{"id":3451,"date":"2018-11-15T14:52:12","date_gmt":"2018-11-15T17:52:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nachodelatorre.com.ar\/mosconi\/?p=3451"},"modified":"2018-11-15T14:52:12","modified_gmt":"2018-11-15T17:52:12","slug":"preocupacion-en-eeuu-por-su-dependencia-en-algunos-materiales-criticos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=3451","title":{"rendered":"Preocupaci\u00f3n en EEUU por su dependencia en algunos materiales cr\u00edticos"},"content":{"rendered":"

Nuevamente en EEUU se despierta la preocupaci\u00f3n por su dependencia de ciertos materiales cr\u00edticos. En este caso se trata de la comunicaci\u00f3n de China referente a que piensa limitar la producci\u00f3n nacional de tierras raras. La IUPAC define a las tierras raras como los 17 elementos de la tabla peri\u00f3dica pertenecientes al grupo de los lant\u00e1nidos m\u00e1s el escandio y el itrio. Su importancia es crucial en la industria electr\u00f3nica, y en la producci\u00f3n de magnetos, vidrios, aleaciones y catalizadores. <\/span><\/p>\n

\"AnHow to view China\u2019s\u00a0<\/strong>recent threat<\/a>\u00a0to limit domestic production of rare earths, those 16 elements that make our cellphones and smart bombs work? It\u2019s the latest move in a game that began before the United States realized it was even playing, that has grown more complex than\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0leaders realize, and that is nearing a very unfortunate\u00a0ending.<\/p>\n

The game began in earnest in 1980, when the United States made two moves that gave its opponent an advantage it has never relinquished. One was industrial: Molycorp, then the country\u2019s largest rare earth mining and processing company, began transferring its processing technology to China (as detailed by Boston University professor Julie Michelle Klinger in\u00a0Rare Earth Frontiers<\/a><\/em>). The other was regulatory: although rare earths are most easily and cheaply obtained as a byproduct of mining for other minerals, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1980 more or less inadvertently placed this activity under the same regulations as mining nuclear fuel. Within a decade and a half, all\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0producers of heavy rare earths shut down. Today, China gets most of its rare earths as a no-cost byproduct of iron ore mining, while the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>runs one expensive, low-value specialty mine: the\u00a0Mountain Pass operation<\/a>\u00a0in\u00a0California.<\/p>\n

Over the following two decades, China raced to cement its global dominance in the field. It established the world\u2019s largest rare earth research facility, a development that generally escaped\u00a0U.S.<\/span>notice, save in a\u00a0single issue<\/a>\u00a0of the Ames National Laboratory rare earth newsletter. Chinese researchers filed for their first international rare earth patent in 1983; within fourteen years, the total number of Chinese patent filings in the field exceeded that of the U.S., which had been working in the field since 1950. And Beijing was using its leverage as the world\u2019s top producer of rare earths to acquire or import\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0technology companies specializing in metals, alloys,\u00a0magnets<\/a>, and integrated rare earth components.<\/p>\n

Perhaps our worst blunder came in 1995, when Congress allowed China to buy Magnequench, the only\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0producer of magnets for our most advanced guided missiles; and\u00a0GA<\/span>\u00a0Powders, a producer of rare earth magnetic powders. Acquired by the family of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Magnequench shut its\u00a0U.S.<\/span>facility seven years later, ending America\u2019s ability to produce magnets key to missiles and other\u00a0weapons.<\/p>\n

But the mistakes didn\u2019t stop there. In 1998, the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0National Defense Stockpile\u00a0sold off\u00a0the last of our nation\u2019s strategic reserve of rare earths,\u00a0including\u00a0all rare earths previously held by the Energy Department. That same year, Rhodia Incorporated, the last integrated\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0producer of rare earth metals and alloys, closed its rare earth separation facility in Texas, announced plans to build a new one in China, and signed a deal with Baotou Rare Earth Development Zone to construct a metal and alloy facility in\u00a0Mongolia.<\/p>\n

By 2002, Molycorp closed the last rare earth mine in the United States. It restarted operations around 2010,\u00a0closed again five years later, and restarted once more this\u00a0year.<\/p>\n

Our leadership failed to note any of this because they did not understand the strategic significance of these\u00a0materials.<\/p>\n

In August, China announced that it would reduce rare earth separation and smelting by 36 percent through the end of the year, putting it on track to produce 45,000 tons of the various elements \u2014 only enough for domestic production, with none left for export. The word reached most Western ears only last week, when Adamas Intelligence, a corporate advisory firm that specializes in rare earths and other metals,\u00a0told Reuters\u00a0about it. An Adamas analyst said that the cost of one rare earth mineral, PrNd oxide, is on track to double within next five years. Overall, Reuters reports, \u201cChinese exports typically supply around 80 percent of the globe\u2019s rare earth needs, about 156,000 tonnes\u00a0annually.\u201d<\/p>\n

Reuters noted that \u201cthe\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0military is worried about China\u2019s dominance of the rare earths market, calling it a \u2018significant and growing risk,\u2019 according to the Pentagon\u2019s recently released industrial-base\u00a0study.<\/p>\n

But there appears to be little concern evinced \u2014 at least in public\u00a0\u2014 by the White House, the Departments of Energy or Commerce, or Congress. Instead,\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0policy makers appear to be counting on a quick ramp-up of private mining operations to cover the absence of Chinese rare earth concentrates and oxides. Regrettably, mining cannot solve the problem. To start with, mine permitting and development typically takes 7 to 10 years in the United States, according to\u00a0one industry-backed study. Moreover, no one is rushing to fund new rare earth\u00a0mines.<\/p>\n

But \u2014 and this is what few in the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0government appear to understand \u2014 China\u2019s grip on the world\u2019s rare earths is not limited to its 80-percent share of raw materials. It also\u00a0controls almost all of the world\u2019s processing facilities\u00a0that transform raw concentrates and oxides into useful forms: metals, alloys, magnets, garnets, and the\u00a0like.<\/p>\n

Apparently, the official\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0plan is for the private sector to respond to the market opportunity. But in 2010, a\u00a0U.S.<\/span>Government Accountability Office\u00a0study\u00a0concluded that developing the requisite metallurgical capabilities could take up to a decade and a\u00a0half.<\/p>\n

Will\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0technology companies weather a 15-year supply disruption? No. Instead, they will move their factories, and all related technologies, to China. We know this, because\u00a0it happened in 2010. The target then was Japanese companies \u2014 which knuckled under to Chinese demands and sold or moved their factories to China.<\/p>\n

This time it\u2019s a global threat. And it\u2019s a threat that shows just how deft China has become in coercing the world. After the Reuters report hit the wires, China\u00a0quietly issued a clarification, suggesting that they simply reweighted the output quota, and nothing has actually changed. That\u2019s what happened with Japan eight years ago; there is little evidence that any single Japanese customer was actually \u201cembargoed.\u201d China\u2019s actions mostly amounted to the threat and some shipping delays. Their effects were no less\u00a0substantial.<\/p>\n

Congress has failed to act or even understand the underlying issues.\u00a0 It is time for the Administration to use its powers under the\u00a0Defense Production Act\u00a0to establish a fully integrated resource value chain that can guarantee our technology and defense industry delivery of rare earth metals, alloys, magnets and other value added\u00a0materials.<\/p>\n

Failure to do so will help China pull our remaining tech sector into its hand and deepen our defense industries\u2019\u00a0dependence.<\/p>\n

Fuente:<\/strong>\u00a0https:\/\/www.defenseone.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Nuevamente en EEUU se despierta la preocupaci\u00f3n por su dependencia de ciertos materiales cr\u00edticos. En este caso se trata de la comunicaci\u00f3n de China referente… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[29,24],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3451"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3451"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3451\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3451"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3451"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3451"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}