Much of the Western discussion about helping Ukraine in the face of overwhelming Russian military advantage centers on relatively short-range weapons and tactics meant to enmesh an invasion force in the \u201cnext Afghanistan<\/a>\u201d or a \u201cnear certainty of hell<\/a>\u201d: for example,\u00a0providing<\/a>\u00a0more Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and weaponized drones; or training Ukrainian forces and Ukrainian non-state groups to make improvised explosive devices. While such courses of action would impose costs, they would impose them on Russian and Russian proxy forces\u2019 ground troops. These approaches do not consider the decisive role that Russian air and standoff missile strikes may play. If the Kremlin orders a large-scale move on Ukraine, it is likely to take the form of a\u00a0multi-domain operation<\/a>, beginning with air and standoff missile strikes that could prove decisive\u2014and devastating\u2014long before short-range defenses come into play.<\/p>\n A better approach starts with looking at the Russian military\u2019s current\u00a0strategy and doctrine<\/a>, the forces it has amassed nearby, and the capabilities it has shown in recent conflicts. Many Russian\u00a0concepts of operation<\/a>\u00a0emphasize a short and intense \u201cInitial Period of War\u201d that may produce decisive effects even before ground forces are fully committed. Standoff weapons\u2014bombs, precision guided missiles\u2014are unleashed against enemy forces and the infrastructure that sustains the fight: military bases, forward-deployed units, air defense sites, airfields, key transportation nodes, fuel depots, command-and-control targets, power plants, even local news organizations. The aim is to force the enemy government to capitulate quickly.<\/p>\n A large-scale Russian operation against Ukraine would likely be different from previous post-Soviet operations for several reasons. The Russian military has spent the past decade refining doctrine, reorganizing its forces, and updating its arsenal. It no longer relies on large numbers of poorly trained conscripts and ill-equipped ground forces as it did in Chechnya. Its modernization program was designed to avoid the kind of disorganized, stove-piped, ground-force dominant operation seen in Georgia in 2008. Even its \u201chybrid\u201d incursions into the Donbass and Crimea in 2014 may be only partially illustrative at best.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n The most illuminating illustration of current Russian tactics is probably its\u00a0overt operations<\/a>\u00a0in Syria. But that expeditionary force was\u00a0much smaller<\/a>, designed only to support what Moscow claims is a counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operation. At their peak, Russian forces in Syria were only a small fraction of the strike power that is permanently based and temporary deployed near Ukraine today.<\/p>\n The modernized and massive Russian military force that currently\u00a0surrounds Ukraine on three sides<\/a>\u00a0can muster air and missile strikes that would likely overwhelm Ukrainian airpower and air defenses and severely damage military and other facilities. In particular, Russia\u2019s Aerospace Forces, or VKS, are very different from a decade ago. They have new and modernized aircraft, along with better radar, communications, and targeting equipment. Pilots have generally flown more flight hours and received training in close air support and nighttime operations. And although they have little experience flying through hostile air defenses,\u00a092 percent of VKS pilots<\/a>\u00a0have recent combat experience in Syria. The VKS also has\u00a0adopted\u00a0<\/a>more effective countermeasures against man-portable or short-range air defenses such as Stinger missiles, including flying at higher altitudes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n