{"id":3131,"date":"2018-07-16T12:47:48","date_gmt":"2018-07-16T15:47:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nachodelatorre.com.ar\/mosconi\/?p=3131"},"modified":"2018-07-16T12:47:48","modified_gmt":"2018-07-16T15:47:48","slug":"la-amenaza-de-los-drones-a-las-pequenas-fracciones-de-combate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=3131","title":{"rendered":"La amenaza de los drones a las peque\u00f1as fracciones de combate"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/u>Los elementos y fracciones del US ARMY en los niveles de Batall\u00f3n e inferiores no se encuentran preparados para hacer frente a la creciente amenaza a\u00e9rea de los drones, en especial los que disponen de capacidad letal. Seg\u00fan la opini\u00f3n de expertos en el tema, los planes de capacitaci\u00f3n y equipamiento implementados, siempre van retrasados respecto de los avances tecnol\u00f3gicos, muchos de ellos de bajo costo, en poder del oponente.<\/p>\n

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\"\"Army units at and below the battalion level are unprepared to defeat aerial\u00a0drones\u00a0and current plans can\u2019t keep up with rapidly evolving technology, according to a recent study.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Back in 2016, the Army Research Office asked an outside organization, The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, to evaluate their counter\u00a0drone\u00a0capabilities for battalion and below operations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The report they published earlier this year notes some significant gaps and threats to soldiers with this\u00a0technology.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cContrary to the past, when U.S. warfighters may have found (improvised explosive devices), now the IEDs will find our warfighters,\u201d according to the report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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While the Army and Marine Corps, which also included representatives in the study, are throwing resources at the small drone problem, they are not keeping pace with the threat.<\/p>\n

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Army units at and below the battalion level are unprepared to defeat aerial\u00a0drones\u00a0and current plans can\u2019t keep up with rapidly evolving technology, according to a recent study.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Back in 2016, the Army Research Office asked an outside organization, The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, to evaluate their counter\u00a0drone\u00a0capabilities for battalion and below operations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The report they published earlier this year notes some significant gaps and threats to soldiers with this\u00a0technology.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cContrary to the past, when U.S. warfighters may have found (improvised explosive devices), now the IEDs will find our warfighters,\u201d according to the report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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While the Army and Marine Corps, which also included representatives in the study, are throwing resources at the small drone problem, they are not keeping pace with the threat.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cArmy time frames are significantly out of sync with the rapidly advancing performance capabilities of individual (small Unmanned Aerial Systems) and teams of sUASs,\u201d according to the report.<\/p>\n

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The report noted that most of the service\u2019s counter drone asset work was focused on heavy vehicle platforms or on fixed sites, which leaves smaller units most likely to first encounter the threat more exposed.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cSignificant quantities of man-portable\u201d counter-drone systems have been fielded, Army spokesman Maj. Chris Ophardt told Army Times in an email. The Army will continue to pursue those capabilities based on emerging threats.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Based on his response, which did not include details of capabilities, the Army is pursuing other ways to defeat drones. A large portion of the study was classified, due to operational security concerns.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cFuture Army C-UAS systems will encompass a variety of potential platforms to include fixed, mobile, and Soldier-portable capabilities,\u201d Ophardt wrote.<\/p>\n

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But beyond the types of systems employed, what they\u2019re targeting or attacking also came under fire in the report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The Army and other branches have invested significantly in counter-drone technology, \u201coften focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions and GPS signals of individual sUASs. However, today\u2019s consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency (command and control) links.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Drones now available can use automated target recognition, tracking, obstacle avoidance and other software-enabled activities instead of traditional RF and GPS.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Ophardt did not divulge specifics of how the Army is addressing this, but responded that the service\u2019s counter drone capabilities, \u201cinclude multiple methods in order to detect, identify and defeat enemy UAS.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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A new school began last month at Fort Benning, Georgia to give basic trainees familiarity with small drones. The drone school gives infantry and scouts the ability to fill out a seven-line report when they encounter a drone then relay that info to their headquarters.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The students use both fixed-wing and helicopter small drones. They also learn defensive tactics such as how to use dispersal and hiding tactics to minimize casualties from drone-coordinated fires, according to an Army release.<\/p>\n

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Those introductory tactics can help even brand-new soldiers start thinking about how to deal with drone threats.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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But, at the same time, the low-level tactics currently used for counter drone work have tried to use \u201ckinetic effects,\u201d basically shooting down the drone by interfering with its signals or overheating its circuits.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The report noted that method isn\u2019t practical on a wide scale for large numbers of troops, especially dismounted units.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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That path only adds more gear from the equipment to the batteries, to an already overloaded soldier, not to mention the \u201ccognitive load\u201d of training and using another piece of equipment, according to the report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Ophardt responded that the Army\u2019s counter-drone strategy included \u201cmultiple methods\u201d to detect, identify and defeat\u201d enemy drones.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The major provided a similar response when asked about Army efforts at counter-drone tactics, capabilities against swarming drones and collaboratively acting drone groups, which the report remarks will be more prevalent and sophisticated as soon as 2025.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Report authors urge Army leaders to adjust their timelines for matching tech development, which are woefully inadequate for the exponential changes in software, hardware and drone capabilities.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Current Army time frames consider near-term planning to run from now until 2025; mid-term planning in the 2026 to 2035 window and far-term at the 2036 to 2050.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Those efforts mirror vehicle acquisition strategy timelines, not the drone arena.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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The report pushes for a near-term planning of one to two years, mid-term at the three- to five-year level and far term in drone tech at the six- to eight-year range.<\/p>\n

The advances are happening so quickly, authors point out, that it is \u201cimpossible to predict performance capabilities beyond eight years.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Fuente:<\/strong>\u00a0https:\/\/www.armytimes.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Los elementos y fracciones del US ARMY en los niveles de Batall\u00f3n e inferiores no se encuentran preparados para hacer frente a la creciente amenaza… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,2,29],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3131"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3131"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3131\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3131"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3131"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3131"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}