El gobierno de Gran Breta\u00f1a (RUGB) ha iniciado una investigaci\u00f3n para determinar, por qu\u00e9 raz\u00f3n empresas Brit\u00e1nicas vendieron a Rusia, componentes que pueden ser empleados en sistemas y plataformas de uso militar, pese a que exist\u00eda una prohibici\u00f3n de exportaci\u00f3n de Tecnolog\u00eda a ese pa\u00eds desde el 2014, como consecuencia de la anexi\u00f3n de Crimea. La gran cantidad de material enemigo capturado por Ucrania y las pericias realizadas a los mismos, ha puesto en evidencia que no solo RUGB ha continuado exportando tecnolog\u00eda cr\u00edtica, sino que muchos otros pa\u00edses lo han hecho.\u00a0Uno de los casos\u00a0citados,\u00a0es el de los transistores de alta frecuencia\u00a0de origen UK, hallados en los\u00a0sistemas m\u00f3viles de GE\u00a0\u201cBorisoglebsk 2 jamming system\u201d. Resulta complejo disponer de controles efectivos sobre los movimientos de componentes cr\u00edticos, cuando existe una \u201cl\u00ednea difusa\u201d, por el car\u00e1cter de \u201cuso dual\u201d que muchos de estos elementos tienen, principalmente los electr\u00f3nicos, vitales e imprescindibles en los modernos sistemas de armas militares.<\/p>\n
The UK government has reportedly\u00a0launched an enquiry<\/a>\u00a0into how British-manufactured components have made their way into Russian weapons systems, despite an arms embargo being in operation since Russia annexed Crimea\u00a0in 2014<\/a>.<\/p>\n Russian material captured by Ukrainian forces has revealed a significant dependence on western-made components. Multiple UK-manufactured high-frequency transistors \u2013 \u201cdual use\u201d electronics that can be used for both military and civilian purposes \u2013 were found inside a Russian\u00a0Borisoglebsk-2 mobile jamming system<\/a>.<\/p>\n My research into\u00a0illicit procurement<\/a>\u00a0by sanctioned states for their weapons programmes shows a long history of Soviet and Russian dependence on western technologies. It also suggests that states can be highly adaptive in finding ways around barriers to the acquisition of technology from overseas and that more than just export controls are required to prevent illicit procurement.<\/p>\n A recent report by the\u00a0Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)<\/a>\u00a0has suggested that the Russian arms industry uses more western-origin components in its weapons systems than previously thought. The report notes that: \u201cRussia\u2019s latest weapons are heavily dependent upon critical specialist components manufactured abroad.\u201d It found that Ukraine\u2019s scientific establishments noted \u201ca consistent pattern\u201d across major Russian weapons systems recovered from the battlefields.<\/p>\n Many of the western components that have found their way into Russian systems are, like the UK-made transistors, classed as \u201cdual use\u201d, meaning they can be used in both military and civil applications. Civil goods are subject to lesser regulation than military goods, which has been a loophole. The UK only banned the export of dual-use goods to Russia after the current invasion had begun.<\/p>\n Other evidence also suggests that Russia has benefited from access to foreign technology without government consent over the past decade. This has included weapons, from\u00a0British sniper rifles<\/a>\u00a0used on the frontlines of the Donbas region, to goods for the country\u2019s\u00a0nuclear and missile complex<\/a>, sourced from Sweden.<\/p>\n The British government\u2019s export licensing system is used to implement the embargoes to Russia and to prevent undesirable exports. There are no specific allegations of breaches of the controls by British companies.<\/p>\n These restrictive measures put in place by Britain \u2013 alongside those by\u00a0many other states<\/a>\u00a0\u2013 do seem to have had some potentially significant effects. Ukrainian government sources\u00a0suggested in March<\/a>\u00a0that Russia\u2019s armoured vehicle plants were struggling to obtain western components. In April,\u00a0Ukrainian sources also suggested<\/a>\u00a0that similar challenges were being encountered by Russian factories producing radars and surface-to-air missiles.<\/p>\n Long history of illicit procurement<\/strong><\/p>\n When faced with arms embargoes \u2013 or other less legally formalised barriers to acquiring arms or components \u2013 sanctioned states always look for ways to circumvent them. Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union) have a long history of finding ways to access western technologies.<\/p>\n From the 1920s<\/a>, Soviet agents sought to openly acquire manufacturing equipment from western markets, as well as covertly acquiring military secrets through espionage. During the second world war,\u00a0Soviet spies obtained<\/a>\u00a0nuclear secrets from the Manhattan Project, despite extensive security measures taken to prevent such leaks.<\/p>\n There is evidence of continuing Soviet interest in western technology throughout the cold war as the Soviet Union sought to compete with the US. In 1985, as cold war high-tech competition reached its peak,\u00a0a CIA report<\/a>\u00a0noted a \u201cmassive and well organised campaign\u201d to acquire western technology illegally. The report went as far as to suggest that:<\/p>\n The assimilation of western technology is so broad that the United States and other western nations are thus subsidising the Soviet military buildup.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Closing loopholes<\/strong><\/p>\n Putin has doubled down on his war in Ukraine, despite significant troop and\u00a0equipment losses<\/a>\u00a0by the Russian military. Hindering the Russian military-industrial complex\u2019s access to international markets will help to prevent destroyed and captured equipment from being replaced, expended munitions from being replenished and damaged vehicles from being repaired.<\/p>\n Export controls can play an important role to this end. Governments, intelligence agencies and law enforcement bodies will undoubtedly increase their efforts towards preventing Russia\u2019s illicit procurement. But, as history shows, the adaptive and deceptive nature of Russia\u2019s illicit procurement networks is challenging to contend with. Those seeking to halt the supply will need to go further than merely putting in place the embargoes.<\/p>\n The US and allies should closely work with international partners and neutral states to counter Russia\u2019s use of\u00a0\u201cthird-country\u201d hubs<\/a>\u00a0to evade controls. Fully halting the flow of components could require engaging a wide range of states with varying chances of success. Re-export risks are posed by countries like India, with whom Russia has\u00a0ongoing defence equipment projects<\/a>, large markets like China that have long\u00a0been sources<\/a>\u00a0for sanctioned programmes in the past, and even pariah\u00a0states like Iran<\/a>\u00a0that continue to face international sanctions.<\/p>\n Efforts to\u00a0engage and inform industry<\/a>\u00a0at home \u2013 those who have to comply with export controls but lack intelligence on Russian evasion methods \u2013 will be key to the ability of the restrictions to bite.<\/p>\n Russia is only one of many states that have long pursued illicit procurement. The\u00a0open-source information, tools and approaches\u00a0used by researchers outside of government to understand the illicit supply chains and sanctions-busting networks of Iran, North Korea and others should be applied to shine a light on Russia\u2019s networks.<\/p>\n Government enquiries following goods ending up in enemy hands are not uncommon in Whitehall. The most extensive, the Scott enquiry, lasted for four years in the 1990s following\u00a0the \u201carms to Iraq\u201d scandal<\/a>\u00a0and led to a shake up of the British export control system.<\/p>\n One of the common takeaways from these scandals is that those inside government and those outside \u2013 industry, researchers and academics \u2013 must work together if export controls and embargoes are to be rendered effective. Only these collaborative approaches will ensure that export controls can help to undermine Putin\u2019s war machine.<\/p>\n