El desarme nuclear se trata de confianza, algo difícil de construir cuando se trata de relaciones entre adversarios. Las estados poseedores de armas nucleares (EPAN), aún cuentan con más de 15.000 de éstas, según la Federation of American Scientists. Aunque tratados como el New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty de 2010 intentan limitar estos stocks en Rusia y EEUU, ningún sistema ha sido implementado con éxito para verificar si una ojiva nuclear ha sido desmantelada sin revelar secretos de diseño, por lo cual los métodos en usos son susceptibles al engaño. R. Scott Kemp, experto en temas de política nuclear del MIT ha publicado un trabajo con lo que propone como la primera solución técnica de este problema.
The United States and Russia together retain more than 10,000 nuclear weapons, of which about 5,500 are currently designated to be removed from the stockpile. More designations are expected in the future: The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty requires both countries to reduce to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads each by February 2018, and the most recent US Nuclear Posture Review states, “The United States and Russia have deeply reduced their nuclear forces from Cold War levels, but both still retain many more nuclear weapons than needed”.
The treaties behind arms reductions typically require verification measures to assure compliance with obligations. However, despite nearly five decades of research by US and Russian laboratories, no method for verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads without unacceptable intrusiveness has been found. In the absence of a solution, past arms-control treatie s have verified the dismantlement of delivery systems instead, an effective substitute provided the majority of nuclear forces are deployed in dedicated systems. Direct verification of nondeployed war heads will ultimately be needed to certify warhead destruction, which is critical to reducing their influence on the strategic calculus and the risk of theft. Leer más >>
Fuente: http://www.pnas.org
