{"id":4551,"date":"2019-10-15T09:39:56","date_gmt":"2019-10-15T12:39:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nachodelatorre.com.ar\/mosconi\/?p=4551"},"modified":"2019-10-15T09:39:56","modified_gmt":"2019-10-15T12:39:56","slug":"el-debate-acerca-de-la-vigencia-de-los-portaaviones-frente-a-la-amenaza-de-las-armas-hipersonicas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=4551","title":{"rendered":"El debate acerca de la vigencia de los portaaviones frente a la amenaza de las armas hipers\u00f3nicas"},"content":{"rendered":"

<\/u>La amenaza de las armas hipers\u00f3nicas ha dado lugar a un debate en el Pent\u00e1gono, acerca de la conveniencia de continuar asignando cuantiosos presupuestos para la construcci\u00f3n de modernos portaaviones, frente a la creciente amenaza de las citadas armas y la dificultad que tendr\u00edan las enormes plataformas navales para defenderse eficazmente de ellas.<\/p>\n

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\"\"WASHINGTON \u2014 A debate on the future of aircraft carriers is roiling the U.S. Department of Defense, and it is increasingly spilling out into the open. While the debate over the efficacy of carriers in high-end conflict is nothing new, a general understanding that the DoD will not have unlimited funds with which to deter an increasingly potent China and Russia have made the questions particularly urgent.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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At issue is a choice about continuing to invest in aircraft carriers and the associated air wing \u2014 the mainstay of U.S. global power projection since World War II \u2014 or to gradually reduce investment in those systems and increase investment in new capabilities such as long-range conventional hypersonic missiles.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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It\u2019s a question that Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin put bluntly in his remarks last month at the Defense News Conference.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cLet\u2019s just propose a thought experiment,\u201d Griffin said. \u201cWhich do you think the Chinese leadership would fear more: 2,000 conventional strike missiles possessed by the United States and its allies in the western Pacific capable of ranging Chinese targets, or one new carrier? Because those two things cost about the same amount of money. Those are the kinds of questions we need to be asking ourselves.\u201d<\/p>\n

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But Griffin\u2019s thought experiment has many assumptions that experts \u2014 not to mention large elements of the Navy and Congress \u2014 are hesitant to embrace, in part because of the questions they raise about the future of aircraft carriers. His scenario also assumes that the U.S. would, in a conventional fight with China, be willing to accept the enormous consequences of striking at the Chinese homeland and the frightening possibilities bound up in such an attempt, something many are either not sold on or think is too risky to seriously contemplate.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In Griffin\u2019s mind, the carrier is a known quantity that potential adversaries such as Russia and China have measured and understand.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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“Our carrier fleet, our Navy fleet, our space assets are determinative,\u201d he told the crowd. \u201cAnd were we to cede these things or to fail to continue to support them, we would be ceding ground to our adversaries that we cannot afford to do.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\"The<\/figure>\n

The aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, destroyer Russell and cruiser Bunker Hill conduct routine operations in the eastern Pacific Ocean. (MC2 Anthony Rivera\/U.S. Navy)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cBut our adversaries know and understand these assets and they are developing, have developed, countermeasures. … So while we can\u2019t give up on those things, we have to look to the future.\u201d<\/div>\n
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China, he said, has \u201cliterally thousands of conventional strike assets capable of traveling thousands of kilometers and impacting precisely,\u201d and that threat might call for new measures to deter China.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Some experts and analysts are hesitant to embrace so-called prompt strike weapons as a valid means of deterrent, calling into question whether China would find a threat to its mainland credible in a period of heightened tension.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cThe discussion about us needing hypersonic weapons to deter other countries from using hypersonics is kind of symmetrical thinking that implies we would actually use a hypersonic weapon to attack the Chinese mainland, say, either in response or in anticipation of an attack on a carrier,” said Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.. \u201cCertainly that\u2019s an option, but China has made clear that they would perceive that as highly escalatory.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cIn essence what you are saying is that you would attack the homeland of a nuclear-equipped great power in retaliation for attacking a ship at sea. That might be the kind of thing you might do against an Iran or a North Korea even, but would you do that against China? There is a lot [of] doubt in the Chinese leaders\u2019 minds as to whether we would actually do that because the question would become: \u2018Are we really going to get into a tit-for-tat retaliation exchange on targets in your homeland in the continental United States?\u2019<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cI don\u2019t think they find that to be a credible threat. So as a deterrence, it is of less value.\u201d<\/p>\n

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\u2018We are all in serious trouble\u2019<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The issue of managing any potential conflict with China is a serious one. Throughout the Cold War, the dynamics of managing conflict escalation were crucial to avoiding the kind of head-to-head conflict that could trigger nuclear annihilation.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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For example, the U.S. trained and provided weapons to Afghan fighters when the Soviets invaded that country, but it did not have U.S. troops fighting Soviet troops because of the risk of escalation with another nuclear power.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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That dynamic is still at play today, and in the event of any conflict with China, the goal should be keeping the clash localized; and deescalating rather than engaging in some apocalyptic missile fight in the Pacific, which is what Griffin\u2019s strategy would set up.<\/p>\n

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\u201cGriffin\u2019s point is valid, but it is very scenario-specific,\u201d said Michael O\u2019Hanlon, a fellow at the Brookings Institution. \u201cIt assumes a high-end fight to be already underway. At that point, we are all in serious trouble.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cMore important is deterring the high-end fight or keeping any low-level skirmish at such a level and terminating it. For those cases, the carrier may be more relevant. That\u2019s how we have to think. We can\u2019t always go to the all-out scenario for decision-making purposes.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Still, if the U.S. is seeking a conventional way to respond to a Chinese conventional missile strike, placing hypersonic weapons in the Pacific should be a priority. But it won\u2019t be as impactful as Griffin might believe.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cYou want that tool in the tool kit \u2026 but the impact of those will be minimal,\u201d Clark said. \u201cEven if you have hypersonic weapons, they\u2019re not a guaranteed kill, and we aren\u2019t going to be able to field an extremely high number of these long-range boost-glide systems anyway.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cChina could say: \u2018That\u2019s fine. I\u2019m a big country, I\u2019ve got air defense systems and I can absorb whatever you are planning with conventional hypersonic weapons.\u2019 So either they don\u2019t believe we\u2019re going to use them, or that the effect if we do use them will be minimal.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Naval aviation strikes back<\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Naval aviation is also pushing back against the rising tide of criticism of its raison d’\u00eatre. One of the U.S. Navy\u2019s top aviators mounted a defense in a\u00a0recent op-ed in Defense News<\/a>, saying carriers continue to outclass any other weapon system or combination of systems in providing options and in survivability.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cNo other weapons system or combination of lesser systems in existence or on the drawing board is as lethal, agile and resilient as a full-sized nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its air wing,\u201d Rear Adm. Roy Kelley said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cCarriers deploy with the responsiveness, endurance, multidimensional might, inherent battlespace awareness, and command-and-control capabilities that America needs to prevail in great power competition,” the head of Naval Air Force Atlantic said. “A carrier strike group, by its mere presence, can shape events in the nation\u2019s favor.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Kelly added that adversaries have long sought to challenge the aircraft carrier, but the tactics and air wings have evolved to meet the threat.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cCarriers remain relevant and potent year after year and decade after decade because they are adaptable platforms in which flexible payloads deploy,\u201d he argued \u201cCarrier air wings evolve, incorporating improved and revolutionary aircraft like the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray that first flew last week. The weapons carried by those aircraft evolve even faster, keeping carrier strike groups dominant over realized and potential threats.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Ultimately, however, it\u2019s unlikely the solution will be an either\/or, said Tom Karako, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies who specializes in missiles.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cThis debate has been around a long time, and what the military has found time and again is that first of all you have to get stuff there, and that\u2019s why the U.S. tends to be platform-heavy,\u201d Karako said. \u201cIt\u2019s one thing to say, \u2018Let\u2019s just shoot a bunch of missiles from Hawaii,\u2019 but it\u2019s not just about shooting missiles \u2014 you have to have the complete kill chain.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cYou have to know where they are going to go, and you have to hope your target hasn\u2019t moved since you pulled the trigger. So it\u2019s probably prudent to have a mix of things.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Because one of China\u2019s goals is, for the most part, to project its influence regionally, the country\u2019s investment in missiles makes sense, whereas America\u2019s investment in air power and associated electronic warfare, surveillance and aerial networks also makes sense, even though it is more expensive.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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\u201cChina\u2019s goals are more local \u2026 and I think that helps explain why they are so missile-heavy in their investments,\u201d Karako said. \u201cBecause they only have to get them to Taiwan, or they only have to get them to Japan. We have to first get our stuff over there and then get it to where it\u2019s going.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Fuente:<\/strong>\u00a0https:\/\/www.defensenews.com<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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