![\"Inert](\"https:\/\/cdn.defenseone.com\/media\/img\/upload\/2019\/08\/05\/shutterstock_1054770857\/defense-large.jpg\")
The recent news that Boeing\u00a0<\/strong>will not bid\u00a0to build the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0Air Force\u2019s next-generation\u00a0ICBM<\/span>\u00a0sent ripples of concern throughout the defense world. Absent Boeing\u2019s participation, Northrop Grumman will have no competition for the contract on one of the biggest replacement programs in the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0nuclear modernization plan. The Pentagon\u2019s plan is already expensive enough: an estimated $1.5 trillion (with inflation) over the next three decades, according to the latest\u00a0assessment\u00a0by the Congressional Budget Office. Without competition, that massive figure is only likely to\u00a0rise.<\/p>\nBut the concern about Boeing\u2019s withdrawal from the\u00a0Ground Based Strategic Deterrent\u00a0competition raises a larger question. Does the United States even need ICBMs for its\u00a0defense?<\/p>\n
An\u00a0alternative nuclear posture\u00a0devised by the organization Global Zero answers that question with an emphatic\u00a0\u201cno.\u201d<\/p>\n
The Global Zero plan would shift\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0nuclear strategy from one that engages in planning for elaborate and dangerous nuclear warfighting to one that establishes the nuclear arsenal as a second-strike force meant to deter nuclear attacks against the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0and its allies \u2013 a \u201cdeterrence-only\u201d strategy. This could be achieved with five new ballistic missile submarines and a backup force of 40 nuclear-capable bombers \u2013 a total of 640 deployed nuclear weapons and 450 in reserve. The new approach would be grounded in a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, which would provide a critical margin of safety against the rash or accidental launch of nuclear weapons in a\u00a0crisis.<\/p>\n An estimate by the Center for International Policy\u2019s\u00a0Sustainable Defense Task Force\u00a0suggests that an approach along the lines proposed by Global Zero could save over $100 billion over the next decade \u2013 money that could be used for other urgent national needs. Part of the savings could be used to improve the nation\u2019s vulnerable nuclear command, control and communication systems, elements critical to a survivable and credible\u00a0deterrent.<\/p>\n Based on analysis of credible estimates of Pentagon nuclear planning, Global Zero found that a no-first-use policy would improve global stability and\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0security, reducing the risk of nuclear war without diminishing the United States\u2019 ability to deter nuclear threats to or attacks on itself or its allies. But in order to show commitment to such a policy, the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0would need to go beyond words; it would need also to change to the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0nuclear force structure and move away from a first-strike posture. Taking ICBMs off high alert and phasing them out over the next ten years would not only improve no-first-use credibility and transparency, it would increase presidential launch decision time \u2013 which could now be as short as six minutes \u2013 thereby reducing the risk of nuclear\u00a0use.<\/p>\n The\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0Air Force has 400 ICBMs sitting in silos in the middle of the country on high alert, ready to launch within minutes of receiving the order, vulnerable to an incoming nuclear first strike.\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0officials, who are still working from the Cold War playbook, argue that they provide an opportunity cost for an adversary who would need to \u201cwaste\u201d nuclear weapons on ICBMs so the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>can\u2019t use them to retaliate. Not only is each silo a target for a potential enemy, it\u2019s also an incentive for the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0to use these weapons before they lose them, encouraging preemptive use in a conflict or launch on warning of an incoming attack. There is already a record of instances of false alarms, from a\u00a0flock of geese\u00a0to a\u00a0computer chip malfunction\u00a0to the\u00a0exercise mistaken for a real alert\u00a0in Hawaii last\u00a0year.<\/p>\n The dangers presented by \u201cuse or lose\u201d ICBMs are compounded by their redundancy. Ballistic missile submarines \u2013 the most survivable leg of the nuclear arsenal, virtually undetectable at sea with no known credible threat \u2013 can provide a credible deterrent force. As a hedge against future advances in anti-submarine capabilities, the United States would keep a reserve force of bombers. ICBMs are simply unnecessary. Moreover,\u00a0U.S.<\/span>planners can look for more non-nuclear options as they forge their war plans. Conventional and cyber options are better suited to hit certain targets traditionally reserved for nuclear weapons, and encourage de-escalation of a conflict before it crosses the nuclear threshold. Any military value ICBMs may have held in the past is now outweighed by the inherent risk of use \u2013 by accident, miscalculation or on false warning of an incoming\u00a0attack.<\/p>\n The Global Zero view on ICBMs is shared by former Defense Secretary William Perry, who has\u00a0said\u00a0\u201cThese missiles are some of the most dangerous weapons in the world. They could even trigger an accidental nuclear\u00a0war.\u201d<\/p>\n Congress has resisted even modest changes in the\u00a0ICBM<\/span>\u00a0force, including a recent\u00a0amendment\u00a0by Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D-Oregon, that would have authorized an independent study on options to extend the life of current generation ICBMs and delay the development of new\u00a0ones.<\/p>\n But there are signs of openness. House Armed Services Chairman Adam Smith, D-Washington, has encouraged dialogue about future\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0nuclear strategy and force posture, including declaratory policy and phasing out ICBMs. He held a hearing on the subject in March 2019, and he has introduced\u00a0legislation\u00a0to make it United States policy that it will \u201cnot use nuclear weapons first.\u201d Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Massachusetts, introduced a companion bill in the Senate. After decades of adherence to a nuclear warfighting strategy, Congress should take every opportunity to consider saner, safer\u00a0alternatives.<\/p>\n