virtue of being included in control lists or in relation to specific end uses and end users. Although dual-use by design research refers to research in which both civilian and military applications are considered and enabled from the outset, research funded under dual-use by design calls is not automatically covered by export controls.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Another distinction and potential source of confusion is that \u2018dual-use by design\u2019 and other similar terms can refer to research with very different levels of \u2018<\/span>defence proximity<\/span><\/a>\u2019, potentially requiring very different safeguarding measures. For example, military funding streams may be more likely to fund dual-use by design research with direct military applications, while civilian funding streams may focus on funding research that commits to considering, although not necessarily pursuing, potential military applications. \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n 2. Interpreting and applying export control exemptions for \u2018basic scientific research\u2019<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Within the EU, export controls exempt basic scientific research\u2014research \u2018not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective\u2019\u2014from their coverage. However, there remains a lack of clarity and consistency in how this term is applied.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Available guidance on ICPs published by the EU and states identifies the nine \u2018<\/span>technology readiness levels\u2019<\/span><\/a>\u00a0(TRLs; used to assess the maturity of a technology) as one of the tools that can be used to help determine when a specific item has developed beyond \u2018basic scientific research\u2019, far enough to be controlled. Research at TRLs 1 and 2 is in most cases\u00a0<\/span>exempt from export controls<\/span><\/a>. However, this metric may be less meaningful with a dual-use by design approach, as it means low-TRL research may already consider and enable a range of military and civilian uses. States need to consider the conditions under which the basic scientific research exemption does or does not apply in relation to dual-use by design research, and this could be clarified in new or updated guidance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n