A fines del mes de Mayo, Rusia realizó el mayor de sus ataques aéreos con drones y misiles sobre objetivos en Ucrania, desde el inicio de la invasión en Feb 22. Se estima que se lanzaron cerca de 1.000 vectores, entre drones Shahed/ Gerán, así como misiles balísticos y de crucero. El presente trabajo de CSIS responde una serie de interrogantes acerca de: Como ha evolucionado la estrategia de ataques aéreos rusa; De que manera su Base Industrial de Defensa se ha adaptado para producir localmente y en cantidades suficientes todo tipo de vectores; La forma en que Rusia utiliza estos ataques masivos como una herramienta para “forzar la paz” según sus intereses; Como se debe preparar Ucrania para hacer frente a una estrategia de desgaste que busca además debilitar la moral de la población, sujeta a bombardeos permanentes.
Russia recently conducted its largest air attack on Ukraine, targeting Kyiv and other regions in the country and killing over 15 people and injuring dozens. The attacks, which occurred over the weekend of May 25 during stalled negotiations, were an order of magnitude higher and more deadly than previous salvos. Russia launched a record number of Shahed drones, with 355 deployed on May 25 alone. Alongside these low-cost, long-range loitering munitions, there was a significant increase in the number of Iskander ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine. Typically averaging 1–2 launches per week, 23 were reportedly fired over just two days, accompanied by more than 60 reported air-launched cruise missiles, including models like the X-101 and X-555. In total, approximately 1,000 drones and missiles were launched during this roughly three-day period, demonstrating the use of air and missile power to coerce Ukraine.
This massive attack occurred during the prisoner swap deal and an increased push for peace talks between the warring parties. This intensive campaign shows that Russia’s stockpiling of missiles and drones is increasing. In fact, the Ukrainian government estimates that Russia has a stockpile of 500 ballistic missiles, which could be used in future salvos. Moreover, Moscow appears to be adapting its tactics. There were reports that the Iskanders used new radar decoys to defeat Patriot interceptors. The Shaheds also adopted new attack profiles, including using higher altitude attack vectors and more decoys. Last, Russia appears to be using new approaches to targeting, such as using Telegram to hire local Ukrainians to mark targets.
Q1: What does Russia’s record Shahed deployment signal about its evolving air attack strategy?
A1: The record number of Shahed drones signals Russia’s concept of coercive airpower:
overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses and attack civilian targets and infrastructure to compel Kyiv to end the war. This approach also serves to wear down civilian morale and depletes resources by maintaining relentless pressure. By combining these low-cost drones with more sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles, Russia is finding new ways to wear down Ukrainian air defenses faster than domestic or Western supporters can replenish them, thus compounding the political pressure each salvo generates.
Additionally, the attacks demonstrate Russia’s successful campaign to scale up of domestic production of these drones and decoy systems. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, since September 2024, Russia has dramatically increased its Shahed drone launches from around 200 per week to over 1,000 per week by March 2025, with salvos occurring almost every other day. Over the past seven months, there has not been a single uninterrupted three-day period without a mass Shahed drone launch—mass matters. Even though Ukraine has sustained its ability to shoot down the drones at around 80–85 percent, that means 67 drones got through and hit predominantly civilian areas.
Q2: How did Russia manage to scale up its drone launches?
A2: Russia managed to scale up its drone launches primarily through expanding its domestic production of Shahed-type drones, sometimes called “Geran” in Russia. While originally designed in Iran, these drones are now manufactured at large facilities within Russia, such as the plants in Alabuga and the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant (IEMZ Kupol). To support production, Russia sources key electronic components internationally, with China as a major supplier, and reportedly continues to use smuggled Western electronics as well. The initial drone campaign benefited from importing drones directly from Iran, which provided the time Russia needed to establish indigenous manufacturing capabilities. Recently, Russia has enhanced production capacity further, particularly at the IEMZ Kupol facility, and has developed advanced variants such as the Shahed-238 loitering munition, according to reports. What should concern U.S. defense officials is that Washington cannot scale long-range attack drone production to the extent seen in Russia—despite the United States having an economy more than 10 times larger than Russia.
Q3: How will these attacks affect peace talks?
A3: The only constant in the Kremlin’s playbook is violence. Moscow is buying time for further battlefield gains. Putin signals openness to diplomacy, including pointing out Istanbul as the venue for “direct” talks. But at the same time, he orders increased drone and missile attacks and conducts a diplomatic switch, sending a low-profile delegation to peace talks.
The pattern held over the weekend. Hours after President Trump’s phone call with Putin on May 19, Russia launched its biggest air raid on Kyiv to date. The strike was calibrated violence, a reminder that the Kremlin can raise—or lower—the pain threshold at will. Trump publicly condemned the attack, but the message from Moscow was unmistakable: Battlefield momentum underwrites bargaining power.
We can expect more of the same. After Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Moscow, the Kremlin proposed a second round of direct talks. Although we can expect an increase in periodic meetings towards peace, there is no reason to assume a matching lull in missile salvos. In Putin’s strategy, sustained coercion is not a negotiating chip to be traded away as a goodwill gesture; it is the very leverage he intends to bring to the table.
Q4: How can Ukraine offset these drone attacks?
A4: Blunting Moscow’s drone blitz requires more than patchwork fixes—it demands a layered, offense-defense strategy. First is strengthening the shield. Battlespace needs more diverse interceptors: Patriot and IRIS-T batteries for high-end threats; mobile anti-drone teams and acoustic sensor grids for the low-slow flyers; and emerging capabilities like high-energy lasers to cheaply neutralize swarms. Western backers should support these efforts, along with codeveloping new capabilities with Ukrainian industry, like AI-enabled autonomous antiaircraft turrets.
Second, precision fires must reach deep—striking assembly plants, storage depots, and makeshift launch pads that power Russia’s Shahed conveyor belt. Third, Ukraine and its partners should focus on strangling the supply lines. Ukraine will need to work with allies to choke off the microelectronics trickling in from China and other enablers. Finally, disrupting the signal is critical. Increasing offensive cyber operations and electronic warfare is key so that even when a drone slips the net, its guidance goes dark, and it tumbles harmlessly from the sky.
Combined, efforts to cut supply lines and increase interception rates can blunt Russia’s coercive air and missile campaign. Even though Ukraine will not be able to stop every attack, it can reduce Moscow’s ability to use a punishment strategy as part of its larger “peace” negotiation playbook. That will make it easier for the United States and Ukraine’s other backers to create a framework for real dialogue and the type of direct talks needed to end the war.
Fuente: https://www.csis.org
