China\u2019s messaging around the procession emphasized China\u2019s focus on \u201cinformationized armed forces\u201d and attaining technological dominance.ii<\/sup> Indeed, many of the systems seen on October 1 seem intended to bolster China\u2019s information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and conventional precision strike capabilities. Others appear aimed at degrading U.S. capabilities in those same areas. Specifically, the weaponry China displayed on October 1 signal China\u2019s interest in:<\/p>\n In concert with these new conventional capabilities, China demonstrated several new or upgraded nuclear delivery systems. These mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) appear primarily intended to enhance the survivability and penetration capacity of China\u2019s nuclear forces. Moreover, the display served to highlight the technical sophistication and modernity of China\u2019s strategic missile force, a central consideration in Chinese nuclear decisionmaking.iii<\/sup><\/p>\n Despite their increased sophistication, the nuclear delivery vehicles displayed fill similar roles to previous systems, signaling continuity with existing Chinese limited nuclear doctrine.iv<\/sup> This is in contrast with Russia, which is significantly expanding the scope and ambition of its nuclear doctrine. And while U.S. intelligence projects that China could double the size of its nuclear force in the coming decade, its arsenal will remain a fraction of the size of U.S. and Russian forces.v<\/sup> However, observers remain concerned over the dual-capability of China\u2019s medium-range systems. China\u2019s DF-26, for example, has both conventional and nuclear variants, and similar uncertainties persist over the nuclear capability of China\u2019s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) programs. Chinese commentators made a point, however, to characterize its new DF-17 HGV as conventional-only.<\/p>\n China\u2019s embrace of high-tech \u201cinformationized\u201d warfare reflects the many lessons the PLA has learned from observing U.S. operations over the past two decades. During this period, the United States enjoyed the uncontested use of advanced ISR and C2 networks. The PLA has watched this advantage become a dependency, one which it is now looking to exploit. This brief will provide an overview of the systems and capabilities the PRC emphasized in its 70th anniversary celebration and attempt to explain how they fit into China\u2019s military vision. These include electronic warfare, drones, and China\u2019s array of new missiles.<\/p>\n Consistent with its goal of degrading U.S. ISR, the PLA exhibited a large variety of electronic warfare systems.vi<\/sup> These included numerous ground-based jammers.vii<\/sup> The PLA also revealed two varieties of aerial jamming drones, including an electronic-warfare variant of its ASN-207 UAV, which previously only performed reconnaissance missions. According to Chinese state media, this variety of electronic warfare platforms highlighted China\u2019s efforts \u201cto seize the right to control information\u201d during military operations.viii<\/sup><\/p>\n The United States\u2019 wireless battle networks are essential for completing its \u201ckill chain,\u201d the process of integrating intelligence, command, and fire control data to employ precision-guided weapons. By investing in electronic warfare assets, the PLA aims to sever a vital link in this chain. While a focus on information denial has long remained an element of PLA doctrine, this display of jamming units showcased the PLA\u2019s information denial efforts across multiple domains\u2014intended to disrupt U.S. communications on land, air, and sea.ix<\/sup> Underscoring this point was the presence of the PLA Strategic Support Force, China\u2019s newly-formed cyber-, space-, and electronic-warfare service. The October 1 event was the first appearance of the PLASSF in a military parade.x<\/sup><\/p>\n Several new drones also featured in the display. China revealed the GJ-11 (Gongji [\u201cattack\u201d]-11), a carrier-based unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) based off the PLA\u2019s Lijian (\u201cSharp Sword\u201d) testbed.xi<\/sup> Featuring a stealthy exhaust section and revised aerodynamics, the GJ-11 is designed to conduct long-range strikes and supply targeting information to Chinese missile forces.<\/p>\n In addition, China revealed the WZ-8, an air-launched supersonic drone. Likely released from a bomber, the rocket-propelled WZ-8 is intended to conduct reconnaissance and battle damage assessment on U.S. carrier strike groups.xii<\/sup> Though the WZ-8 is unlikely to possess the loitering capability needed to support missile targeting, it could aid Chinese aircraft in locating and targeting enemy surface forces. According to media reports, the drone may have already entered service with the PLA\u2019s Eastern Theatre Command.xiii<\/sup><\/p>\n Finally, China displayed a new unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). Designed to conduct \u201cbattlefield environment reconnaissance\u201d and \u201cenemy surveillance,\u201d the drone represents a further development in China\u2019s anti-submarine and underwater ISR capabilities. Although its effectiveness remains uncertain, it does show Chinese interest in chipping away at U.S. undersea dominance.<\/p>\n China\u2019s limited ability to detect and track U.S. theater forces has previously constrained its strike potential.xiv<\/sup> By procuring new drones, satellites, and unmanned naval intelligence platforms, Beijing aims to complete its own kill chain.<\/p>\n The parade also showcased China\u2019s investment in advanced missiles, revealing six previously unseen missile systems. These included three new cruise missiles (YJ-12B, YJ-18, and CJ-100), two ballistic missiles (JL-2 and DF-41), and a hypersonic glide vehicle (DF-17). China also showed several other recent systems, including the DF-31AG and DF-26.<\/p>\n First revealed in 2015, the YJ-12 is a ramjet-propelled supersonic anti-ship missile with an estimated range of 500 km.xv<\/sup> The parade marks the first public appearance of the YJ-12B, a ground-launched variant of the missile. According to media reports, the YJ-12B has already entered Chinese service.<\/p>\n The YJ-18, meanwhile, is a subsonic anti-ship missile with an estimated range between 220 and 540 km.xvi<\/sup> After cruising to the target under turbojet propulsion, the YJ-18 releases a rocket-propelled warhead which accelerates to supersonic velocities. Bearing an external resemblance to Russia\u2019s 3M54TE cruise missile<\/a>, the YJ-18 had been known but not publicly showcased prior to the parade.xvii<\/sup><\/p>\n Unknown to the public before the National Day celebration, the CJ-100 is most likely a long-range, supersonic cruise missile.xviii<\/sup> Footage revealed days before the parade indicates that the missile is vertically launched and uses ramjet propulsion.xix<\/sup> Little else is publicly known about it.<\/p>\n The DF-17, a \u201cshort to medium-range\u201d ballistic missile, combines a DF-15<\/a>-like rocket booster with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.xx<\/sup> First tested in January 2014, the missile had not been publicly displayed until the October 1 parade.xxi<\/sup> Public photographs of a similar hypersonic test article\u2014the WU-14\/DF-ZF\u2014first surfaced in late 2017.xxii<\/sup><\/p>\n According to Chinese state media, the DF-17 is intended to defeat U.S. and allied missile defenses, which struggle to engage low-flying, maneuvering threats. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles can modify their trajectory through most of their flight, creating uncertainty over where to commit defensive interceptors. This, however, makes boost-glide vehicles vulnerable to point defenses. Traveling at slower velocities than their ballistic counterparts, hypersonic glide vehicles retain less energy to spend on evasive maneuvers in terminal flight.xxiii<\/sup><\/p>\n First unveiled in 2015, the DF-26 <\/a> is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a 4,000 km range.xxiv<\/sup> The missile can carry a variety of nuclear and conventional payloads and is typically seen with a maneuvering warhead.xxv<\/sup> Such a payload may aid in penetrating terminal missile defenses or striking mobile targets. According to Chinese media sources, China\u2019s defense industry began developing the missile as early as 2008.xxvi<\/sup> China first tested the DF-26 in 2016, conducting its latest flight test in January 2019.xxvii<\/sup> China reportedly tested a rumored anti-ship variant, the DF-26B, in 2017.xxviii<\/sup> To successfully strike a moving target like a ship with a ballistic missile, however, would likely require an ISR asset providing near-real-time targeting information, most likely an unmanned aerial system.<\/p>\n During the parade, China also displayed an upgraded variant of the DF-5<\/a>, its oldest ICBM.xxix<\/sup> Designated the DF-5B, the missile entered service in 2015 and is the first variant of the 1970s-era DF-5 to carry multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). Unlike China\u2019s newer missiles, the DF-5B is silo-based and takes a considerable time to move or fire.<\/p>\n Despite analysts\u2019 expectations, China did not showcase the DF-5C, a modernized DF-5 variant with a 10-MIRV payload.xxx<\/sup> Beijing may have tested the DF-5C as recently as 2017.xxxi<\/sup> Such an absence may reflect China\u2019s emphasis on procuring new technologies; while the DF-5C test served to signal China\u2019s resolve and demonstrate its ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, China may not intend to further develop the DF-5 platform.xxxii<\/sup> Though the \u201cold-fashioned\u201d DF-5-series remains a core element of China\u2019s current force, its underlying technology has become nearly obsolete.xxxiii<\/sup><\/p>\n Beijing\u2019s inclusion of DF-31AG missiles in the parade reflects its focus on modernizing its nuclear forces. The DF-31<\/a> is a solid-fueled ICBM which entered Chinese service in 2006.xxxiv<\/sup> An upgraded variant, the DF-31A, possesses a range of up to 11,700 km and is fitted with a 1-3 megaton nuclear warhead. First displayed in mid-2017, the DF-31AG is the latest upgrade of the DF-31A, equipped with a ruggedized launch vehicle for traversing unpaved terrain.xxxv<\/sup> No longer limited to China\u2019s roads, the DF-31AG could disperse to more remote areas, making it difficult to target.<\/p>\n The National Day Parade also marked the first public appearance of the JL-2<\/a>, a submarine-launched ballistic missile which underwent a troubled development period from 1983 to 2015.xxxvi<\/sup> This public display\u2014combined with repeated declarations of the missile\u2019s maturity\u2014reflect Beijing\u2019s growing confidence in its sea-based deterrent. Derived from the DF-31, the JL-2 reportedly possesses a maximum range of over 8,000 km and may be MIRV-capable.<\/p>\n\n
Electronic Warfare<\/strong><\/h3>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com\/s3fs-public\/Image-1.jpg\")
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\nSource: Global Times<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDrones<\/strong><\/h3>\n
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\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<\/a>
\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<\/a>
\nSource: Xinhua<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nMissiles<\/strong><\/h3>\n
YJ-12B, YJ-18<\/em> \/-18A<\/em><\/h4>\n
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\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<\/a>
\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nCJ-100\/DF-100<\/em><\/h4>\n
<\/a>
\nSource: \u201cCountries,\u201d Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), https:\/\/fred.stlouisfed.org\/categories\/32264.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDF-17<\/em><\/h4>\n
<\/a>
\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDF-26<\/em><\/h4>\n
<\/a>
\nSource: Xinhua<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDF-5B<\/em><\/h4>\n
<\/a>
\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDF-31AG<\/em><\/h4>\n
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\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nJL-2<\/em><\/h4>\n
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\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\nDF-41<\/em><\/h4>\n
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\nSource: PLA<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n