El informe adjunto, producido por el Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), se centra en los avances tácticos de las fuerzas rusas y ucranianas durante 2024, con el objetivo de mejorar la asistencia técnico-militar a Ucrania y asesorar a la OTAN sobre cómo adaptarse. Se basa en el trabajo de campo realizado en Ucrania a finales de 2024 y principios de 2025, que incluyó visitas a varias brigadas y unidades en los frentes de Donetsk y Sumy. El informe destaca la dinámica táctica predominante y explora aspectos emergentes de varias funciones tácticas, como el combate cuerpo a cuerpo terrestre, el apoyo de fuego, la ingeniería, el apoyo médico, la logística y las operaciones de defensa aérea.
Introduction
If a side does not achieve victory within the opening phases of a conflict, protracted warfare necessitates a continuous process of adaptation and counter-adaptation between the parties. The Russo–Ukrainian War has been consistent with this trend, such that the fighting in the first, second and third years of the war saw substantial changes in the composition of forces, equipment, tactics and relative competitive advantages of the combatants. The first year of the war was characterised by comparatively small groupings of well-equipped forces resulting in a mobile conflict. The second year saw the consolidation of areas of control and deliberate attempts to breach the line of contact, first by Russia and then by Ukraine. The third year was highly attritional, with the focus of both parties being the infliction of maximum damage on one another, rather than breakthrough. The available technology with which the war has been waged has also evolved over this period.
Fuente: https://static.rusi.org
