Los programas de desarrollo de Misiles Hipers\u00f3nicos que llevan adelante las grandes potencias como Rusia, China y EUA, han dado lugar en este \u00faltimo pa\u00eds, a debates relacionados con la necesidad real de incorporar estos revolucionarios sistemas en las FFAA. El planteo presentado en el \u201cInforme Anual del Congreso de EUA sobre Armas Hipers\u00f3nicas\u201d, plantea que se requieren cuantiosos recursos presupuestarios, para obtener unos sistemas cuyas capacidades no han sido a\u00fan debidamente establecidas, pero por sobre todo, por las implicancias que conlleva avanzar en una verdadera carrera en \u00e9ste \u00e1rea, sin un adecuado marco regulatorio entre los pa\u00edses involucrados.<\/p>\n
A recently updated Congressional Research Service (CRS) report offers a comprehensive look at the many complex issues surrounding the U.S. military\u2019s adoption of hypersonic weapons technology.<\/p>\n
The report<\/a>, authored by defense analyst Kelley Sayler, opens with a primer distinguishing between the two main types of hypersonic weapons: hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles. The paper then turns to a succinct outline of the hypersonic projects pursued by Russia, China, and the United States\u00a0For the former, these include the U.S. Navy\u2019s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)<\/a> weapon, the Army\u2019s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)<\/a>, the Air Force\u2019s Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)<\/a> and AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)<\/a>, and DARPA\u2019s Tactical Boost Glide (TBG), Operational Fires (OpFires), and Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC). The Defense Department is also reviewing hypersonic missile defense options, but those proposals are still in a fledgling state. The report notes that U.S. funding for hypersonic weapons programs has increased in recent years, partly to keep pace with growing Russian and Chinese capabilities in this domain. But, whereas the latter two have primarily focused on nuclear-capable hypersonic systems, most U.S. hypersonic weapons are being designed for tactical use. These conventional weapons, posits the report, require greater accuracy and are more difficult to develop than their nuclear counterparts.<\/p>\n The subsequent part turns to the ongoing debate in Washington over the future of hypersonic weapons, centered around four overarching issues: mission requirements, funding, strategic stability, and arms control. The report notes that the Defense Department has not yet established a clear set of operational parameters for hypersonic weapons: \u201cWhat mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts?\u201d<\/p>\n The CRS report adds that, given the lack of clearly defined mission sets, it is difficult to move forward with optimized budgets that can successfully balance the many costly considerations of hypersonic weapons research, development, production, and deployment. The report notes that the jury is still out on the \u201cstrategic implications\u201d of hypersonic weapons, with analysts disagreeing on whether or not these weapons can decisively shape a state\u2019s military capabilities or alter the basic logic of nuclear deterrence. The paper cites some analysts who have argued that current arms control agreements should be expanded to cover certain hypersonic systems, or that entirely new treaties should be negotiated to curtail if not ban the testing of these weapons.<\/p>\n The CRS report underscores just how uncertain Washington\u2019s current hypersonic weapons development plans really are. Some individual projects like the CPS system are proceeding apace, but there is still no long-term procurement and doctrinal approach to hypersonics\u2014what specific mission purpose do these weapons serve, and how do we acquire them in a cost-effective way? As the Pentagon continues to grapple with these core questions, Washington\u2019s rift with Beijing and Moscow in hypersonic technology shows no signs of meaningfully closing over the coming years. Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin<\/a> posed the potential risk in stark terms: The U.S. does not \u201chave systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don\u2019t have defenses against [their] systems,\u201d he said during an earlier testimony to Congress.<\/p>\n