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\u201cOur current priorities are on establishing defensive measures and resilience for our satellite platforms,\u201d Engberg told Air Force Magazine. The idea, he said, is that, even in the teeth of an attack using weapons like the one Russia tested Nov. 15, Space Force orbital assets should continue to \u201cprovide critical space-based services like communications, navigation [and] timing, operational awareness, information dominance, which then enable strong offensive and defensive advantages for [our terrestrial forces] on land, sea, and [in the] air.\u201d<\/p>\n
A Tough Ask<\/strong><\/p>\n That\u2019s a tough ask, said Brian Weeden, director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation, who has spent two decades studying the issue. The Russian weapon,\u00a0a vehicle-launched ballistic missile called Nudol<\/a>, is a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon or DA-ASAT, Weeden explained.<\/p>\n The missile acts like a rocket, powering a kinetic kill vehicle, or KKV, into a collision path with the target satellite. The KKV doesn\u2019t need a warhead, just a guidance system to make last minute course corrections to steer it into the target, Weeden said. Kinetic energy does the rest. \u201cAt the speed the KKV is traveling and the satellite is also, in low Earth orbit, probably already moving at six or seven kilometers per second \u2026 It\u2019s just boom,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Weeden also pointed out that explosions in space lack the destructive power of their counterparts on the ground. \u201cNo atmosphere means no blast wave, no concussion effects,\u201d he noted.<\/p>\n Nonetheless, the DA-ASAT is a very effective weapon, he said. \u201cFrom launch to impact, you may have as little as five or 10 minutes\u201d before the KKV impacts the target. When the launch occurs, the target satellite may still be beyond the horizon, meaning it wouldn\u2019t see the telltale flare.<\/p>\n \u201cSo I think it\u2019s very, very difficult to counter that,\u201d he said, adding that an architecture based on hundreds of satellites would be less vulnerable than one based on two or three.<\/p>\n The effectiveness of DA-ASAT probably explains why the U.S., China, and India have\u00a0also successfully tested<\/a>\u00a0such weapons, Weeden added.<\/p>\n Understanding the brief window of time satellite assets will have to respond to threats is powering a major focus of AFRL\u2019s research, said Engberg, referring to satellite autonomy.<\/p>\n \u201cWe\u2019re not on a path to Skynet,\u201d he joked. The aim of the research is to show how satellites can use artificial intelligence and machine learning \u201cto be able to detect and make a decision about protecting its own capability, when you cannot wait for a human on the ground to receive data, make a decision, and send up a command to avoid a potential threat.\u201d<\/p>\n Autonomy is especially important when dealing with directed energy weapons, which travel at the speed of light, Engberg said. \u201cWe anticipate there will be scenarios and threats for which a human in the loop commanding a satellite or a system of satellites from the ground will not be fast enough to defeat certain threats, especially speed-of-light threats.\u201d<\/p>\n In addition to autonomy, the other two foci of R&D in the Space Control Technology Branch are cybersecurity of space systems and space situational awareness in the vast empty spaces between Earth orbit and the Moon, Engberg said.<\/p>\n A Changing Strategic Calculus<\/strong><\/p>\n The strategic calculus embedded in the Space Force\u2019s R&D focus on defensive capabilities is that deterrence by denial (i.e. hardening U.S. space systems) is a more productive strategy than deterrence by destruction, said Weeden. Especially given that the U.S. military relied much more heavily on space than potential adversaries. \u201cThe calculation has always been that deterrence by threatening reprisal doesn\u2019t work as well if your adversary doesn\u2019t rely on space as much as you do,\u201d Weeden explained.<\/p>\n Over time, that strategic calculus might shift, Weeden said, especially with regard to Beijing.<\/p>\n \u201cChina is investing a lot of money in developing its own constellation of GPS satellites. They\u2019re developing their own satellites for reconnaissance and intelligence collection; they\u2019re building a space station; they\u2019re developing their own satellites for communications. They\u2019re investing a lot of money in developing space, so I think it is true that over time, China is going to become more of a stakeholder in space.\u201d<\/p>\n But he cautioned that currently, the traditional security calculus still holds true. \u201cAt the moment, when it comes to national security benefits from space, the U.S. still relies a lot more on it than China does,\u201d Weeden noted. \u201cParticularly for something like a Taiwan Straits or a South China Sea crisis, where we would be \u2018playing away\u2019\u201d and more reliant on globe-spanning communication.<\/p>\n China, which has astronauts building a space station in a similar orbit to the ISS, has not reacted to the Russian test or published what safety measures its astronauts may have taken as they construct the\u00a0Tianhe module<\/a>\u00a0of the space station. The China Manned Space Agency said Oct 15 that it was publishing orbital data for Tianhe and hoped \u201crelevant agencies and organizations of other countries will pay attention to these data and avoid collisions,\u201d\u00a0according to\u00a0state media.<\/a><\/p>\n The Russian test and its impact on the ISS also demonstrates the growing danger that a war in space might create, Engberg added.<\/p>\n The Kessler Syndrome and the End of Orbit<\/strong><\/p>\n As thousands of satellites are launched into LEO constellations such as\u00a0Starlink<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0OneWeb<\/a>, the risk grows that any single collision could spark a chain reaction, as debris collides with additional satellites, in turn creating more debris. Such a cascade could end by destroying everything in orbit, a phenomenon known as\u00a0Kessler Syndrome<\/a>.<\/p>\n An early public indication Nov. 15 that something was amiss in orbit was when NASA ordered astronauts in the International Space Station to take shelter in the crew capsules that would return them to Earth in an emergency. The concern was, Weeden said, that the debris field from the Russian satellite, in orbit a mere 40 or 50 kilometers above the ISS, might impact the space station.<\/p>\n \u201cThe debris field spreads above and below the destruction point. We don\u2019t know how high yet, because that data is still being collected and analyzed,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Kessler Syndrome is, in some ways, like climate change was in the last century, he said. \u201cIt\u2019s a poorly understood risk, but it\u2019s getting worse,\u201d he said. \u201cAll we know is, there\u2019s some unknown probability that one of these pieces might hit something else over the next years to several decades. And space is big. So the probability is pretty low. But you do this frequently enough, and the probabilities catch up to you, eventually.\u201d<\/p>\n For exactly that reason, Weeden said, strategists tended to favor attacks on orbital assets that were non-kinetic, and if possible temporary and reversible.<\/p>\n \u201cThe high risk of collateral damage from offensive space weapons means no one will really benefit from escalating a [kinetic] conflict into the space domain,\u201d added Engberg.<\/p>\n