Las fuerzas militares tienen servicios para tierra, mar, aire y espacio. Es hora de construir uno para el ciberespacio. EE.UU.\u00a0se est\u00e1 preparando para el conflicto cibern\u00e9tico con una estructura militar que todav\u00eda trata el ciberespacio como una funci\u00f3n de apoyo secundaria.\u00a0La cibern\u00e9tica militar todav\u00eda lucha con problemas de reclutamiento y retenci\u00f3n inconsistentes. Un joven estadounidense que puede escribir c\u00f3digo, detectar debilidades en el software o entender c\u00f3mo se rompen los sistemas digitales, puede ser exactamente el tipo de recurso humano que el pa\u00eds necesita, incluso si esa persona no se ajusta al molde est\u00e1ndar, que los servicios existentes construyeron para reclutar, promover y retener.<\/p>\n
The United States is preparing for cyber conflict with a military structure that still treats cyberspace as a secondary supporting function.<\/p>\n
We have soldiers for land, sailors for sea, airmen for air, and guardians for space. But in cyberspace, a borderless domain where American forces are engaged with adversaries every day, we still do not have a military service whose central purpose is to build a quality, expert force, equipped with the most cutting-edge capabilities, for war-fighting in the cyber domain.<\/p>\n
For more than a decade, Washington has tried to patch this problem instead of fixing it. Congress has granted U.S. Cyber Command new authorities. The Pentagon has adjusted organizations, budgets and training pipelines. Senior leaders have made the current structure work better than it should. But those reforms have not changed the basic fact that there is no military service that sees organizing, training and equipping forces for the cyber domain as its first and primary priority.<\/p>\n
Cyber Command\u2019s job is to employ cyber capabilities in military operations. But it still depends on the existing services to recruit, train, retain, and develop the people who carry out those missions and equip them with the capabilities to do so. In the rest of the military, that division of labor is clear: services build forces, and combatant commands employ them.<\/p>\n
Cyber remains the exception. The Navy must build fleets, the Army must build land power, the Air Force must attain air superiority, and so on. Each service has cyber responsibilities, but each also has core missions that naturally, and appropriately, come first. Cyber matters to all of the services, but it is not the central organizing mission of any of them.<\/p>\n
The result is a weaker cyber force than the country needs. The military\u2019s cyber enterprise still struggles with inconsistent recruiting and retention problems. A young American who can write code, spot weaknesses in software or understand how digital systems break may be exactly who the country needs, even if that person does not fit the standard mold the existing services were built to recruit, promote and retain.<\/p>\n
Cyber talent does not grow by accident. It must be recruited deliberately, trained continuously and retained through a career model that rewards technical mastery, instead of forcing top operators to move into command or management roles just to advance. The country needs people who can spend years becoming experts in offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, not personnel forced through systems that were never built for the mission.<\/p>\n
The threat is evolving too quickly to justify continuing marginal fixes to the current system. China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and criminal actors are targeting U.S. networks, critical infrastructure and military systems. Artificial intelligence will only increase the speed and scale of cyber operations. The United States cannot keep relying on a cyber force stitched together across multiple services, each with different priorities, incentives and personnel rules.<\/p>\n