{"id":8720,"date":"2021-10-01T09:36:30","date_gmt":"2021-10-01T12:36:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=8720"},"modified":"2021-10-01T09:36:30","modified_gmt":"2021-10-01T12:36:30","slug":"ucas-bayraktar-tb-2-para-ucrania","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=8720","title":{"rendered":"UCAS BAYRAKTAR TB-2 para Ucrania"},"content":{"rendered":"

Como resultado de su empleo exitoso en escenarios de combate como Nagorno-Karabaj, Siria y Libia, muchos pa\u00edses demandan los sistemas a\u00e9reos aut\u00f3nomos de combate (UCAS) Bayraktar TB-2, de origen turco. El TB-2 es un UCAS de altitud media, pero gran alcance, que dispara peque\u00f1os misiles guiados, con efectos devastadores sobre blancos como blindados o sistemas radar. Ucrania ha realizado una importante compra, para tratar de balancear la desventaja frente a su oponente Rusia, con la que mantiene un conflicto armado por la regi\u00f3n del Donbas. En el 2014, Ucrania sufri\u00f3 una severa derrota, entre otros aspectos, por el dominio absoluto del espacio a\u00e9reo por parte de su oponente.<\/p>\n

\n

ANKARA, Turkey \u2014 Ukraine hopes to quickly turn around a contract to buy 24 drones from Turkey, but the former\u2019s adversary and the latter\u2019s ally could upend the potential sale.<\/p>\n

Turkey is Russia\u2019s closest ally in NATO \u2014 which Ukraine wants to join \u2014 but Ankara and Moscow have diverging interests over Kyiv.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainian government announced Sept. 15 that it\u2019s seeking 24 Bayraktar TB2 combat drones in the coming months. Two years ago, TB2 producer Baykar Makina won a contract to sell six TB2s to Ukraine. The $69 million contract also involved the sale of ammunition for the armed version. The private firm has also won contracts to sell the TB2 to Qatar, Azerbaijan and Poland.<\/p>\n

The TB2 is a medium-altitude, long-range tactical UAV system. It was developed by Kale-Baykar, a joint venture of Baykar Makina and the Kale Group. The UAV operates as a platform for conducting reconnaissance and intelligence missions. The aircraft features a monocoque design and integrates an inverse V-tail structure. The fuselage is made of carbon fiber, Kevlar and hybrid composites, whereas the joint segments constitute precision \u201ccomputer numerical control\u201d machined aluminum parts. Its maximum payload exceeds 55 kilograms, and the standard payload configuration includes an electro-optical camera module, an infrared camera module, a laser designator, a laser range finder and a laser pointer.<\/p>\n

Each TB2 system consists of six aerial vehicles, two ground control stations, three ground data terminals, two remote video terminals and ground-support equipment.<\/p>\n

A senior Turkish procurement official said Ankara and Kyiv have an understanding to finalize the potential deal before year\u2019s end. \u201cThere is strong political support for this contract from both governments,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

Industry sources estimate the contract value at about $300 million.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s ally<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russia and Ukraine are tied up in conflict over the annexation of Crimea, which Turkey\u2019s Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman Tanju Bilgic described Sept. 20 as unlawful.<\/p>\n

Turkey has been a\u00a0beneficiary of Ukraine\u2019s defense spending<\/a>\u00a0for years. For example, in 2019, state-controlled Ukrainian company Ukrspecexport and Baykar Makina\u00a0signed a deal to co-develop and co-produce<\/a>\u00a0\u201csensitive technologies in defense and aerospace.\u201d And in December 2020, a Turkish shipyard penned a $200 million deal to sell two Ada-class corvettes to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Navy will deploy the corvettes in both the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, both disputed waters between Russia and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The allies are also cooperating on engine technology to power Turkish-made drones.<\/p>\n

But Turkey is also involved in the Russian arms trade. Turkey purchased the Russian-made S-400 air defense system in 2019, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is negotiating for a second batch. In a Sept. 26 interview with CBS News, Erdogan said he would consider buying a second Russian missile system\u00a0in defiance of strong objections by the United States<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"\"
A rocket launches from a S-400 missile system at the Ashuluk military base in southern Russia on Sept. 22, 2020, during military drills. (Dimitar Dilkoff\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In response to the first S-400 acquisition, the U.S. removed Turkey from the American-led, multinational Joint Strike Fighter program that builds the F-35 fighter. And Washington also placed sanctions<\/a>\u00a0on Ankara under the Countering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.<\/p>\n

Turkey has since said it\u2019s\u00a0considering Russian-made fighter jets<\/a>\u00a0as an alternative to the F-35s in can no longer access.<\/p>\n

As for the outcome of the drone sale, a senior Turkish diplomat said there\u2019s a limit to Russia\u2019s silence when it comes to arms trade between Turkey and Ukraine.<\/p>\n

But the procurement official is optimistic the deal will move forward without Russian concern. \u201cFirst, the Turkish systems are no gamechanger in any Russian-Ukrainian conflict,\u201d he said. \u201cThen we have our own private agenda with Russia.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Russians will not want to ruin their strategic defense cooperation with us for the sake of a few weapons systems our companies sell to Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n

Why sell to a Russian adversary?<\/strong><\/p>\n

One obvious motivation for Turkey\u2019s drone sales \u2014 and the other advanced defense equipment \u2014 to Ukraine is the government\u2019s desire to increase defense exports. Turkey has invested billions of dollars in its defense industry over the last four decades, and expanding the country\u2019s share in global defense trade is a publicly known government objective.<\/p>\n

Another driver is the reciprocity in defense trade between the two countries, said Sitki Egeli, a defense analyst and assistant professor at Izmir University of Economy.<\/p>\n

Ukraine needs the niche defense items that Turkey can provide \u2014 such as armed drones, electronic warfare technology and advanced communications gear \u2014 and likewise Turkey\u2019s defense industry looks to Ukraine for specific items \u2014 such as engines, whose supply from Western manufacturers has proved lacking, Egeli explained.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Pro-Russian separatists ride on top of a tank near the town of Krasnyi Luch in the Lugansk region of Ukraine on Oct. 28, 2014. (Dimitar Dilkoff\/AFP via Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cProviding Ukraine with advanced military equipment provides for a rare leverage for Ankara in its complicated and strained relationship with Moscow. In this relationship that was characterized by some observers as one of \u2018asymmetric interdependence\u2019 that heavily favors Russia, Ankara is hard-pressed to create and take advantage of any leverages and counterweights that could be employed against an increasingly assertive and at times even arrogant Russia,\u201d \u201cEgeli said.<\/p>\n

Asked how long Russia might remain silent over the potential drone sale, Egli said it will come down to the future state of geopolitics.<\/p>\n

\u201cMoscow has so far been careful and successful in compartmentalizing its complex relationship with Turkey, whereby overlapping or else conflicting agendas \u2014 in Syria, Libya, Caucasus, Black Sea, or in the economic and energy trade realms \u2014 were handled independently of each other. Moscow has so far restrained its reaction over Ankara\u2019s growing defense cooperation with Ukraine, probably because [the] Russian military still holds overwhelming superiority over its Ukrainian counterpart,\u201d Egeli said.<\/p>\n

\u201cBut if this gap were to narrow down with further transfers to Ukraine, or more importantly, if Russian military planners feel concerned about the successes of Turkish-style drone- and network-centric combat tactics in defeating Soviet-style military adversaries in Idlib and Nagorno-Karabakh, then this could constitute a tipping point for Moscow. When we look at the commentary coming from Russian officials over the last few weeks, we may in fact be seeing the first signs of such growing concern and unease. A second S-400 order is unlikely to be impacted by all this because the first S-400 order signified major political, economic and geopolitical benefits for Moscow, whereas with almost no benefits for Ankara. Therefore, Moscow would definitely not miss another opportunity to further deepen the wedge between Turkey and its Western allies, and further isolate Erdogan.\u201d<\/p>\n

\n
\n
\n
Fuente:<\/strong> https:\/\/www.defensenews.com<\/em><\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Como resultado de su empleo exitoso en escenarios de combate como Nagorno-Karabaj, Siria y Libia, muchos pa\u00edses demandan los sistemas a\u00e9reos aut\u00f3nomos de combate (UCAS)… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":8721,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,2],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8720"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=8720"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8720\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8724,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8720\/revisions\/8724"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/8721"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=8720"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=8720"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=8720"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}