{"id":9723,"date":"2022-04-12T09:16:50","date_gmt":"2022-04-12T12:16:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=9723"},"modified":"2022-04-12T09:16:50","modified_gmt":"2022-04-12T12:16:50","slug":"el-futuro-de-los-vehiculos-blindados-requisitos-y-capacidades","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/?p=9723","title":{"rendered":"El futuro de los veh\u00edculos blindados, requisitos y capacidades"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

La efectividad de las armas antitanque utilizadas por Ucrania contra los tanques rusos plantea interrogantes sobre el futuro de los veh\u00edculos blindados. Juzgar la situaci\u00f3n militar en Ucrania y formarse una imagen precisa de las caracter\u00edsticas de la guerra es bastante dif\u00edcil debido a las operaciones de informaci\u00f3n llevadas a cabo por ambos lados del conflicto.\u00a0Sin embargo, el arma ligera antitanque de pr\u00f3xima generaci\u00f3n (NLAW), el sistema de misiles antitanque FGM-148 Javelin y el dron turco Bayraktar TB2 que usa misiles antitanque, parecen ser bastante efectivos contra veh\u00edculos rusos fuertemente blindado.<\/p>\n

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Judging the military situation in Ukraine and forming an accurate picture of the characteristics of the war is quite difficult due to the information operations carried out by both sides of the conflict. However, the next-generation light-anti tank weapon (NLAW), the FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missiles system and the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone using anti-tank missiles, appear to be quite effective against heavily armoured Russian vehicles.<\/p>\n

Contributing factors include bad Russian tactics, the failure to establish air superiority and successful and determined Ukrainian ambushes and guerrilla tactics. Notwithstanding these aspects, images and footage \u2013 sometimes unverified \u2013 showing burning and shattered tanks have reinvigorated the longstanding debate as to whether tanks and heavily armoured vehicles still have a role on the battlefield.<\/p>\n

Go modular<\/strong><\/p>\n

Prior to Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, the struggling Turkish Leopard 2A5s in Syria and American M1A1s against ISIS in Iraq showed that heavily armoured vehicles lack mobility and adaptability\u00a0and thus struggle in urban settings.<\/p>\n

A vehicle with a common chassis with several interchangeable units not only makes it deployable in various combat scenarios, but often also reduces manufacturing costs and the logistical tail on the battlefield. Although the Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) Boxer is not the first modular unit, it is one of the most famous ones. The 8\u00d78 wheeled armoured vehicle can support 16 different configurations with a payload of up to 15 tonnes.<\/p>\n

International Institute of Strategic Studies senior fellow for land warfare Ben Barry says: \u201cTaking off a physical module and putting on a new one is very easy in a garage or in an engineering shed during peacetime, but it\u2019s much more difficult in field operations in war.\u201d<\/p>\n

Though the Boxer\u2019s configurations can be changed in about an hour with adequate equipment, logistics can still prove difficult. \u201cWhat do you do with the modules you are not using? How do you carry them around the battlefield, where do you store them? What if the situation changes?\u201d Barry questions.<\/p>\n

Rheinmetall seems to have the solution. The Lynx KF41 infantry fighting vehicle unveiled in the summer of 2016 can support five mission modules. However, instead of storing them in containers waiting for deployment, the Lynx modules can be directly deployed in standard ISO containers as standalone solutions and can play an active role in combat operations.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere are other ways of looking at modularity,\u201d Barry says. \u201cWhat we\u2019ve seen over the last 20 years is a lot of modules of armour being added to vehicles. And we\u2019ve also seen modules of electronic equipment, such as air conditioners or jammers for roadside bombs.<\/p>\n

\u201cArmoured vehicles to have a modular approach to armour, electronic architecture, electronic equipment, they need an open system architecture so it\u2019s easy to add new equipment.\u201d<\/p>\n

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In 2020, the UK has committed \u00a32.8bn to deliver over 500 vehicles to the British Army. Credit: Jack Eckersley.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Don\u2019t write off tanks yet<\/strong><\/p>\n

Whether and how the war in Ukraine will influence military procurement and doctrines in other countries is difficult to tell, but seeing dozens of $10m tanks destroyed by $150,000 anti-tank weapons will certainly evoke questions about economic sustainability.<\/p>\n

However, while mechanised infantry vehicles form an essential part of any military, medium and lightly armoured, wheeled vehicles like the Boxer are even more vulnerable to a wide range of anti-tank weapons, even rudimentary ones like rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). They are also highly susceptible to the cannons with which heavy armoured vehicles are equipped.<\/p>\n

There are, however, active protective systems that can increase vehicle survivability immensely. The Rafael-made Trophy, for instance, protects the vehicle by creating a neutralisation bubble around it. The company claims the system rapidly detects, classifies and engages all known chemical energy threats, including recoilless rifles, anti-tank guided missiles, anti-tank rockets, high-explosive anti-tank rounds and RPGs. The German Army selected Trophy for the Leopard 2 main battle tank and the British Army for the new Challenger 3.<\/p>\n

The Russian military has been designing active protective systems for tanks, like the Arena-M for its -72 tanks, since the end of 90s. But active protective systems have weak points too. \u201cThey can be counted for and jammed,\u201d Barry says. \u201cBy virtue, having to have a radar and other components in the system on the outside of a tank, they can be attacked by machine guns, cannon and artillery fire too.\u201d<\/p>\n

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T-72 AMT is a modernised variant of the T-72A main battle tank that is in service with the Ukraine Armed Forces. Credit: Ukroboronprom.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Combined armed units is the key<\/strong><\/p>\n

While the tank is not the answer for everything on its own, particularly in a terrain found in Eastern Ukraine, they are the best suited for destroying other tanks and play an essential role in operations. \u201cThe silver bullet is combined arms which is tanks, infantry, including infantry travelling in armoured vehicles, engineers, including armoured engineers, artillery and mortars,\u201d Barry explains.<\/p>\n

Another reason why Ukrainians managed to ostensibly destroy so many Russian armoured vehicles is the very poor standards of combined armed forces. Footages of successful Russian tank ambushes like the one at the outskirts of Kyiv, near Brovary, suggest this too.<\/p>\n

Barry says: \u201cA US or a British tank battalion would be driving on the roads to Brovary, but when they arrive at the town, they might slow down to walking pace and then deploy their infantry to protect their armour from close attacks. When the column is attacked, they would deploy artillery.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Russians, on the other hand, appear to drive all the way and when attacked they do not seem to withdraw under cover of smoke or use any artillery to cover their withdrawal.<\/p>\n

But while people debate whether or not tanks are obsolete, \u201cthe sheer scale of devastation wreaked upon Mariupol reminds us that indirect fire is still king of the battlefield and why Russian military places such an emphasis on tube, rocket, and missile artillery,\u201d said land warfare specialist defence consultant Nicholas Drummond for the British Times newspaper.<\/p>\n

Fuente:<\/strong> https:\/\/www.army-technology.com<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La efectividad de las armas antitanque utilizadas por Ucrania contra los tanques rusos plantea interrogantes sobre el futuro de los veh\u00edculos blindados. Juzgar la situaci\u00f3n… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9724,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18,11],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9723"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=9723"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9723\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9727,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9723\/revisions\/9727"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/9724"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=9723"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=9723"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.fie.undef.edu.ar\/ceptm\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=9723"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}