El comandante del Batallón de Sistemas No Tripulados de Azov comparte los últimos detalles sobre cómo están evolucionando las tácticas en la sangrienta región del Donbass. La Brigada Azov del Primer Cuerpo de la Guardia Nacional de Ucrania vio la necesidad de aumentar el número de drones que tenía y la gente para operarlos. Así que creó la 12.ª Brigada de Fuerzas Especiales Azov del Batallón de Sistemas No Tripulados de la Guardia Nacional de Ucrania.
Last October, the First Corps Azov Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard saw the need to increase the number of drones it had and people to operate them. So it created the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov of the Ukrainian National Guard’s Unmanned Systems Battalion. It now has several hundred troops and tens of thousands of drones ranging from first-person view (FPV) variants to heavy ‘bomber’ types. They are fighting in and around Toretsk, a now-destroyed city in Donetsk Oblast where some of the war’s fiercest battles are taking place. In a deeper dive into our nearly two-hour exclusive interview, the commander of this battalion, callsign “Yas,” shared new details about the ever-evolving use of drones in combat.
Yas addressed a huge range of issues. He told us about what is working and what is not, Russia’s new battlefield tactics, the problem with ‘dragon drones,’ how they are putting their new fixed-wing SETH drones to use, how combat is morphing to war between robots, and why he is wary of operating unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that are equipped with the ability to kill. The questions and answers have been slightly edited for clarity. You can catch up with his insights on the pros and cons of fiber-optic controlled FPV drones in our recent piece linked here.
Q: Have the Russians changed the way they are operating, and if so, how?
A: Yes, there are definitely changes. I cannot say that there are daily changes, but approximately every month, more or less, the enemy changes their tactics. And for example, we see fewer and fewer ‘meat grinder’ assaults, those cannon fodder assaults that the enemy was so famous for, and fewer motorized assaults. Instead, we see that the tactics change, and we spend more and more time trying to identify the enemy, trying to locate the enemy. So now they’re using their small group tactics. They’re infiltrating our positions, infiltrating our defense lines, and they are using our vulnerabilities. And I must say that from time to time, they do this successfully. Unfortunately, we still do not have a sufficient amount of reconnaissance drones in the air to cover every square meter of the territory. But the pilots of our reconnaissance drones do their best to detect the enemy and to carry out the main task. That is actually defined for our unmanned systems battalion, namely, to save as many lives of our infantrymen as possible and to prevent the infantry from entering combat, from entering the battle. Unfortunately, we are not always successful in carrying out this task, but we are doing our best. We are trying to create the so-called buffer zone, approximately one or two kilometers between the enemy lines and the positions of our infantry. And we mostly deal with striking the enemy’s logistics, the enemy’s communication. And in this case, we are preventing the enemy from fulfilling their aims and engaging our troops.
Q: What’s an attack that you are most proud of?
A: I’m mostly proud not of operations, but of people conducting those operations. So I do remember one of the most notable cases. Approximately one year ago, one of our men in one of the sectors destroyed a TOS-2 [thermobaric rocket launcher] system with the unmanned system. That was really notable.
Q: Anything more recent?
A: At the moment our operations have become more of a routine for us, and we just operate based on the principle that we must do this. We must get the job done. And it is quite difficult for me to single out something that is really notable for me. So even if now we have a chance to strike another TOS system, that would be just a part of our routine work. We have engaged tanks, for example. We dealt with all types of vehicles, but once again, at this particular moment, they become less and less visible. More and more concealment measures are employed, and they are usually located at larger distances, and this is why, mostly, we use more and more resources. But unfortunately, the level of efficiency decreases because the enemy also doesn’t wait for us and doesn’t stop their development.
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We didn’t really participate in any massive drone attacks, because we have quite a modest depth of operation, approximately up to 25 kilometers (about 15.5 miles) in depth. And within this area, it doesn’t really make much sense to conduct massive drone strikes. So we usually establish communication with other drone teams, and we stick to the principle that two or three drones flying to strike a target are better than only one drone for this purpose. But if we are talking about a massive deployment of drones, like 10 to 20 unmanned systems, we didn’t participate in such massive attacks, and we find this particular kind of drone usage quite inappropriate at our level.
Q: Talk about the challenges of fighting in and around Toretsk.
A: At the moment, the level of the enemy’s activity in this sector has risen, and the enemy advances. The enemy pushes our logistical capacities backwards. And over the recent one and a half months, approximately, the enemy uses the unmanned systems. Well, I cannot say whether it is at our level or better than us. That is a difficult thing to determine, but they’re using our tactics approximately the same as us, and they are also striking our logistical capacities, and this creates a significant problem for us.
Q: Are you seeing the Russians increasing the number of drones that they have and are using? And are they outpacing you yet in terms of the number of drones you’re using?
A: It is difficult to say whether they are outpacing us in terms of numbers. I can only tell you about the tactics … They deployed their drones along the front edge of the battle area, and the number was quite significant, so we felt that number quite well. But at this moment, I’m not so sure about the numbers that they deploy, but they are starting to deploy their drones more intelligently. They are selecting their high-value targets, their priority targets, and this is why it is quite difficult for me to talk about exact numbers.
Q: How many troops have you lost in this difficult fight?
A: That’s war. It is impossible to fight a war without losses, and of course, we also suffered losses. But I will not disclose the exact number of troops that we have lost. For me, personally, from my perspective, the loss of every soldier is a critical loss, just from a human side of this issue.
Q: Describe what it is like for the drone operators who carry out your missions.
A: The process is quite complex. First, we receive the drones. We send them to our workshop to be worked on by our specialists. This has now become a complete must for us. Any freshly manufactured drone still has to be refined by our specialists, because a newly manufactured drone is frequently inefficient. After our specialists work with our drones, we transport them directly to the positions where our pilots test them once more, because there can be some malfunctions due to the transportation, conditions, etcetera, etcetera. We need to make sure that the drones are completely operational.
In terms of the work of the pilots themselves, they are always monitoring their voice chat – any secure voice chat that is agreed to – and when the superior commander gives an order to lift off, they already have this drone ready. Depending on the conditions, they might have a lot of space for the drone or less space for the drone, but they always have the UAVs handy. And then a pilot switches the drone on, then gives feedback to the command that everything is fine. Then the pilot returns back to the shelter, because this creates additional protection in case, for example, there is a malfunction, or there is an explosion of the ammunition, etcetera. Only after everyone in the team takes shelter does the actual liftoff happen, and the mission starts.
Basically, the pilot flies the drone, and the pilot is assisted by the navigator, and they fulfill their orders of their superiors. The pilot is also the one who is responsible for the mechanical work, and the pilot is told what to strike and where to fly, etc. With time, of course, as pilots become more and more experienced, they have a more detailed understanding of all of the aspects. But when we have new pilots, when they are just fresh from training, usually the most important role, and this is just a philosophical thought from my side, the most important work is conducted by the navigator, because they need to have impeccable knowledge of the topography, of the terrain. They need to know all the terrain benchmarks to navigate through it. And this becomes especially important while flying long ranges.
Q: Late last year, you began to use the new SETH drone, which features a delta wing planform similar to the Russian Shahed drones. What can you tell me about this new drone?
A: They are, from time to time, called Lancet analogs. From time to time, they are called mini Shaheds. Well, I do not know why we tend to use those analogies with the Russian systems. I think that’s not really appropriate, but I must say that, in collaboration with the reconnaissance UAVs, these drones make quite a strong complex and operating together, they can ensure up to 100% probability of engaging high-value targets. But of course, that’s just what is said on paper. In practice, we have already had cases of actual combat deployment of those systems, but I’m not really ready to comment on their success at this moment. However, I would just like to say that since these systems are quite expensive – one system costs approximately several hundred thousand dollars – we need to find high-value targets for such systems.
So for example, this can be the enemy’s air defense assets. And I think that one of the interesting specificities for deployment of these unmanned systems is that the reconnaissance drone that is used in tandem with this drone, it is also used as the repeater for the strike component of the system. In general, this drone has huge potential, but still, the technology is quite raw. It still has to be refined.
Q: Talk about how the SETH drone works.
A: This drone doesn’t really detect the target … all the commands are still given by the pilot, so the pilot commands when the drone should center on the target and fly towards it, and it doesn’t have any auto-detection or auto-guidance systems … It is equipped with GPS CRPA [Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna] but that is used mainly for positioning the system, positioning the strike component, and not for guidance. As for the guidance system, it is equipped with a contrast target acquisition system so we see the picture, we indicate what exactly we need to capture as an acquired target, and after that, the guidance system comes into action.
Q: What is the range of the SETH?
A: Its range of operations is up to 40 kilometers (about 25 miles). Anything that is further than 40 kilometers is quite a questionable issue. So if, for example, you have a range of 50 kilometers (about 31 miles), it’s not a fact that it can do such distances. It also definitely depends on weather conditions, which definitely define whether we are going to get the intended results. If the weather conditions are unsatisfactory, if they are poor, then even flying 40 kilometers can be quite a problem. But the official specifications indicate that its range of operations is from 40 to 50 kilometers.
Q: What kind of warhead does it have?
A: It is equipped with a high explosive and a fragmentary warhead. Some people call it a thermobaric warhead. The payload is three kilograms (about 6.6 pounds). And I must say that this is not a lot for such a weapon. And if, for example, we try to strike heavily armored enemy vehicles, it is questionable whether this strike is going to be successful, which is why we actually hunt those targets that I have already mentioned before.
Q: Do you use so-called mothership drones as signal repeaters to extend the range of your FPV drones?
A: In terms of those mother drones that you were referring to, the technology still needs further refining, and at the moment, it is quite expensive. The highest price offer that I heard for one is approximately $200,000 and it is quite unacceptable for us to pay so much for one asset, for one function, a stable functioning operational asset. As for the repeaters, there is a misconception that they are only used to increase range. We mostly use them at the beginning to cover areas that were not covered by our radio signals, those areas that were behind the radio horizon or that were in the radio shadows. Only with the evolution of these tactics, of these technologies, with the use of more powerful carriers that could bear a huge payload and that could lift up more. We could also use higher quality parts, and with these high-quality parts, with better repeaters, we could also cover longer distances. But again, the repeaters are also not a magic pill. So there are still some challenges in using them.
As for the mother drone technology, we are currently experimenting with this technology ourselves, because we understand that for us, it is going to be cheaper to invent something ourselves than to pay for unknown assets, unknown products and unknown technologies that still need to be tested.
Q: Do you use thermite-dropping so-called dragon drones?
A: We do deploy such drones depending on the season. But I would like to mention that there is nothing very special about such drones, and their efficiency is also questionable. From time to time, you can use five drones like this within a 100-meter (about 328-foot) sector of the front line, and there will be no effect at all. But if something catches fire, then, of course, even one drone like that can be effective. But in general, if you ask me, I would like to say that they mostly have a psychological effect.
Q: Why are they not effective from a combat standpoint?
A: This combat inefficiency is caused by the fact that the majority of the incendiaries that are dropped burn out before even reaching the surface that they target. So if we talk about, let’s say, a 2.5 kilogram (about 5.5 pounds) payload, then only approximately 50% of the incendiary that is dropped actually reaches the Earth and reaches the target.
Q: What percentage of Russian targets in your sector are destroyed by drones as opposed to artillery, indirect fire, aerial munitions or other means?
A: I would like to say that, according to my conservative estimation, well, once again, we use drones more than the Russians because there is a deficit of other kinds of fires. And drones are actually the cheapest way to strike the enemy, the cheapest kind of fires that we have. And that’s also quite efficient, because, for example, if we fire one artillery shell that costs $3,000, that’s quite a lot. But we have switched to drones, and I can say about my unit that we ensured approximately 80% of all targets engaged, from our brigade, are by unmanned systems. I think that this percentage is a bit lower, but still, most of the targets struck by our fires are struck by drones.
Q: What about uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs)? How prevalent are they in your operations?
A: We use land-based systems for supply purposes, and especially for supplying medicine, including blood. We also used air drones for that as well. But in terms of land-based systems, we mostly use them for logistical purposes. The system is still under development. The technology is still quite raw, and the level of stability is not very high. We have been deploying such systems since the autumn of 2024, and now they’re more or less stable. They are quite functional and operational, but still, there are many peculiarities that still need further refinement.
For example, there are problems with the radio connection. The radio connection is now the only possible stable way to connect with the drone. No other stable connection solution has been offered as of now. As a maximum, we can use the land-based robotic systems to evacuate the bodies of our fallen brothers in arms. We have also tried to deploy them as kamikaze drones, but they didn’t show a very high level of efficiency. They usually do not reach the target. There are some problems with the radio connection, and the only way to connect to them is by using repeaters. Usually, we mount [the repeaters] on the Mavic drones. And we also do not have a first-person view video from the land-based system, so we can only observe and control the land-based systems by observing them from the Mavic drone, from the repeater drone, and the need to continually charge the repeater drone and fly back and forth slows down the operation. And because of that, the operation can last from two hours to the whole night, for example.
Q: Do you use ground drones with machine guns or other kinetic systems?
A: We do not use such systems with mounted fires on them, because this is actually the area where I am afraid of the friendly fire … These systems can have unexpected behavior, and this is why they are still waiting for further refinement of the technology. But we cannot rely on systems collected from Chinese parts to provide us with reliable combat solutions. So until the state introduces some kind of standards, some kind of mandatory requirements for such systems, we cannot talk about steady combat solutions. And I think that even then, we won’t have an ultimate guarantee that such systems won’t harm our units, our troops.
Q: Do you envision a future where combat will be between drones and humans will just be hiding out, operating them?
A: We are actually moving towards that. We gradually move towards that, and not because we want that, but mostly because we are short on human resources. And we are moving towards the situation where we have, like, several unmanned systems that can be operated by one person who is in the shelter, that is safe. We are gradually moving towards the principle that the life of one soldier, one human, is considered to be of much higher value than any piece of equipment, no matter how high value it is. And maybe we are transitioning to those principles of unmanned system usage way too fast, and that is why we also suffer a lot of losses that maybe could be avoided. But maybe that’s also for the better, because at the moment, we are making a lot of mistakes that our successors would be able to learn from.
Q: What kind of mistakes?
A: I think that we are currently in the state of the so-called technological rush, and we are trying to implement the unmanned systems as fast as possible, and we are deploying our unmanned systems units with the same level of intensity as our infantry units. And when people are tired, when they’re exhausted, they can make mistakes, and from time to time, unfortunately, these mistakes can lead to lethal consequences. Fortunately that these cases are not very frequent, but still, they happen.
Q: Are you talking about fratricide?
A: If we see fratricide as the damage that is dealt to that very crew that operates this drone. From time to time, when some experimental systems are tested, then this may lead to the injury of the operators, and the problems may be related both to the drones themselves and also the explosives that are used.
Fuente: https://www.twz.com
