Around the world, scientists conduct many kinds of biological research experiments \u2013 from basic studies exploring how living systems operate to synthesizing novel organisms. Applications range from developing medical treatments to protecting the food supply to modifying bacteria to cleaning up oil spills and much more. A subset of experiments may also involve\u00a0gain-of-function research<\/a>, which involves modifying an organism to gain a new property or ability.<\/p>\n The idea that a pathogen could escape from a laboratory and infect the entire world is the stuff of horror movies. Working with biological materials does have inherent risks, and\u00a0laboratory incidents will happen<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 the goal is to minimize risks to laboratory personnel, the community and the environment.<\/p>\n We are\u00a0biosafety<\/a>\u00a0and<\/a>\u00a0biosecurity<\/a>\u00a0professionals with expertise in mitigating risks associated with biological research. Without a standardized, international framework for reporting laboratory incidents and responses, the task of mitigating such risks is quite difficult. If laboratories were more open about when things go wrong, others could learn from their mistakes and lessen the chances of a future accident.<\/p>\n Science and technology mishaps<\/strong><\/p>\n In 1984,\u00a030 tons of a highly toxic gas<\/a>\u00a0were released in Bhopal, India. Considered one of the\u00a0world\u2019s worst industrial accidents<\/a>, the explosion killed several thousand people.<\/p>\n When one of Chernobyl\u2019s radioactive nuclear cores had a meltdown in 1986, the Soviet government hid details and\u00a0spread misinformation<\/a>\u00a0about the event, even though the heat from the reactor could be\u00a0seen from space<\/a>.<\/p>\n By contrast, when an accident occurs with a biological material, it is not a spectacular event like an explosion or meltdown. A disease caused by a biological organism takes time to appear. It may take days or weeks for symptoms to present after infection.<\/p>\n The\u00a01979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak in the Soviet Union<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a02007 Pirbright Institute\u2019s foot-and-mouth incident in the U.K.<\/a>\u00a0are examples where biological materials unintentionally escaped the laboratory. People got sick and farm animals died.<\/p>\n Laboratory-related infections are frequently tied to the breakdown of a particular laboratory safety procedure, equipment or organizational process.<\/p>\n Here in the U.S., several well-documented laboratory errors have resulted in potential exposures, including the\u00a02014 unintentional release of potentially viable anthrax bacteria<\/a>, the\u00a02014 potential exposure of a laboratory technician to Ebola virus<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a02015 discovery of improperly inactivated anthrax bacteria<\/a>\u00a0that was shipped around the globe.\u00a0In<\/a>\u00a0each<\/a>\u00a0case<\/a>, medical care was provided and no one became ill.<\/p>\n Biological incident reporting<\/strong><\/p>\n In the U.S., a\u00a0standardized system to report<\/a>\u00a0all biological incidents and potential exposures does not exist.<\/p>\n The U.S.\u00a0National Institutes of Health<\/a>\u00a0has requirements for reporting any\u00a0significant problems, accidents and illnesses<\/a>\u00a0involving experiments with altered genetic material. If a research institution receives U.S. government funding, failure to comply with NIH rules can result in a loss of this funding, no matter where in the world the lab is located.<\/p>\n But private, corporate or\u00a0DIY biology laboratories<\/a>\u00a0operate with even less government oversight and fewer reporting requirements \u2013 though many have adopted their own\u00a0biosafety practices<\/a>\u00a0and follow local requirements and best management practices.<\/p>\n Outside the U.S., the\u00a0robustness of biosafety and biosecurity oversight<\/a>\u00a0varies significantly from country to country.<\/p>\n [Over 110,000 readers rely on The Conversation\u2019s newsletter to understand the world.<\/em>\u00a0Sign up today<\/a>.]<\/p>\n Sharing information<\/strong><\/p>\n Although reporting to the U.S. government is required in certain circumstances, the information contained in the reports may never reach the public.<\/p>\n Some institutions openly publish information about their incidents, while others keep that data private. Reasons may include concerns about reputation, protection of personal health information or even sensationalism in the media. Some fear reprisal from a disgruntled employee, a competitor or even a nation-state. Others are concerned about the spread of misinformation by\u00a0individuals who fear biological labs<\/a>\u00a0or those who seek to\u00a0end human genetic engineering research<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0ban animal experiments<\/a>.<\/p>\n Even with these concerns, we believe a more transparent and comprehensive system of reporting biological incidents to a neutral third party would help reduce the number of laboratory incidents \u2013 and could improve public trust in the scientific enterprise. If this type of system had been in place prior to COVID-19, more data would presumably have been available to help evaluate the Wuhan laboratory leak hypothesis and cut down on speculation.<\/p>\n In the U.S., a possible way to do this is to expand the American Biological Safety Association\u2019s\u00a0Laboratory Acquired Infection database<\/a>. Currently, it contains incident data only from published research papers. But it could be broadened to include all kinds of incident data. In our opinion, an international version of such a reporting system would also help reduce the number and severity of laboratory incidents, both locally and worldwide. The more information available about the root cause of incidents, the more it could be used to help improve training, procedures and controls \u2013 and prevent future problems. It would also suggest how safety systems break down and what systems might be at risk.<\/p>\n Biosafety and biosecurity professionals have been discussing this topic for a\u00a0long time<\/a>, including at a\u00a0U.S. Trans-Federal Task Force on Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment<\/a>\u00a0and by a\u00a0Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel<\/a>. But to make a centralized reporting system a reality, key players will need to commit and act. They include governments, international agencies, industry partners and the scientific community.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/10\/file-20211001-23-18xjcsn.jpg\")