Estados Unidos est\u00e1 considerando convertirse en el primer estado en lanzar un sistema de propulsi\u00f3n nuclear espacial bajo la nueva estrategia nacional. Desde finales de la d\u00e9cada de 1960, Estados Unidos ha aprovechado la tecnolog\u00eda de energ\u00eda nuclear para ayudar a impulsar las naves espaciales.\u00a0Los ejemplos recientes incluyen la misi\u00f3n New Horizons en curso, la misi\u00f3n Cassini a Saturno y la\u00a0misi\u00f3n\u00a0Voyager 1\u00a0para alcanzar el espacio interestelar\u00a0por primera vez en la historia.\u00a0Estas misiones utilizaron sistemas de energ\u00eda de radiois\u00f3topos: tecnolog\u00eda de energ\u00eda nuclear que convierte el calor en energ\u00eda aprovechando la desintegraci\u00f3n radiactiva\u00a0natural del plutonio 238\u00a0.\u00a0Seg\u00fan la\u00a0 Casa Blanca:\u00a0aunque \u201chasta la fecha no se han lanzado sistemas de propulsi\u00f3n nuclear espacial\u201d, estos sistemas son necesarios para la exploraci\u00f3n espacial porque acortar\u00e1n el tiempo de viaje a Marte.<\/p>\n
The United States is considering becoming the first state to launch a space nuclear propulsion system under the new national strategy for space nuclear power. According to Space Policy Directive-6<\/a>, signed by President Donald Trump on December 16, these systems are necessary for exploration because they will help shorten travel time, which helps protect crewed and robotic spacecraft from prolonged exposure to harsh radiation. Although the directive\u2019s space exploration goals are admirable, it unfortunately gives too little attention to crucial safety considerations.<\/p>\n Q1: Hasn\u2019t the United States already been leveraging nuclear energy technology in space?<\/strong><\/p>\n A1: <\/strong>Yes. Since the late 1960s, the United States has leveraged nuclear energy technology to help power spacecraft. Recent examples include the ongoing New Horizons <\/em>mission<\/a>, the Cassini<\/em> mission<\/a> to Saturn, and the Voyager 1<\/em> mission to reach interstellar space<\/a> for the first time in history. These missions used radioisotope power systems\u2014nuclear energy technology that converts heat into energy by harnessing the natural radioactive decay of plutonium-238<\/a>. According to the Trump White House\u2019s<\/a> directive, although \u201cno space nuclear propulsion systems have been launched to-date,\u201d these systems are necessary for space exploration because they will shorten travel time to Mars.<\/p>\n Q2: So what\u2019s new?<\/strong><\/p>\n A2: <\/strong>At its core, Space Policy Directive-6 is an ode to exploring Mars. The directive is unique because it prioritizes developing more advanced radioisotope power systems capabilities and nuclear propulsion systems to support robotic and human exploration of Mars and the Moon. For example, it calls for developing new uranium fuel processing capabilities by the mid-2020s to \u201cenable production of fuel that is suitable for lunar and planetary surface and in-space power,\u201d including nuclear electric propulsion, and nuclear thermal propulsion functions. Additionally, by 2027, NASA expects to \u201cinitiate a fission surface power project for lunar surface demonstration . . . with scalability to Mars exploration.\u201d Overall, developing advanced radioisotope power system capabilities<\/a> will provide spacecraft with a greater source of energy for deep-space missions, and as NASA explains<\/a>, \u201cbetter fuel efficiency versus solar energy in darker and colder locations.\u201d On that point, the directive reinforces the centrality of the 2019 National Security Presidential Memorandum-20<\/a>, which discusses the process for launching spacecraft containing space nuclear systems, as well as Executive Order 13803<\/a> to revive the National Space Council.<\/p>\n Q3: Where does the strategy need additional improvement?<\/strong><\/p>\n A3: <\/strong>As written, Space Policy Directive-6 provides greater guidance on leveraging advanced nuclear power systems to explore Mars than it does on promulgating security principles for criticality accident planning<\/a> and launch safety. Criticality assessment<\/a>\u2014that is, evaluating each system function for potential points of failure and evaluating how to minimize loss of life or damage to the system in the event of an accident\u2014is essential for many reasons. For example, it could help quickly determine a course of action if a nuclear-powered satellite were to malfunction and accidentally reenter the Earth\u2019s atmosphere, contaminating Earth surfaces. Despite these concerns about accidental reentry from Earth orbit or during an Earth flyby, the directive is surprisingly silent on criticality assessment standards; instead, it briefly mentions<\/a> that a \u201chighly reliable operational system\u201d is needed for spacecraft operating fission reactors in low Earth orbit.<\/p>\n To be clear, developing space nuclear propulsion systems is both an admirable goal and an opportunity to signal the United States\u2019 <\/strong>strategic resolve<\/strong><\/a> and intentions in space. <\/strong>For developing space doctrine, however, failing to articulate \u201cprinciples of safety, security, and sustainability<\/a>\u201d with granularity is a missed opportunity in international relations to shape the behavior<\/a> of other spacefaring nations as well as aspiring spacefaring nations<\/a>.<\/p>\n Both groups look to the United States as a model to follow<\/a>\u2014so if the United States cuts any safety corners for the operation and disposition of these advanced systems, other states may view that as something to emulate. For example, as Cort Thompson points out in Lawfare<\/a> about anti-satellite weapons testing, \u201cWhere the United States has left a vacuum of inaction, Russia<\/a> and China<\/a> have taken the lead on shaping the ASAT [anti-satellite] conversation with their own proposals to the international community, the \u2018Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n Q4: What should the Biden administration do?<\/strong><\/p>\n A4: <\/strong>Although the Biden administration \u201chas yet to indicate what it plans to do with President Donald J. Trump\u2019s legacy in this area\u201d of space initiatives, as the New York Times <\/em>reports<\/a>, on February 3, White House spokesperson Jen Psaki stated that President Biden \u201cfully supports<\/a>\u201d the U.S. Space Force and the administration looks forward to continuing the work of the Space Force<\/a>. That said, despite the uncertainty about the Biden administration\u2019s posture on deep space exploration, a recommended first step is to encourage collaboration<\/a> between the U.S. government and the commercial space sector to advance the country\u2019s strategic capabilities and signal what it means to be a good steward of space<\/a>. As noted in the Department of Defense\u2019s 2020 Defense Space Strategy<\/a>, communicating with allies and other partners is necessary for ensuring space stability. The cost of failing to do so calls to mind the haunting parable by Danish philosopher S\u00f8ren Kierkegaard<\/a>: \u201cA fire broke out backstage in a theatre. The clown came out to warn the public; they thought it was a joke and applauded. He repeated it; the acclaim was even greater. I think that\u2019s just how the world will come to an end.\u201d Thus, to advance U.S. strategic leadership in space, the Biden administration should ensure our space exploration goals are pursued in equal measure with safely harnessing advanced nuclear power systems.<\/p>\n