En la UE, los programas de financiación distinguen claramente entre investigación civil y militar, como lo demuestra el actual programa Horizonte Europa -el programa marco de investigación e innovación en Europa para el período 2021-2027-, en el que solo la investigación centrada exclusivamente en aplicaciones civiles puede optar a financiación. La investigación militar se financia mediante un instrumento independiente, el Fondo Europeo de Defensa (FED), creado en 2017.
Both European states and the European Union (EU) are trying to accelerate and support national rearmament and military modernization plans. As part of this, they are seeking to harness research and innovation from the civilian sector and increase engagement with actors beyond the traditional arms producers, including research organizations—whether universities, research institutes or ‘spin-offs’ (companies founded by researchers to turn knowledge results into commercial products; also referred to as spin-outs). This has led to increased funding for so-called dual-use by design research: research in which both civilian and military applications are considered and enabled from the outset.
Efforts to incentivize dual-use by design research are largely under development and still being debated. It is therefore a good time to consider the questions raised by this shift—not least about the expanding ways in which research organizations are being drawn into military production processes, and what this means for export controls and for organizations whose work is characterized by international research collaboration and openness.
This topical backgrounder examines how the increase in dual-use by design research blurs the traditional distinction between publicly funded civilian and military research in Europe. It highlights proliferation, diversion and misuse risks that the growth in dual-use by design research could bring, explores five challenges that need to be addressed in order for export controls to play a meaningful role in mitigating those risks, and stresses the need for a broader and more integrated governance framework.
The traditional distinction between civilian and military research in Europe
While the United States has a history of military and intelligence agencies funding fundamental and applied research that considers and enables both military and civilian uses, in Europe dual-use by design research has been far less common. Instead, many European states have tended to fund military research that involves a restricted group of research institutes and universities, which takes place within separate ecosystems from civilian research.
In the EU, funding programmes clearly distinguish between civilian and military research, as exemplified by the current Horizon Europe—the framework programme for research and innovation in Europe for the period 2021–27, under which only ‘research with an exclusive focus on civil applications’ is eligible for funding. Military research is funded through a separate instrument, the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017. EDF-funded projects have included research organizations as partners and, in a small number of cases, consortium leads, in collaborative European military research projects.
The separation of civilian and military research is not only a matter of funding. Some universities and research institutes have taken steps to limit or actively disassociate their research from any connection with the military. For example, the 1954 convention establishing the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) states that it ‘shall have no concern with work for military requirements’. A majority of universities in Germany and some in Spain have adopted so-called civil clauses, which are commitments to perform research only for peaceful or ‘non-hostile’ purposes. Many of them did so in the early 2000s, when funding for military research was increasing.
While dual-use by design research has not been prevalent in Europe, even research exclusively focused on civilian uses can involve goods and technologies that have unintended applications in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other military uses.
To address proliferation, diversion and misuse risks associated with transfers of military and dual-use items, including in research contexts, states have developed export control measures. Export controls legally require research organizations, like companies, to request an authorization before exporting military items or dual-use items that could be used to produce, develop or deploy WMD or conventional military equipment.
Many states and the EU have also taken steps towards adopting research security policies and guidelines, usually in collaboration with academia and research institutes, to safeguard against the broader range of security risks related to international research collaboration.
Export control and research security policy frameworks are complemented by mechanisms that some research organizations have set up themselves, such as ethics committees and internal human rights policies. Many also use and apply the concept of responsible research and innovation to help identify and mitigate the humanitarian and strategic risks related to the development, diffusion and use of research activities.
Policy incentives for dual-use by design research
In recent years, both the EU and individual European states have launched, or at least discussed, policy initiatives to encourage or incentivize dual-use by design research. Their justifications include strengthening economic security and driving technological innovation in emerging technology areas—from artificial intelligence (AI) to quantum and hypersonic technologies—that they increasingly view as strategic and in which research organizations are at the cutting edge of research and development. Another of the main drivers has been European rearmament plans. Lessons from Ukraine’s military innovation processes, which have systematically integrated civilian technologies into military procurement processes—particularly when it comes to drone warfare capabilities—have been an important influence.
The dual-use by design approach was mentioned in the 2025 European Preparedness Union Strategy and further detailed in two EU Commission reports drafted by independent groups of experts on why a dual-use by design approach is needed and how it might look.
Some EU states, including Germany and Sweden, have taken more explicit steps towards incentivizing dual-use by design research than their peers by proposing initiatives to strengthen cooperation between civilian and military research ecosystems. That said, current and expected policy changes at the national and European levels will have implications across Europe.
In parallel, there have been calls in Germany from policymakers and in parliament to remove or redesign the civil clauses adopted by German research organizations, which are seen as an obstacle to increasing dual-use by design research. A court case in Bavaria concluded in March 2026 that while the State of Bavaria could not oblige universities to cooperate with the military establishment, it could nevertheless prohibit civil clauses. Meanwhile, some research organizations are considering removing the clause themselves.
Increased funding for dual-use by design research
Policy initiatives are leading in turn to changes in existing civilian and military research funding mechanisms and to the creation of new mechanisms dedicated to dual-use by design research.
Several existing funding mechanisms for civilian research have already been adapted to enable dual-use by design research. A December 2025 EU regulation (Regulation 2025/2653) incentivizing investment to support implementation of the ReArm Europe Plan includes modifications to a range of existing funding instruments designed to facilitate and encourage investment in dual-use and military research and innovation.
One of the instruments it modifies is the European Innovation Council (EIC) Accelerator, which funds critical emerging technology innovation close to commercialization. The regulation creates a targeted exception to the ‘exclusive focus on civil applications’ principle in order to remove investment barriers for military and dual-use start-ups. While the EIC Accelerator is not open to non-profit entities, it is relevant for research spin-offs.
The regulation also modifies the Digital Europe Programme, established in 2021, to stress that support to dual-use actions is ‘a general and specific objective of the instrument’. The programme funds research and innovation in areas such as supercomputing, AI, cybersecurity and semiconductors, and includes many projects that are led by research organizations.
Further changes to major civilian research funding streams are also being considered. The most significant anticipated change is contained in the European Commission’s July 2025 proposal for a new iteration of Horizon Europe for the period 2028–34. The proposal, which has reportedly received positive feedback from member states, suggests that the scope of Horizon Europe be broadened to allow it to ‘support dual-use actions’. It thus goes beyond the ‘options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential’ outlined in a 2024 European Commission white paper.
Military funding streams have also been created for or adapted to dual-use by design research. The NATO Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), operational since 2023, is designed to accelerate dual-use innovation capacity in ‘deep technology’ areas. Research organizations are not only participating in the programme but also becoming accelerator sites, acting as hubs in different countries. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Defence has recently made funds available for the creation of dual-use research spin-offs to focus on technology development with both civilian and military applications. The Swedish armed forces put out a joint call with the national innovation agency Vinnova in 2024 for proposals to strengthen synergies between civilian companies and universities and the military sector on technology innovation.
New proliferation, diversion and misuse risks
Research organizations and others have highlighted the many questions and risks raised by the shift towards dual-use by design research. These range from ethical concerns and calls for civil clauses to be strengthened, to doubts about the feasibility of dual-use by design given the very different processes for developing and procuring military and security technology on the one hand and civilian technology on the other. Other organizations have stressed the possible negative impacts for scientific progress if funding is redirected away from (purely) civilian funding programmes.
Beyond this, the growth of dual-use by design research could increase the risk of military- and security-relevant knowledge and technologies falling into the hands of unintended end users or used in ways that violate human rights or international humanitarian law, which in turn could pose national security risks. Reports by national intelligence services indicate that knowledge in emerging technology areas with potential military applications is highly sought after by state and non-state actors for military and proliferation purposes. As funding pathways enable more research organizations to conduct dual-use by design research, the number of actors developing military- and security-relevant knowledge will increase, multiplying the possible avenues through which diversion could occur.
Research areas that pose misuse concerns include research in technologies that could be integrated into military or security systems that are then used to commit human rights or international humanitarian law violations. Such concerns have, for example, recently been flagged over research into surveillance technologies, such as facial recognition technology and AI-enabled computer vision capabilities.
Five challenges for export controls stemming from dual-use by design research
Export controls play an important role in addressing risks of proliferation, diversion and misuse. They do this by regulating the transfer of military and certain dual-use items and by requiring exporters to establish internal compliance programmes (ICPs) to ensure they fulfil their obligations. However, current developments in dual-use by design research pose several challenges for export controls to achieve their full potential in this area. Five of these are explored below.
1. Distinguishing between the multiple meanings of ‘dual-use’
A first challenge is that the term ‘dual-use’ is used to mean different things. In the context of export controls, ‘dual-use’ refers to civilian goods, software and technology that have potential applications in conventional military or WMD programmes. These are controlled either by virtue of being included in control lists or in relation to specific end uses and end users. Although dual-use by design research refers to research in which both civilian and military applications are considered and enabled from the outset, research funded under dual-use by design calls is not automatically covered by export controls.
Another distinction and potential source of confusion is that ‘dual-use by design’ and other similar terms can refer to research with very different levels of ‘defence proximity’, potentially requiring very different safeguarding measures. For example, military funding streams may be more likely to fund dual-use by design research with direct military applications, while civilian funding streams may focus on funding research that commits to considering, although not necessarily pursuing, potential military applications.
2. Interpreting and applying export control exemptions for ‘basic scientific research’
Within the EU, export controls exempt basic scientific research—research ‘not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective’—from their coverage. However, there remains a lack of clarity and consistency in how this term is applied.
Available guidance on ICPs published by the EU and states identifies the nine ‘technology readiness levels’ (TRLs; used to assess the maturity of a technology) as one of the tools that can be used to help determine when a specific item has developed beyond ‘basic scientific research’, far enough to be controlled. Research at TRLs 1 and 2 is in most cases exempt from export controls. However, this metric may be less meaningful with a dual-use by design approach, as it means low-TRL research may already consider and enable a range of military and civilian uses. States need to consider the conditions under which the basic scientific research exemption does or does not apply in relation to dual-use by design research, and this could be clarified in new or updated guidance.
3. Engaging the growing number and types of actors involved in security- and military-relevant research
European states and the EU have made increasing efforts in recent years to provide guidance and conduct or facilitate outreach to research organizations on export controls. Despite this, there remains a disparity within most states in terms of the adoption of ICPs in research organizations, and export control compliance challenges remain across organizations.
Research spin-offs can be far more numerous and far harder to map and reach, as they are not always directly attached to larger organizations or innovation hubs. The increase in the number and types of actors potentially subject to export controls under a dual-use by design approach means licensing authorities will need to strengthen export control outreach strategies—and resources—in order to engage with them. Licensing authorities could also consider providing guidance tailored for the different types of actors, including research spin-offs.
4. Creating stronger links between export control authorities and funding agencies
Throughout Europe, funding agencies that until recently mainly supported civilian research are increasingly offering funding for dual-use by design research. These agencies are in the process of strengthening their awareness of, and provision of guidance on, security issues, including research security. However, specific awareness of export controls remains lower among them, which can lead to a lack of specific guidance on export control considerations, including in funding application forms.
Creating stronger links between export control authorities and funding agencies could help to ensure that, where relevant, funding agencies add requirements under which organizations can receive funding to conduct dual-use by design research. At the application stage, they could, for example, develop security questionnaires that include specific export control-related questions or, where relevant, make the allocation of funds conditional on having an ICP for export controls in place. Strengthening exchanges between funding agencies and export control licensing authorities could also help to clarify the respective meanings of ‘dual-use’ in different policy and funding initiatives.
5. Coordinating the use of export controls and research security
In recent years, states have expanded the scope of export controls in emerging technology areas where research organizations are active, including quantum computers and additive manufacturing equipment and technologies. Dual-use by design research is likely to enter new and expanding areas that can pose proliferation, diversion and misuse risks. States should consider cases where know-how and items resulting from dual-use by design research that currently fall below the thresholds of export control regulations should be added to the control lists because of their potential military uses.
The rapidly emerging research security measures and associated guidelines being developed at national and EU levels, most of which do not establish legally binding obligations but rather call for proportionate risk mitigation frameworks, could provide an opportunity to address risks in areas with lower defence proximity and yet viewed as sensitive by states. States should coordinate and decide when each policy tool is best suited to addressing risks related to dual-use by design research.
A broader and more integrated governance framework is needed
Funding for dual-use by design research is only one of the avenues through which research organizations are being incentivized to play a bigger role in military production processes. There is also more funding for military research available. And, while this backgrounder has focused on publicly funded research, research organizations also receive significant and growing amounts of funding from companies and other private donors. Such funding could be used to encourage dual-use by design research and may be much more challenging to track and attach requirements to than public funding.
Export controls can play an important role in mitigating proliferation, diversion and misuse risks related to dual-use by design research if the challenges above are addressed. However, export controls are only one measure of an effective governance framework for military- and security-relevant research. An effective framework will need to include stronger coordination between export controls and policy in other areas, such as research security, that states are adopting or strengthening to protect technology and research. It will also require stronger links between the policies that seek to address risks and those that seek to encourage dual-use by design research, to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place. Finally, the framework will require the active involvement of research organizations themselves, to strengthen bottom-up responsible research and innovation and due diligence processes.
Fuente: https://www.sipri.org
