Experts say\u00a0the documents<\/a>\u00a0that the Russian military allegedly acquired show that labs in Ukraine were working on public health research and aren\u2019t evidence of a weapons program. Some of the Russian claims,\u00a0at least<\/a>, come from publicly available sources. At the heart of the allegations are dozens of labs in Ukraine. They are\u00a0not a secret<\/a>; they\u2019re run by Ukrainian officials and partner with the US government on health research programs, for instance, surveys on\u00a0natural exposure to endemic pathogens<\/a>\u00a0like hantavirus. These aren\u2019t biological weapons laboratories, but the allegations raise important questions. Just what are bioweapons, anyway? How have they been used and developed throughout the years? And how can real bioweapons facilities be identified?<\/p>\n What is a biological weapon?<\/strong>\u00a0George Mason University Professor Greg Koblentz, the director of the school\u2019s biodefense graduate program, said the bacterium that causes anthrax infection has been the most commonly studied biological agent in modern biowarfare programs. That\u2019s because\u00a0Bacillus anthracis<\/em>\u00a0forms a spore that can be aerosolized and spread through the air, the main way to deliver a large-scale biological attack. \u201cThis is a very strenuous experience for the pathogen,\u201d Koblentz said. \u201cThey don\u2019t like being blown up. They don\u2019t like UV radiation. They don\u2019t like being suspended in air. This process will kill most of the bacteria or viruses in a biological weapon once it\u2019s being disseminated. Anthrax spores provide that ability for them to survive that process much better than other pathogens.\u201d With a\u00a0fatality rate of 80 percent<\/a>, inhaled anthrax bacteria can be a deadly weapon.<\/p>\n Other diseases, including the bacterial illness tularemia, have also been studied, but, Koblentz said, weapons programs have shied away from diseases like influenza that spread easily. While the Soviet Union did weaponize smallpox<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0plague<\/a>, two contagious diseases, the US program tended to \u201cshy away from\u201d these agents, he said.<\/p>\n \u201cYou wouldn\u2019t purposefully develop a biological weapon that is highly contagious that could cause a pandemic because that will affect your country along with everyone else,\u201d Koblentz said.<\/p>\n What is the history of biological warfare?<\/strong>\u00a0By the 1300s,\u00a0warring armies in Europe<\/a>\u00a0had arrived at the idea of using dead animals and people, including plague victims, as weapons. According to\u00a0one historical account<\/a>, a Mongol army in 1346 loaded plague victims on catapults and \u201churled\u201d them into Caffa, a fortified Genoese trading post in present-day Ukraine. In 1650, Kazimierz Siemienowicz, a Polish general, reportedly laced bullets with\u00a0saliva from rabid dogs<\/a>. And colonial British forces in the United States gave\u00a0smallpox infested blankets<\/a>\u00a0to Native Americans on at least one occasion. But the best example of modern biowarfare, Koblentz said, comes from the Japanese invasion and occupation of China.<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s infamous Unit 731 conducted\u00a0grotesque experiments<\/a>\u00a0on prisoners to assess the effects of biological agents like the bacteria that causes cholera, including dissections on living, unanesthetized people. The unit allegedly experimented on at least 3,000 prisoners of war; an estimated 1,000 died, according to\u00a0a 1997 report<\/a>\u00a0by the US Surgeon General.<\/p>\n But far from limiting its work to lab settings, the Japanese military also tested weapons on the public in Chinese cities. Planes would fly over communities and drop plague infested flees,\u00a0attacks<\/a>\u00a0that were followed by reports of outbreaks. \u201cWhat\u2019s not well known is that they actually integrated their use of biological weapons with their conventional military operations in China,\u201d Koblentz said.<\/p>\n Despite the horrors committed by Unit 731, several of its officials were given immunity from war crimes prosecution; the United States, which by then had its own offensive biological weapons program, sought to understand what the Japanese had learned.<\/p>\n Which countries have had biological weapons programs?\u00a0<\/strong>According to a\u00a02008 tabulation<\/a>\u00a0by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, more than 20 countries have or have had a biological weapons program.<\/p>\n Of those programs, the former Soviet Union once maintained the world\u2019s most extensive. While the country had been developing bioweapons since the 1920s, the Soviet government secretly expanded that effort after signing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The Soviet program intended to capitalize on advances in genetic engineering to produce pathogens that were\u00a0more suitable<\/a>\u00a0for weaponization than naturally occurring strains, and tens of thousands of scientists and others\u00a0worked<\/a>\u00a0on the illicit effort. They conducted research to make hybrid pathogens with genetic material from more than one virus; pathogens that could elude diagnostic tests; and pathogens made up of both bacteria and viruses. The Soviets had the ability to\u00a0produce massive amounts<\/a>\u00a0of anthrax agent and other pathogens, according to a 2002 Congressional Research Service report.<\/p>\n The United States also had a formidable weapons program. The military had a research and development lab at Ft. Detrick in Maryland, an open-air test site in Utah, and a production plant in Arkansas which produced biological agents and filled them into delivery devices, including spray tanks, bombs, and bomblets. According to a 2009 National Defense University\u00a0case study<\/a>, the program\u2019s wares included lethal antipersonnel agents, incapacitating agents, and anti-crop weapons. The offensive program, however, ended in 1969, when President Richard Nixon, after an internal review, unilaterally abandoned the weapons and had the US stockpile destroyed.<\/p>\n That review found that pathogens take time to incubate, making them an impractical weapon during battle, and that they could mutate or establish themselves in animal species. Officials reasoned bioweapons couldn\u2019t be used first without drawing international condemnation and, moreover, that the country had a powerful nuclear arsenal to deter an attack. The Army destroyed its supplies of the pathogens that cause anthrax, tuleremia, and other diseases between 1971 and 1972, along with tens of thousands of munitions filled with biological agents, according to the case study. The United States ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975.<\/p>\n How have biological weapons been tested?<\/strong>\u00a0At Ft. Detrick, military researchers used a giant steel\u00a0sphere<\/a>\u00a0known as the Eight Ball to test aerosolized agents on military volunteers. At the Dugway Proving Ground in the Utah desert, researchers\u00a0conducted<\/a>\u00a0open-air experimentation, where germs were spread on the wind toward soldiers who had volunteered for tests. While researchers used animals in offensive weapons tests, the purpose of human tests was murkier, Koblentz said. More than 2,000 conscientious objectors, mainly from the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, participated in the Project Whitecoat program. That effort exposed volunteers to several diseases, including\u00a0tularemia<\/a>, which was eventually standardized as a biological weapons agent. The experiments led to knowledge that could be used in both in offensive weapons and for defensive purposes, Koblentz said.<\/p>\n The military also conducted various tests in public places using agents that could simulate dangerous pathogens. For example, researchers in the 1950 exposed the San Francisco Bay-area to aerosolized\u00a0Bacillus globigii\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0Serratia marcescens<\/em>, bacteria which were thought to be benign. According to the Surgeon General\u2019s report, however, there were subsequent reports of infections in the surrounding communities.<\/p>\n Bioweapons accidents in the Soviet Union led to several deaths.<\/p>\n In 1971, a research vessel on the Aral Sea\u00a0sailed<\/a>\u00a0near Vozrozhdeniya Island and into a \u201cbrownish haze.\u201d The island was an out-door Soviet bioweapons testing site, and the haze was aerosolized version of the virus that causes smallpox. An infected crew member took the virus back home and nine people fell sick in a subsequent outbreak; three including the researcher\u2019s brother died, according to a BBC report.<\/p>\n One of the worst bioweapons accidents happened in 1979 when anthrax spores leaked from a plant in the city of Sverdlovsk, now called Yekaterinburg. The leak killed at least 66 people, and perhaps more. A team that\u00a0included<\/a>\u00a0Jeanne Guillemin and Matthew Meselson, noted bioweapons experts,\u00a0plotted<\/a>\u00a0where each of the victims had been and, based on meteorological data, placed them in a zone downwind from the weapons plant known as Compound 19. The research showed that perhaps even less than 1 gram of anthrax spores\u2014equivalent to a quarter teaspoon of salt\u2014could kill many people. Had the wind been blowing toward Sverdlovsk, the death toll could have been far higher.<\/p>\n In 1992, former Russian President Boris Yeltsin\u00a0acknowledged<\/a>\u00a0that the Sverdlovks outbreak had been caused by military activity and ordered an end to Russia\u2019s offensive bioweapons program that year.<\/p>\n How can bioweapons programs be identified?\u00a0<\/strong>Identifying a bioweapons program is no easy task, Koblentz said. That\u2019s because many of the pathogens and equipment that would be necessary for an offensive program also have legitimate uses: \u201cYou can\u2019t just look at a facility and say, \u2018Oh, you have a fermenter of this size, therefore, it is civilian, or therefore it is part of a bioweapons program.\u2019\u201d The same goes for pathogen strains, he said. Labs might have virulent anthrax in order to produce vaccines or detection systems, for example, or because they\u2019re dealing with public health outbreaks in the area. \u201cJust seeing something there is by no means sufficient,\u201d Koblentz said.<\/p>\n But by analyzing various facts about a site, Koblentz said, a facility\u2019s true intention can be apparent.<\/p>\n Near the Kazakhstani city of Stepnogorsk, a Soviet biological weapons production facility contained \u201ctowering fermenters<\/a>\u201d that could produce two tons of anthrax in a day. The Stepnogorsk plant also\u00a0produced<\/a>\u00a0civilian products, but the purpose of the facility was clear to analysts. \u201cThere was no plausible civilian rationale for having that production capacity,\u201d Koblentz said. \u201cNext door to that production building there were fortified bunkers that were designed to store the ammunition that this anthrax would go into. So looking at this combination of facilities and capabilities, you could say this is a biological weapons production facility.\u201d<\/p>\n Inspectors and analysts don\u2019t have access to all facilities they suspect of being involved in biological weapons activities. The US government, for instance, has alleged that Russia still maintains an offensive biological weapons program. Even without access, Koblentz said, there are ways to assess whether a country has an offensive program. The US government, for example, has accused a military facility at\u00a0Sergiev Posad\u00a0<\/a>of being part of the program. \u201cThe fact that this is a military facility, it\u2019s top secret, no outsiders are allowed in, [the] lack of transparency in itself is a tell,\u201d Koblentz said.<\/p>\n In contrast, Koblentz said, the recent Russian allegations of illegitimate biological research being conducted in Ukraine rely on publicly available information. \u201cThe Russians were putting up slides being used at scientific conferences. These researchers are publishing in peer reviewed journals, right?\u201d he said. \u201cYou don\u2019t\u00a0do that<\/a>\u00a0if you\u2019re trying to hide a secret bioweapons program in Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n How are biological weapons regulated?\u00a0<\/strong>The Biological Weapons Convention has\u00a0183 members<\/a>, called states parties. By contrast, just 10 countries have not signed or ratified the treaty. The treaty doesn\u2019t ban pathogens or the equipment like fermenters used to work with them, biosecurity expert Filippa Lentzos said at a recent event. \u201cWe\u2019re saying, \u2018You\u2019re not allowed to use it if it\u2019s not for peaceful purposes.\u2019 It comes down to intent.\u201d While the convention has helped shape norms against biological weapons,\u00a0some<\/a>\u00a0observers\u00a0point<\/a>\u00a0to a gap in the agreement, the lack of a \u201cformal verification regime to monitor compliance<\/a>.\u201d As it stands, members participate in\u00a0confidence-building measures<\/a>, for example, by sharing reports on biological research centers and biodefense initiatives. Violating the treaty, Koblentz said, doesn\u2019t necessarily come with a steep price. \u201cThe treaty itself doesn\u2019t have any real penalties and given the difficulty of proving in an unclassified way that a country is in violation\u2014it\u2019s challenging,\u201d he said. \u201cThat\u2019s been a major weakness in the whole bioweapons non-proliferation regime from the beginning.\u201d<\/p>\n Part of why the Soviet Union\u00a0proceeded to expand<\/a>\u00a0its bioweapons program after joining the Biological Weapons Convention was because officials thought that Nixon\u2019s order to end the US offensive program was a ruse and that the United States was continuing to develop offensive capabilities. Some fear that\u00a0false accusations<\/a>\u00a0about bioweapons programs, like the recent Russian disinformation, could erode trust and weaken the norm that prohibits the operation of clandestine programs. Well-documented cases of countries using bioweapons in war have been rare. But if a country were to reverse course, as the Sverdlovks anthrax leak suggests, the results could be catastrophic.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/caffa.png.webp\")
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/04\/sphere.png.webp\")