{"id":3713,"date":"2019-03-18T17:17:27","date_gmt":"2019-03-18T20:17:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nachodelatorre.com.ar\/mosconi\/?p=3713"},"modified":"2019-03-18T17:17:27","modified_gmt":"2019-03-18T20:17:27","slug":"estado-de-avance-de-los-proyectos-de-soldado-del-futuro","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=3713","title":{"rendered":"Estado de avance de los proyectos de “Soldado del Futuro”"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/u>Hace a\u00f1os que tanto EUA como Rusia que desarrollan investigaciones relacionadas con el equipamiento necesario para sus respectivos proyectos de \u201cSoldado del Futuro\u201d. Con \u00e9xitos m\u00e1s promocionados que reales, los resultados hasta ahora han sido modestos, limit\u00e1ndose a mejorar la protecci\u00f3n individual y la letalidad de las armas, as\u00ed como generar alternativas de conectividad eficientes entre los individuos y con sistemas aut\u00f3nomos.\u00a0<\/p>\n

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Both American and Russian special operations forces have made it clear they\u2019re seeking game-changing technology to elevate their troops on the battlefield, but reality often tramples expectations.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Going back to 2013,\u00a0U.S. Special Operations Command\u00a0sought proposals for its\u00a0Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit, or TALOS. The system was quickly likened to an \u201cIron Man\u201d suit, but in fact, it sought a range of technologies that would minimize traumatic brain injury, reduce electromagnetic and acoustic signature and protect against advanced rifle rounds.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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SOCOM threw water on the ambitious program in February, announcing that it would not be the \u201cexoskeleton\u201d they had boldly advertised, and it certainly wouldn\u2019t be a feasible kit addition for troops in close quarters battle.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cIt\u2019s not the Iron Man. I\u2019ll be the first person to tell you that,\u201d SOCOM Acquisition Executive James Smith said at a defense industry forum.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Instead, what the project has reportedly yielded are load-reducing systems, like the\u00a0ONYX exoskeleton. That will probably end up being useful for long road-marches, but not exactly the combat battle suit first envisioned.<\/p>\n

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On the other side of the world, the Russian Federation has been revamping its own special operations forces.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A Russian Iron Man?<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The country\u2019s \u201cRatnik” program is developing its third iteration of combat equipment \u2014 the first two versions of the program were basic gear for soldiers, according to Rob Lee, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and doctoral candidate who focuses on Russian defense policy at King\u2019s College London.<\/p>\n

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\u201cThey had a new helmet, new FLAK, new load-bearing vest, with a few higher-tech systems like a GLONASS [GPS alternative] receiver and a tablet for commanders,” Lee said. “It just gave them gear roughly comparable to what Western forces had, since their older equipment wasn\u2019t really upgraded during the 1990s-2000s, but it wasn\u2019t anyway comparable to the TALOS stuff.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Ratnik 3 does boast some of the early TALOS promises: exoskeleton, a visor with a laser aiming system and integrated command-and-control technology, or C2.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Most of that is probably hype.<\/p>\n

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\"The<\/figure>\n

The third generation of Russia\u2019s Ratnik “soldier of the future” combat outfit, featuring an active exoskeleton, may be created by 2025, a senior Russian defense official Alexander Romanyuta said during a forum in 2018. (Marina Lystseva\/TASS)<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cAs a reminder, most GRU spetsnaz brigade servicemen still aren\u2019t equipped with optics on their rifles, and their most elite units generally prefer Western optics like Aimpoints or EOTechs,\u201d Lee said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In\u00a0both training\u00a0and during operations in\u00a0warzones such as Syria, Russian spetsnaz are often pictured without any optics mounted on their rifles.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cThey kind of remind me of infantry units going into [Operation Iraqi Freedom] when one guy per squad would have an ACOG [a common optic],\u201d Lee said. \u201cThey are still behind us on NVGs and thermal optics, as well. So when I hear about any kind of super high-tech new personal equipment for Russian soldiers, I am skeptical.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Ratnik does have potential in the C2 realm, though.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russian media and defense firms have emphasized that the new combat equipment is designed for network-centric warfare involving drones and fire support.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russian firm Front Tactical Systems designed an ammunition backpack and machine gun belt feeder for 550 7.62×54 R rounds. The system has been spotted with Russian SSO troops in Syria. (Front Tactical Systems\/Twitter)<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Ratnik will be \u201cmated\u201d with small unmanned aerial vehicles and possibly unmanned ground drones for call-for-fire missions, according to Samuel Bendett, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and a fellow in Russia studies at the American Foreign Policy Council.<\/p>\n

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Bendett and a colleague wrote an article in the\u00a0The Strategy Bridge\u00a0in February arguing that Russia has been growing its C2 capabilities for ground forces through systems like Strelets \u2014 a tactical reconnaissance device that shares information with both air and artillery assets.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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This has already been seen in Syria, according to Bendett, where Russian forces have reported increased speed and accuracy when conducting call-for-fire missions in combat.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cIn the near future, Russian soldiers may be able to \u2018link in\u2019 with a [unmanned combat aerial vehicle] to call in a strike \u2014 but that\u2019s years away at this point,” Bendett said. \u201cToday\u2019s Ratnik 2 personal combat gear is still very basic \u2014 it\u2019s the future plans for Ratnik 3 and 4 that are impressive.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The overall goal is information fusion, allowing each soldier on the ground to be both the recipient and generator of data to share with all members of a unit using tablet computers. Russians are working toward this type of integration, but \u201cI think Americans can do this much faster, on a more robust and proven C4ISR network,\u201d Bendett said.<\/p>\n

\u201cA lot of these plans are still at concept stages, though Russian soldiers can use [tablets] already,\u201d he added. \u201cI also think a lot of Russian statements are influenced by what they they encountered in Syria \u2014 basically, one type of Russian military went in in 2015, and another one came out in 2018.\u201d<\/p>\n

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American special operators, particularly those qualified in\u00a0joint terminal attack control, already plan fire support missions and track forces using applications for tablets like the\u00a0Android Team Awareness Kit.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Meanwhile, Russian military advances are tempered by the country\u2019s declining defense spending.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\"A<\/figure>\n

A U.S. and Slovenian Joint terminal attack controller conduct close air support training utilizing a tablet device in 2018. (Staff Sgt. Michelle Y. Alvarez-Rea\/Air Force)<\/p><\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Russia is increasingly dispensing with weapons programs that aren\u2019t priorities. The country is procuring fewer T-14 Armatas, its next-generation main battle tank, in favor of upgrading existing T-72, T-80, and T-90 tanks, Harvard researcher Dmitry Gorenburg wrote in an\u00a0Oxford Analytica brief\u00a0in 2015.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cI have a feeling the same approach will govern procurement for new personal equipment for soldiers,\u201d Lee said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cThey\u2019ll probably improve the tablets and communications gear for improving C2 and maybe some other elements but not a new Iron Man suit,\u201d he added. \u201cA number of defense companies continue to show off new systems with hyperbolic claims about their capabilities, but ultimately Russia just can\u2019t afford most of these.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In addition to financial troubles, there\u2019s also the problem of troop quality and command structures that Russian special operations leaders have been attempting to address.<\/p>\n

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Russia\u2019s regular ground forces are still manned by a lot of conscripts. These troops only serve for one year and \u201care hardly the most motivated soldiers,” Lee said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The various spetsnaz units scattered across the Russian defense ministry and even the interior ministry vary greatly in equipment and training.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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While the Russians focus on large strategic exercises more than Americans, “I think the quality of the individual soldiers and small unit training is far behind ours,\u201d Lee added.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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After all, the country only publicly announced the formation of a unified command for its SOF troops in 2013, mimicking U.S. Joint Special Operations Command\u2019s cache of tier one operators, which was set up roughly 30 years prior.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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Fuente:\u00a0<\/strong>https:\/\/www.c4isrnet.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Hace a\u00f1os que tanto EUA como Rusia que desarrollan investigaciones relacionadas con el equipamiento necesario para sus respectivos proyectos de \u201cSoldado del Futuro\u201d. Con \u00e9xitos… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,2,29],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3713"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=3713"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3713\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=3713"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=3713"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=3713"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}